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Résumé 
 
 
La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » 
dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes 
conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre 
étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de 
liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les 
conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches 
juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, 
comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et 
troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté 
de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse 
approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent 
irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de 
conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union 
Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre 
hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation 
entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de 
la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mots clés : Droit constitutionnel – liberté de conscience et religion – Canada – 
Convention Européenne des droits de l’Homme – États-Unis – Droit comparé
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Abstract 
 
 
Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, 
also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the 
collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European 
constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will 
examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from 
the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion 
is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to 
enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in 
and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the 
relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as 
well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom 
of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the 
European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We 
hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of 
conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of 
religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Constitutional law – Freedom of conscience and religion – Canada – 
European Convention on Human Rights – United States – comparative law 
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Introduction 
 
 
Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are constitutionally 
recognised as fundamental freedoms by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1. However, their history and protection predate that point. In an effort to 
better understand and conceptualise the current – and future – relationship between 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, I have chosen to explore the 
tensions that exist, subsist and resist appeasement. To explore involves the 
following, according to the Oxford Dictionary: 
 
1 travel through (an unfamiliar area) in order to learn about it.  
2 inquire into or discuss in detail.  
3 evaluate (a new option or possibility).  
4 examine or scrutinize by searching through or touching.2  
  
Exploring freedom of conscience and religion entails a similar exercise, since 
I will travel through anthropological and sociological interpretations of religion in 
order to better understand how religion is perceived in law; I will inquire into how 
religion is conceived in law and how it affects its sister provision of freedom of 
conscience; I will then evaluate the right to freedom of conscience in an effort to 
develop an enhanced view of this fundamental freedom; finally, I will scrutinise 
freedom of conscience from a comparative perspective, enabling me to seek out 
alternative interpretations of this freedom.  
 
My master’s thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will argue 
that a better understanding of religion in law can be achieved by examining religion 
out of law. I will draw on different definitional philosophies of religion found in the 
fields of sociology and anthropology in order to form an understanding of religion; in 
a second movement, I will examine various approaches to defining religion in law, 
                                               
1
 The primacy of the Constitution of Canada is guaranteed by s. 52(1) of the Constitutional 
Act of Canada, which states that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada. 
Freedom of conscience and religion is protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.) 1982, c. 11 [Canadian Charter], s. 2a). 
2
 COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, “Explore”, 3rd ed. rev. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, online: http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/explore?view=uk (site last 
accessed 18.12.2009). 
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directing us ultimately to what constitutes “freedom of religion”. In studying religion 
out of law, the role of the community is greatly emphasised and valued, which 
constitutes the foremost difference with religion in law. Three approaches to defining 
religion in law are also proposed, setting the stage for our comparative constitutional 
analysis of Canada, the United States and the decisions under article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. I posit that the Supreme Court of Canada 
has espoused a definition of freedom of religion that straddles the subjective-
functional and substantive-content approaches since Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem3, demonstrating the inherent difficulty of defining religion in law. In practice, 
this means that both religion and religious belief have been defined, constituting a 
coloured framework approach to freedom of religion. Adding to this difficulty is the 
qualification of its relationship with its relationship with its sister provision of freedom 
of conscience in Canada.  
 
The second chapter will examine freedom of religion, also known as the ‘first 
freedom’ in Canadian constitutional law. The study of freedom of religion should be 
understood as the backdrop to my analysis of freedom of conscience. In this sense, I 
will attempt to redress the composition of freedom of religion and freedom of 
conscience in an effort to better understand these two fundamentally interrelated 
freedoms. I have elected to study freedom of religion in three successive waves: 
first, before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights; second, under the 
Canadian Bill of Rights; lastly, after the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Moreover, the accommodation as well as the proportionality of one’s 
freedom of religion is also addressed. Freedom of religion, as it shall be 
demonstrated, has engendered a re-positioning of individual and community 
interests as well as a reinterpretation of the justifications leading to the safeguarding 
of these beliefs.  
 
The third chapter will study how freedom of conscience has been understood 
in the Canadian constitutional context. Freedom of conscience has been explained in 
the case law as either signifying the absence of autonomy of freedom of conscience 
or as a synonym related to free choice and personal autonomy. Freedom of 
                                               
3
 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [Amselem]. 
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conscience, as a fundamental freedom, has yet to find its own voice in the broader 
discourse on freedom of conscience and religion. Drawing on Canadian legal 
literature, however, I construct an understanding of freedom of conscience based on 
a scale with freedom of religion; this position differs from the case-law interpretation 
of freedom of conscience. In this way, all authors attribute a certain role to freedom 
of conscience, whether it be lesser than, equivalent to, or broader than freedom of 
religion. I will argue that recognising freedom of conscience as equivalent to freedom 
of religion constitutes its optimal interpretation in the Canadian constitutional context. 
Through this examination of freedom of conscience, the interdependence of that 
freedom with freedom of religion provides its strongest rallying point and justifies 
further analysis. 
 
The final chapter will analyse freedom of conscience through the comparative 
lenses of American and European case law and legal literature. This comparative 
approach will, in my view, enhance the understanding of freedom of conscience in 
the Canadian constitutional context. The European perspective on freedom of 
conscience seems to rely on both religious and secular conceptions of conscience. 
Alternatively, freedom of conscience is not recognised in the American Constitution 
or through its Amendments; it has served instead to demonstrate what should be 
included in a claim of religion rather than a claim of conscience. Within comparative 
legal literature, freedom of conscience has been afforded marginally more place than 
within the comparative case law. Freedom of conscience, as understood in the 
American constitutional experience, remains secondary to the all-pervasive nature of 
free exercise. The European perspective has revealed an imbalance between the 
rates at which freedom of conscience has developed in the legal literature 
perspective versus the case law. In this sense, freedom of conscience has been 
suggested as a flexible tool for re-imagining, reinterpreting and reclaiming the 
relationship not only between the individual and the community, but also between 
minorities and the majority group.  
 
In fact, my exploration and consequent analysis of freedom of conscience 
and freedom of religion lead me to conclude that both freedoms draw from multiple 
legal and social science sources concurrently, engaging at once the individual and 
the community and revealing the underlying philosophical discourses in Canada. By 
  4   
 
 
legally constructing freedom of religion from both the perspective of the individual as 
well as the religious institution and conceptualising freedom of conscience as relating 
to the absence or presence of personal autonomy and free choice, a call is put 
forward for a more contextual approach to these fundamental freedoms within to the 
Canadian constitutional discourse.   
  5 
Chapter I. Theoretical Conceptions of Religion: Toward a Better 
Understanding In and Out of Law 
 
Introduction 
 
 Freedom of religion has often been seen as the “first” freedom afforded. 
Granting missionaries secure passage, offering minorities a safe haven to practice 
and decidedly, reflecting a society’s makeup, all constituted rationales for protecting 
that freedom. Indeed, freedom of religion has played an increasingly central role in 
understanding the interactions of groups and individuals. Nevertheless, one may be 
tempted to ask the following: who establishes or defines religion? According to what 
criteria? When were these standards devised? Where were these conditions 
documented? Why are these norms recognised? And finally, how were these 
principles acknowledged? Although not purporting to answer these vast questions, I 
am rather underlining the breadth of this freedom. I shall turn my attention more 
particularly to a related perspective, namely, how does the interpretation of religion, 
both in and out of law, affect its relationship with its sister provision of freedom of 
conscience in Canada? 
 
 Given the recent case law in Canada, it becomes all the more important to 
understand how one might interpret freedom of religion. Within the Canadian 
constitutional context, the Supreme Court of Canada has seemingly espoused a 
definition of freedom of religion that straddles the subjective-functional and 
substantive-content approaches since Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem4. At issue in 
                                               
4
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 39, 46. See also Congregation of the Followers of the Rabbis of 
Belz to Strengthen Torah c. Val-Morin (Municipalité de), 2008 QCCA 577 (application for 
leave to appeal dismissed, No. 32663, 25 September 2008, 2008 CanLII 48619 (S.C.C.)) 
[Rabbis of Belz]; Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, [2007] 3 R.C.S. 607 [Bruker]; A.C. v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30 [A.C.]; and Alberta v. 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony]. 
Our position differs from the conclusions of authors Ahdar and Leigh, who suggest a 
substantive-content approach (Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal 
State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 119 and Lori Beaman, who suggests that 
although we start with a substantive-content approach, we come out with a subjective-
functional approach to religion in law at the end: see Lori G. Beaman, “Defining Religion: The 
Promise and the Peril of Legal Interpretation” in Richard Moon, ed., Law and Religious 
Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008), 192 at 194 [Beaman, “Defining 
Religion”]. 
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Amselem was whether Orthodox Jews could erect succahs5 on their balconies in 
pursuance to their religious beliefs but contrary to the declaration of co-ownership. 
The majority of the Supreme Court defined “religion”6 and developed at the same 
time a test based on the sincerity of the claimant’s beliefs7.  
 
Decided a few years later, Bruker dealt with the refusal of the husband to give 
his wife a get, a divorce under Jewish law (Halakhic law) after obtaining a divorce 
under civil law8, and this, despite the fact that a standing agreement had been 
negotiated, known as the Consent to Corollary Relief. When the sincerity (or lack 
thereof) of the husband’s religious beliefs9 was balanced with the wife’s “ability to live 
her life fully as a Jewish woman in Canada”10, the majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the breach in the husband’s rights was inconsequential11. In doing so, the 
test for freedom of religion became more objective, rather than subjective12.  
 
The scope of freedom of religion was again questioned in A.C., where a child 
of fourteen years and ten months wished to refuse a blood transfusion on the basis 
of her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. This case unequivocally illustrates 
                                               
5
 The succah is explained as follows in Amselem, supra note 3, at ¶ 5: “A succah is a small 
enclosed temporary hut or booth, traditionally made of wood or other materials such as 
fastened canvas, and open to the heavens, in which, it has been acknowledged, Jews are 
commanded to “dwell” temporarily during the festival of Succot, which commences annually 
with nightfall on the fifteenth day of the Jewish month of Tishrei. This nine-day festival, which 
begins in late September or early- to mid-October, commemorates the 40-year period during 
which, according to Jewish tradition, the Children of Israel wandered in the desert, living in 
temporary shelters.” 
6
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 39. 
7
 Ibid, ¶ 56. 
8
 The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), was reformed in 1990 following the alliance 
of B’Nai Brith, the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian Coalition of Jewish Women 
for the Get. The reform, as illustrated through article 21.1 of the Divorce Act, now provided 
the opportunity for either side to initiate proceedings and submit an affidavit to remove the 
barriers to religious remarriage. The reform was therefore aimed at protecting Jewish women 
who found themselves in a problematic divorce situation and ultimately help them toward 
obtaining a get (Jewish divorce). 
9
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 78-79. 
10
 Ibid, ¶ 93. 
11
 The majority did not discern any errors in the assessment of damages by the trial judge 
and therefore elected to leave them undisturbed: Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 97-99. According to 
the minority position, damages would not have been awarded, since the issue of this case 
falls outside the jurisdiction of civil courts: Ibid, ¶ 177-180. 
12
 Ibid, ¶ 68-70. 
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7 
the Court’s admission that there is no “eureka moment”13 delineating the child from 
the adolescent, dividing between those who are in need of protection from harm from 
those who have the capacity to understand its effects14.  
 
Most recently in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, new regulations 
regarding the issuing of photographs with all drivers’ licenses15 were instituted by the 
Albertan government, upsetting a careful balance that had existed with the Hutterian 
Brethren for the last thirty years16. The Brethren believed that graven images, such 
as those obtained by the process of photography, would contravene the Second 
commandment17. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that “the Charter 
guarantees freedom of religion, but does not indemnify practitioners against all costs 
incident to the practice of religion.”18 In examining the deleterious effects of such 
legislation, McLachlin C.J. (writing for the majority) admits that there is no “magic 
barometer” to measure the implication of a particular limit on a religious practice: 
“[r]eligion is a matter of faith, intermingled with culture.”19  
 
The past five years have indeed provided much food for thought for freedom 
of religion; many questions have also been elicited, many of them still unanswered. 
In light of this, our understanding of religion in law can arguably be aided by an 
examination of religion out of law and more particularly, within the realm of the social 
sciences.   
 
 My study of freedom of religion will begin by examining the mechanisms 
involved in defining a concept. I will draw on different definitional philosophies of 
religion in order to form a more complex understanding of religion and, in a second 
                                               
13
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 4. 
14
 Ibid, ¶ 108, 111. 
15
 Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, s. 14(1)(b) (am. 
Alta. Reg. 137/2003, s. 3 
16
 The Hutterian Brethren had benefited from an exemption, obtaining a Code G license, 
which was a non-photo license and could be obtained at the discretion of the Registrar for 
religious objectors. 
17
 “You shall not make for yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on 
the earth beneath or in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4): Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 29. 
18
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 95. 
19
 Ibid, ¶ 89, 90.  
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movement, of freedom of religion. I will then present three ways of thinking about 
religion: first, by looking at the ‘essence’ of religion as explained by Max Weber (1.1); 
second, by examining the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane as argued 
by Émile Durkheim (1.2); and third, by understanding religion as cultural system as 
suggested by Clifford Geertz (1.3). While I admit that these interpretations of religion 
cannot entirely be transposed into a legal setting20, they nevertheless represent a 
necessary step to enrich the law’s understanding of freedom of religion.  
 
In a second part, I will turn to contemporary legal authors in order to 
appreciate the difficulty of not only defining religion, but defining religion in law. 
Three distinct approaches to defining religion in law have been suggested21: first, the 
subjective-functional approach, which places the emphasis on the individual (2.1); 
second, the substantive-content approach, focusing primarily on identifying the 
characteristics of religion (2.2); third, the so-called “Strasbourg approach”, which 
follows the provision set out by the European Convention on Human Rights (2.3). 
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of these various approaches to defining 
religion in law will be discussed, as will alternative conceptions of religion in law. 
 
1. Defining Religion in Life: Religion through the Lens of Anthropology and 
Sociology 
 
“Every definition is dangerous.”22 
 
Erasmus 
 
                                               
20
 Author Benjamin Berger has explained that “law has no choice but to conceive of religion in 
terms cognizable within constitutional liberalism” and has argued for the relationship between 
law and religion to be reconceived, namely as the interaction of two cultural systems: see 
Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture”, (2007) 45(2) Osgoode Hall L.J. 277, 
at 281 [Berger, “Law’s Religion”] and Benjamin Berger, “Understanding Law and Religion 
as Culture: Making Room for Meaning in the Public Sphere” (2006) 15(1) Const. Forum 
Const. 15 [Berger, “Understanding Law”].  
21
 I will build on the approaches offered by Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4. 
22
 Rodney Stark and Charles Young Glock, Patterns of Religious Commitment, American 
Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968), 
11 as cited in George C. Freeman, “The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 
“Religion””, (1982-1983) 71 Geo. L.J. 1519, at 1519 [Freeman, “Misguided Search”]. 
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 How does one define the act of definition? Author Aldo Antonelli explains that 
the classical theory of definition ‘captures’ the true nature of what is being defined23. 
Applied to religion, however, the task becomes inherently more complex, since the 
subject spans both time and disciplines. This classical approach to defining 
underlines the difficulty of capturing the true nature of religion; identifying techniques 
– who, what, when, where, why and how – further illustrate the intricacies of religion.  
 
 Defining religion has never been a task for the faint of heart. While it is 
wholeheartedly acknowledged that this topic merits its own study24, I intend to limit 
myself to a few overarching ideas in order to establish a broad interdisciplinary 
framework on religion. At the same time, I also recognise that my very attempt at 
definition might reveal a bias; this issue will be addressed further on in the study. I 
will successively and briefly examine the positions of theorists Max Weber, Émile 
Durkheim and Clifford Geertz. I suggest that these social science approaches to 
religion may, and will, enhance our awareness of the ramifications of defining religion 
in law.  
 
1.1 The ‘Essence’ of Religion 
 
 Best known for his contributions to the fields of sociology and economics at 
the turn of the twentieth century, Max Weber challenged perceptions of society with 
unparalleled scientific rigour. In his work Economy and Society: an Outline of 
Interpretative Sociology, Weber explains indirectly that a given religious conception’s 
                                               
23
 Aldo G. Antonelli, “Definition” in E. Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
(London, Routledge, 1998). Retrieved February 20, 2009, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y057: “A ‘‘definition’’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s 
essence’ (Aristotle). Historically, philosophers have come to distinguish these ‘real’ definitions 
from ‘nominal’ definitions that specify the meaning of a linguistic expression rather than 
signify the essential nature of an object, ‘making another understand by Words, what Idea, 
the term defined stands for’ (Locke).” 
24
 The study of defining religion has been tackled effectively and methodologically by various 
authors: See Jan G. Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk, eds., The Pragmatics of Defining 
Religion: Contexts, Concepts and Contests (Leiden (Netherlands), Koninklijke Brill NV, 
1999); Arthur L. Greil and David R. Bromley, Defining Religion: Investigating the Boundaries 
Between the Sacred and the Secular, Religion and the Social Order coll. (London, JAI, 2003); 
Victoria S. Harrison, “The Pragmatics of defining religion in a multi-cultural world” (2006) 59 
Int’l J. Phil. Rel. 133. 
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endurance – and by extension its acceptance – depends most importantly on 
personal experiences25: 
 
“To define ‘religion’, to say what it is, is not possible at the start of a presentation 
such as this. Definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study. 
The essence of religion is not even our concern, as we make it our task to study the 
conditions and effects of a particular type of social behaviour.”26 
 
Max Weber’s choice not to define religion requires that we stop and ask ourselves 
whether religion should or should not be defined. Perhaps it is not a question of 
rituals, practices and beliefs but rather about the “essence of religion”. Author Alan 
Aldridge, in his recent edition of Religion in a Contemporary World, addresses critics’ 
concerns about Weber’s stance on religion27, concluding that a Weberian 
interpretation would focus on “conditions and effects” of religion rather than the 
formal act of defining religion. Max Weber’s perspective on religion is founded, 
therefore, not on the basis of pre-determined content, but rather on the 
consequences of those beliefs on society. This is not to say that religion is 
unimportant – rather it is a question of how one should approach this type of ‘social 
behaviour’.  
 
 Weber’s understanding of religion could be qualified as experiential: by 
focusing on the outcomes of religious beliefs rather than their definition, Weber was 
indeed evaluating the impact of religion on society as a whole. By examining the 
essence of religion, both the individual and the collective become engaged in the 
discourse on religion. 
 
                                               
25
 Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretative Sociology (edited by 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich; translated by Ephraim Fischoff et al., New York, 
Bedminster Press, 1978), 403 
26
 Ibid, 399 [my emphasis] 
27
 Alan E. Aldridge, Religion in the Contemporary World: A Sociological Introduction, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, Polity, 2007), 30-31. Specifically, the author addresses the critique of Weber’s 
interpretation of religion on several grounds at the same pages: “First, is it true that a formal 
definition of religion is indispensable? […] Second, any formal definition of religion is bound 
to contain theoretical assumptions that are contentious. […] Third, sociologists should ask: 
who is demanding a definition, why, and with what consequences? […] Fourth, society 
changes and religion changes with it.” 
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1.2 The Dichotomy between the Sacred and the Profane 
 
 Émile Durkheim, known as the “father” of modern French sociology28 as well 
as a contemporary of Max Weber’s, focussed on the interactions between the 
individual and the ‘collective’. However, unlike Weber, Durkheim put forth a 
preliminary definition of religion. He opined that religion should be defined by 
distinguishing the sacred from the profane29. Religion could be understood as   
 
“un système solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives à des choses sacrées, 
c'est-à-dire séparées, interdites, croyances et pratiques qui unissent en une même 
communauté morale, appelée Église, tous ceux qui y adhèrent. »30  
 
While it might be difficult to conceive of religion in such categorical terms of “sacred” 
and “forbidden”, Durkheim provided a social intersection between the individual and 
the community: the Church. For Durkheim, religion was an eminently social and 
therefore collective, thing31. This is not to say, however, that all collective gatherings 
can be qualified in religious terms. As noted by Durkheim, magical societies can 
                                               
28
 L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE DE L’AGORA, « Émile Durkheim », online : < 
http://agora.qc.ca/mot.nsf/Dossiers/Emile_Durkheim> (last consulted on 26.02.2009) 
29
 Durkheim was not alone in defining religion along the sacred/profane dichotomy: on this 
subject, see also Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion 
(translated by Willard Trask, New York, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1968), who explained the 
dichotomy as different experiences of space (“sacred space” and “profane space”). Eliade, at 
page 22, explained “sacred space” as “possess[ing] existential value for the religious man; for 
nothing can begin, nothing can be done, without a previous orientation – and any orientation 
implies acquiring a fixed point. It is for this reason that religious man has always sought to fix 
his abode at the “centre of the world”. Profane space, on the other hand, was described as 
“homogenous and neutral; no break qualitatively differentiates the various parts of its mass”. 
The subject of sacred versus profane space is considered, by author Woulter J. Hanegraaff, 
as a glimpse into the “heart of Eliade’s entire oeuvre:  the perception that modern man lives 
(or, at least, tried to live) in an ‘unreal’, meaningful, ordered cosmos of archaic man.”: see 
Woulter J. Hanegraaff, “Defining Religion in Spite of History” in Platvoet & Molendijk, supra 
note 24, 337 at 358. 
30
 Émile Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, 5th ed. (Paris, Les Presses 
universitaires de France, 1968), Livre I. Online : 
<http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/formes_vie_religieuse/formes_elemen
taires_1.pdf> (last consulted 23.02.2009), 51. 
31
 Ibid, 21 [my translation]. More recently, author Russell Sandberg examined how 
Durkheim’s formulation of the individual and the collective phenomenon of religion helped 
illustrate that “[c]ollectivity remains a definitional attribute of religion: legal instruments show 
that States have not yet fully embraced the idea that religion is an individual and private affair 
(although international authorities seem closer to embracing this notion.” See Russell 
Sandberg, “Religion and the Individual: a Socio-Legal Perspective” in Abby Day, ed., Religion 
and the Individual: Belief, Practice, Identity (Vermont, Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 157 at 165. 
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exist, but a Church of magic cannot32. The difference lies in the ultimate vocation: a 
magician provides a service to a clientele whereas religion offers a true community, 
bound by belief33. While it is beyond my reach to explain Durkheim’s complex and 
intricate definition of religion, I regard his divide between the sacred and the profane 
as presenting an appealing and challenging way of looking at the role of religion in 
society. 
 
 Beyond the sacred and profane dichotomy, Émile Durkheim’s focus on the 
community presents an interesting point of view: although often set aside, the notion 
of community remains incontrovertible to one’s understanding of religion. By 
requiring the existence of a moral community (“communauté morale”), Durkheim was 
in fact appealing to a collective sense of self. This constitutes, in my view, the 
backbone of Durkheim’s conception of religion. 
 
1.3 Religion as a Cultural System 
 
 Building on both Weber and Durkheim’s versions – lest we say visions – of 
religion, Clifford Geertz later offered his interpretation of religion as a cultural system. 
Culture, for Geertz, meant “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied 
in symbols, a system of inherited conception expressed in symbolic forms by which 
men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
toward life.”34 Culture, therefore, seems to be a constant state of redefinition, building 
on existing meanings to create future understandings. Geertz also reminds us that a 
definition can provide a “useful orientation, or reorientation, of thought”35 but admits 
                                               
32
 Durkheim, supra note 30, 49 [my translation, emphasis in original]. 
33
 Anne Warfield Rawls, Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Form of 
Religious Life (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122. 
34
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, Basic Books, 
1973), 89. 
35
 Clifford Geertz, « Religion as a Cultural System » in Michael Lambek, ed., A Reader in the 
Anthropology of Religion, Blackwell Anthologies in Social and Cultural Anthropology coll., 
(Malden (MA), Blackwell Publishing 2002), 61 [Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”]  at 
63. With regard to religion, Geertz explains that there must be a logic to religion, at page 68 
of the same text: “What any particular religion affirms about the fundamental nature of reality 
may be obscure, shallow, or, all too often, perverse; but it must, if it is not to consist of the 
mere collection of received practices and conventional sentiments we usually refer to as 
moralism, affirm something. If one were to essay a minimal definition of religion today, it 
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that the difficulties of defining religion scientifically are not insignificant36.  Religion 
can thus be considered as  
 
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”37 
 
Geertz, unlike Durkheim, did not define religion to the exclusion of all other social 
forces and believed that this did not explain its socio-anthropological interest. 
Indeed, according to Geertz, religion should not describe the social order, but help 
shape it38. It was in this sense that Geertz, believing much like Max Weber, 
explained that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance, he himself has 
spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in the search of law but an interpretative one in search of 
meaning.”39 By placing the emphasis on the meaning of cultural acts or patterns, 
Geertz was effectively illustrating his “thick description of culture”. By searching for 
the meaning of and behind these cultural acts and patterns, Geertz, like Weber 
before him, was far more interested in the conditions, effects and thus meaning of a 
‘particular kind of social behaviour’.  
 
Clifford Geertz’s contribution to the definition of religion is substantial. Though 
I do not claim to have exhausted his theory on the definition of religion, he has 
provided, in my view, a new mode to evaluate the meaning of religion. Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                                      
would not be Tylor’s famous “belief in spiritual being,” to which Goody, wearied of theoretical 
subtleties, has lately urged us to return, but rather what Salvador de Madariaga has called 
“the relatively modest dogma that God is not mad.”” [references omitted] 
36
 Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, supra note 35, 80-81. 
37
 Ibid, 63. The anthropological study of religion was explained as a two-step process by 
Geertz at page 81, highlighting simultaneously the neglected and the concerned: “The 
anthropological study of religion is therefore a two-stage operation: first, an analysis of the 
system of meanings embodied in the symbols which make up the religion proper, and, 
second, the relating of these systems to social-structural and psychological processes.” 
38
 Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, supra note 35, 79. 
39
 Clifford Geertz, “ Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture” in Michael 
Martin and Lee C. McIntyre, eds., Readings in the philosophy of social science, 5th ed., 
(Boston, MIT Press, 1994), 213 at 214. 
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approaching religion as a cultural system allows for the believer’s input on what he or 
she might think religion is or can be40. 
 
1.4 Conclusion on Defining Religion in Life 
 
 Authors Weber, Durkheim and Geertz were selected not only for the theories 
of religion they proposed, but also for the questions further elicited on religion. 
Defining religion is not a mere reflexive process; it must heed to historical, 
sociological, geographical and temporal considerations. I have sought to broaden the 
discourse on religion by introducing their perspectives.  
 
What conclusions can be drawn from their considerable insight into religion? 
First, I question whether religion should even be defined unless one is compelled to 
do so for external reasons (such as constitutional guaranteed). By providing a 
definition, I believe that certain preconceptions or preliminary conditions become 
unarguable, effectively short-circuiting potential discussions on a concept. Second, I 
wonder whether the dichotomy between the sacred and profane should serve as the 
point of reference for religion, since its legitimacy is determined on the basis of the 
existence of a Church. While Durkheim did not limit the existence of communities, he 
challenged their vocation. In doing so, certain communities became undeniably more 
valuable than others41. Religion and religiosity must therefore be distinguished: 
                                               
40
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London, Fontana, 1993), 
93, 118 as cited in Arun Micheelsen, « « I don’t do systems » : An Interview with Clifford 
Geertz » (2002) 14 Meth. Theor. Stud. Relig. 2, at 16: “Geertz, with his concept of “model of” 
and “model for” has stressed the interpretive function of religion for the believer. 
Nevertheless, this changes several things, for we now have to clarify what it is we wish to 
study. Is it our task to study what a religion means, or is it our task to study how religion 
generates and articulates meaning? It is my view that Geertz is concerned with both issues, 
which is why he applies and combines a phenomenological and hermeneutical perspective. If 
this is the case, then the specific what and the general how is combined in Geertz’s method 
and therefore one cannot do without the other. The question is: what is the general, and in 
which way is it related to the concept of symbol, culture, or even one’s general 
assumptions?” [references omitted] 
41
 Unlike Durkheim, however, Clifford Geertz stated that one can be considered “religious” 
about an activity, if that activity is symbolic of some transcendent truths: “A man can indeed 
be said to be “religious” about golf, but not merely if he pursues it with passion and plays it on 
Sundays: he must also see it as symbolic of some transcendent truths.”: Geertz, supra note 
32, 68. For a recent argument in favour of hockey as a religion (in the very unique setting of 
Montréal): see Jean-Marc Barreau and Olivier Bauer, eds., La religion du Canadien de 
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whereas the former points to established dogma, the latter has been generally 
interpreted as a “multidimensional phenomenon”42 that should be understood as 
religion in everyday life. In other words, while religion establishes the framework 
(macro level), religiosity illustrates the internalisation of religion by individuals, as 
seen by their practices, beliefs and commitment to the institution (micro level)43. 
Lastly, in considering whether religion should be regarded as a culture44, one must 
be aware of the claim of the individual believer and thus the accompanying symbolic 
act. Although religion as a cultural system invites a contextualising approach to the 
social order, the importance of the individual believer must not be forgotten and how 
he or she relates to a religion.  
 
A final point must be made about the importance of the community by all 
three of these authors: for Weber, the community served as the sounding board to 
religious beliefs; for Durkheim, religion was an undeniably social thing and the 
                                                                                                                                      
Montréal (Montréal, Fides, 2009). Given the discussion below, I consider that hockey in 
Montréal should be understood in terms of religiosity rather than religion: we detect the 
presence of both components and modes of religiosity. In this way, there is an undeniable 
orthodoxy surrounding the famed Canadiens; the feelings about the Canadiens run deep, as 
does fans’ loyalty to the team (though thoroughly unforgiving at times); finally, support for the 
Canadiens is seen throughout the year and especially during the season, through sell-out 
crowds at the Bell Centre, the sporting of team paraphernalia and pilgrimages to local 
establishments to watch the games. Moreover, religious fervour about the Canadiens can be 
exercised in public or in private, reinforcing the various modes of religiosity. 
42
 Although authors Marie Cornwall and Stan Albrecht admit that this position is not 
unanimous amongst authors, it can be interpreted as a ‘general agreement’: see Marie 
Cornwall and Stan Albrecht, “The Dimensions of Religiosity: A Conceptual Model with an 
Empirical Test” (1986) 27(3) Rev. Relig. Res. 226, at 226. The authors add, at pages 227-
228, that religiosity is comprised of components (religious beliefs, religious feelings and 
religious works or practices) and modes of religious involvement (personal and institutional). 
Indeed, while Cornwall and Albrecht’s study clearly supports the contention that religiosity is 
best viewed as multidimensional, it is also admitted that this model was developed for a 
particular religious group (Mormons) and would need to be adapted to other religious 
realities: see ibid, 242. 
43
 See Karel Dobbelaere, “Assessing Secularization Theory” in Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz 
and Randi R. Warne, eds., New Approaches to the Study of Religion, Vol. 2: Textual, 
Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches (Berlin, Walter de Guyter, 2004), 229 
at 243. 
44
 Examining religion as culture has pervaded other related discourses as well. Paul Kahn 
has developed a more ‘flexible’ manner in which to describe law through culture: see Paul W. 
Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship, (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1999).  Author Benjamin L. Berger has built on Kahn’s approach of law as 
culture, and more specifically with regard to Canadian constitutional rule of law as culture, in 
order to form a better understanding of religion: see Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20. 
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Church proved to be the necessary junction between the individual and the 
community. Finally, for Geertz, a social order is made up of many different cultural 
acts: “cultural acts, the construction, apprehension and utilization of symbolic forms, 
are social events like any other; they are as public as marriage and as observable as 
agriculture.”45 In this sense, culture patterns can exemplify models for and from 
reality46. The role of the community (and thus the collective) has been greatly 
emphasised and valued in the discourse of defining religion in life. The same cannot 
be said about defining religion in law, where the individual approach is favoured for 
resolving claims. This is not an insignificant point: I will pursue this distinction 
between religion in life and in law further on in my study. 
 
In sum, delineating religion in life has proven to be a fruitful yet demanding 
exercise. These questions are not exclusive to the field of the social sciences and I 
will demonstrate that similar queries and challenges are present in the discourse on 
defining religion in law.  
 
Nevertheless, defining religion in law imposes an additional framework, 
engendering a multiplication of meanings and systems. I will attempt, in the next 
section, to understand the different approaches employed to define religion in law.  
 
2.  Defining Religion in Law 
 
 As seen previously, religion can be defined in a variety of manners, placing 
emphasis on different actors in society and changing therein the manner in which 
religion is perceived and thus, to a greater extent, religious claims. Authors Rex 
Ahdar and Ian Leigh have offered, in Religious Freedom in the Liberal State47, three 
                                               
45
 Geertz, supra note 35, 64. 
46
 Ibid, 65: “The intertransposability of models for and models of which symbolic formulation 
makes possible is the distinctive characteristic of our mentality.” 
47
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4. Author T. Jeremy Gunn also provides a typology of defining 
religion, albeit less thorough, see: T. Jeremy Gunn, “The Complexity of Religion and the 
Definition of “Religion” in International Law” (2003) 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 189, 194 [Gunn, 
“Complexity of Religion”]. Gunn stated that an “essentialist” definition identifies the 
elements that are necessary for something to be designated as a “religion” whereas a 
“polythetic” definition does not require that all religions have specific elements in common. 
The former definition relies on the assumption that religion has one or more elements in 
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distinct approaches to defining religion in law, which appropriately span our three 
spheres of interest. They are known as the “subjective-functional approach” (2.1) 
and the “substantive-content approach” (2.2): the latter referring to what religion is 
and the former indicating what religion does48. The final approach offered by Ahdar 
and Leigh is known as the “Strasbourg approach” (2.3). They will now be examined 
each in turn. 
 
2.1 The Subjective-Functional Approach 
  
The “subjective-functional approach” defines religion from the perspective of 
the individual claimant. The foremost condition of this approach is therefore the 
sincerity of belief of the individual49. Interestingly, author Wojciech Sadurski offered 
Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion as an example of the functionalist approach, 
since “a “general order of existence” need not reach the dimension of 
“transcendence” required by the concept of the supernatural.”50 In using the 
Geertzian typology of religion, the emphasis is therefore placed on experiences –
religiosity – rather than the sacredness of the system.  
 
The subjective-functional approach has been the focus of many authors’ 
critiques which will be identified and discussed. A first point of contention has been 
privileging the individual’s perspective on religion. Indeed, this approach does not 
require a definition of religion; however, this raises a qualitative issue since there is 
no ‘barometer’ by which to measure an individual’s belief. In this way, the subjective-
functional approach encourages a circular understanding of religion51. As such, it 
                                                                                                                                      
common with all other religions. Wittgenstein’s meaning of game serves to illustrate the 
“polythetic” definition of religion in Gunn’s theory; this approach is similar to the substantive-
content approach advocated by Ahdar and Leigh [Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119]. 
Nevertheless, the use of “essentialist approach” to demonstrate one or more common 
features in order to qualify as “religion” by Ahdar and Leigh contra-indicates Gunn’s approach 
which supports a separation between what is necessary to religion and what is common to 
religions. While I find Gunn’s approach interesting, I consider that his typology does not 
reflect the elaboration of the different approaches to defining religion.  
48
 See Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, at 193. 
49
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 115. 
50
 Wojciech Sadurski, “On Legal Definitions of “Religion”” (1989) 63 Austl. L.J. 834, 838 
[Sadurski, “Legal Definitions”]. 
51
 Sadurski, ibid, 836; Ahdar and Leigh, supra note 4, 116. 
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becomes difficult to describe the sincerity of beliefs when religion goes unexplained. 
A second criticism of the subjective-functional approach focuses on the over-
inclusiveness of beliefs52, since it can dilute at once the meaning of religion as well 
as its distinctiveness. The final and more substantial criticism of the subjective-
functional approach rests on the evaluation of the individual’s sincerity of belief53.  
 
As noted earlier, even though the subjective-functional approach places the 
emphasis on individual beliefs, it still remains impracticable (for some) not to provide 
a definition of religion, since the word “religion” is used in this approach. At the same 
time, proponents of the subjective-functional approach will claim that religion is a 
social behaviour or cultural system amongst many: a definition will not delineate 
what constitutes religion nor should it limit its possible content54. According to 
Sadurski, the line between the sacred and the profane is illusory, as is the need for a 
definition, proprio motu, of religion, since “both religious and non-religious beliefs, if 
held sincerely by an individual as the motivating grounds of his or her actions, call for 
legal protection in a liberal and secular State.”55 Opponents of this approach will 
argue, like Ahdar and Leigh, that ‘avoiding’ a definition of religion is ‘unpersuasive’ 
since “the legal system still needs some means of differentiating which beliefs are 
important enough to be respected by non-interference.”56 By relying on an 
individual’s account of beliefs, as well as eschewing a definition of religion, non-
religious beliefs can be protected, so long as their motivation is sincere. This is 
especially true in a context where the principle of constitutionalism prevails, as in the 
case of Canada, unlike that of New Zealand or the United Kingdom. Therefore, a 
belief can be sincere while not being important; however, a belief can be important 
but not sincere, or even religious.  
 
                                               
52
 Sadurski, “Legal Definitions”, supra note 50, 836; Ahdar and Leigh, supra note 4, 116. 
53
 Sadurski, ibid; Ahdar & Leigh, ibid, 117. 
54
 Following the logic that religion is therefore but one amongst many, it should not receive a 
differential form of protection. It behoves us to demand that the proponents of this approach 
proceed to a further explanation of the subjective-functional approach with regard to the 
place of religion, as well as identify more clearly its shortcomings.   
55
 Sadurski, “Legal Definitions”, supra note 50, 843 [my emphasis]. 
56
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 117. 
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The subjective-functional approach also draws its biggest strength as well as 
most significant weakness from the same concept: sincerity. While this point is not 
substantively addressed by Ahdar and Leigh, Sadurski argues that the 
‘shortcomings’ of the subjective-functional approach are actually strong points, since 
they can be justified by “the overall pattern of freedom of religion moulded”57. With 
particular attention to the importance placed on the sincerity of the belief, Sadurski 
maintains that the inquiry is not qualitatively different from any other judicial scrutiny 
of the individual state of mind, such as in the examination of criminal mens rea or 
legislative intent for the purpose of statutory interpretation, since internal safeguards 
exist to prevent the ill use of religious exemption58. He proposes that this cannot be 
considered a “serious objection”, since there are a number of methods of measuring 
the sincerity of a claim already in place, such as the  
 
“conformity of this claim with the written or empirically verifiable traditions and 
proscriptions of the church or cult, congruence between the pressed religious tenets 
and one’s actions, the willingness to undertake alternative duties and burdens, 
equally onerous from the point of view of that’s religion’s proscriptions, etc.”59 
 
                                               
57
 Sadurski, “Legal Definitions”, supra note 50, 836. 
58
 Ibid, 836-837. The issue of “sincere beliefs” has been questioned in more than one field in 
Canada, rendering analysis at times more complex or simplistic that necessary. I bring the 
reader’s attention to an interesting article on the conjunction of beliefs and tort law, where the 
author provides a plausible argument for religious thin skulls as a third alternative (to 
mitigation of damages and the thin skull rule). Consider, as the author did, the following 
intersection of competing claims: a Jehovah’s Witness suffers injuries due to a driver’s 
negligent driving. Although a full recovery would be expected if the victim underwent 
proscribed surgical treatment, the victim refuses due to necessity of blood transfusions, 
which contravene the beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness. The victim proceeds, nonetheless, to 
sue the negligent driver. The author concludes by stating that “[w]e cannot refuse to 
recognize religious thin skulls without making a negative judgment against the 
reasonableness of the victim’s religion.”: Marc Ramsay, “The Religious Beliefs of Tort 
Victims: Religious Thin Skulls or Failures to Mitigate?”, (2007) 20 Can. J.L. & Juris. 399 at 
399 and 427. A Canadian author has recently challenged the term ‘honest belief’ in consent 
to determine culpability in sexual assault. The author argues that this outdated approach cuts 
short the comprehensive study of criminal responsibility. See: Lucinda Vandervort, “Honest 
Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality, and Mens Rea in 
Sexual Assault” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625. On this point, see also Alison Dundes 
Renteln, The Cultural Defense (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), who examined the 
nature of the debate surrounding the admissibility of cultural evidence in the courtroom. The 
author concludes that cultural evidence should be considered in all cases, even if it is 
ultimately not used as the basis for mitigation, damages, or other remedies: Ibid, 5, 213. 
59
 Sadurski, “Legal Definitions”, supra note 50, 837. 
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While the existence of these parameters indicates a framework of religion, it does 
not, for all intents and purposes, proceed to a definition. Nevertheless, these 
parameters do reintroduce an objective rather than a subjective test for freedom of 
religion60. By playing devil’s advocate to Sadurski’s final claim, I posit that the 
sincerity of a claim can also act as a springboard for ignoring “embarrassing 
beliefs”61, under the banner of an objective test for freedom of religion.  
 
The subjective-functional approach62 has garnered some support in the 
United States; the Supreme Court has adopted this approach in two conscientious 
objector cases63, namely United States v. Seeger64 and Welsh v. United States65. A 
                                               
60
 This can be seen in Bruker, supra note 4, at ¶ 68-70, where Abella J. questions the 
religious sincerity of the ex-husband’s beliefs; she concludes that the ex-husband refused to 
give the get on the basis of emotions rather than beliefs.  
61
 Bruker, supra note 4, at ¶ 68-70. 
62
 The definition of religion adopted by the Supreme Court in these cases was largely derived 
from the writings of theologian Paul Tillich: see Jeffrey Omar Usman, “Defining Religion: The 
Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of 
Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, The Arts, and 
Anthropology” (2007) 83 N.D.L. Rev. 123, 193, citing Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 
753 F. 2d 1528, 1537 n. 10 (Canby, J., concurring). As Usman notes at page 194, “[w]ith 
religion no longer requiring a god or gods, the Seeger/Tillichian functional phenomenological 
approach “treats an individual’s ‘ultimate concern’ – whatever that concern may be – as his 
religion.” [references omitted] Although beyond the scope of my study, I note that the 
subjective-functional approach has also found partial support in Australia: see Sadurski, 
supra note 50, 836-837, citing Church of New Faith v. Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 
57 ALJR 785 [Church of New Faith]. Author Carolyn Evans has argued recently that the 
Australian courts – and the High Court in particular – need to be able to develop more 
sophisticated legal approaches to questions of religious freedom: Carolyn Evans, “Religion 
as Politics and not Law: the Religion Clauses in the Australian Constitution (2008) 36(3) 
Relig. State Soc. 283 [Evans, “Religion as Politics”]. As Evans explains, Australia does not 
have a bill of rights; religion is protected under s. 116 of the Constitution [An Act to constitute 
the Commonwealth of Australia [9th July 1900] (63 & 64 Victoria - Chapter 12)] which reads: 
“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any 
religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test 
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.” 
Judges have, for the most part, interpreted this section as a limitation on government power 
rather than on the basis of a free-standing right, according to Evans at pages 298-299 and 
“[u]ntil the High Court is prepared to take a more robustly rights-oriented view of Section 116 
it is likely to be a marginal influence in these debates.” 
63
 As noted by both Sadurski and Ahdar and Leigh: Sadurski, supra note 50, 835-836; Ahdar 
& Leigh, supra note 4, 115-116. 
64
 United States v. Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965) [Seeger]. At issue in Seeger was the 
interpretation of s. 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which created an 
exemption for conscientious objectors on the basis of their “religious training and belief”. 
Although Seeger did not profess exemption on the basis religious faith but rather on the basis 
of a purely ethical creed, the Supreme Court interpreted his request as based on religious 
Chapter I. Theoretical Conceptions of Religion: Toward a Better Understanding  
In and Out of Law 
 
 
 
21
few years later, however, it was held that sincere beliefs could not be extended to 
personal beliefs by the United States’ Supreme Court66. In Canada, the Supreme 
Court opined in R. v. Big M. Drug Mart67 that the concept of freedom of religion 
should be understood as the right to entertain religious beliefs, but also that each is 
entitled to their views. In this way, a positive and negative right to religion co-exist68, 
which serves as a first parameter of the individual’s conception of religion. 
Furthermore, the Canadian approach as defined most recently by Amselem69, offers 
in my view, both a definition of religion as well as a test based on the sincerity of 
beliefs and seems to straddle the subjective-functional and the substantive-content 
approaches70. Although this point will be examined in greater detail later in the study, 
it is the conjunction of these approaches that demonstrate the intrinsic difficulties of 
defining religion in law. 
 
In closing, while the subjectivist-functional approach rightfully places the 
attention on an individual’s beliefs and rather than official dogma, I think that this 
                                                                                                                                      
faith. Nevertheless, the reference to a “Supreme Being” in s. 6(j) of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act was deleted: see John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Constitutional Law, 7th ed. (St. Paul (MN), Thomson West, 2004), 1507. 
65
 Welsh v. United States, 398 US 333 (1970) [Welsh]. While factually similar to Seeger, the 
Supreme Court in Welsh examined whether Welsh’s set of beliefs could qualify for the 
exemption set out in s. 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The Supreme 
Court found that given Welsh’s beliefs, he should be entitled to a conscientious objector 
exemption. See Welsh, supra, at 343-344. 
66
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972) [Yoder]. 
67
 R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M Drug Mart]. 
68
 Ibid, ¶ 94-95. 
69
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 46: “To summarize up to this point, our Court’s past decisions 
and the basic principles underlying freedom of religion support the view that freedom of 
religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus 
with religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is 
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or her 
spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by 
official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials.” [our 
emphasis] 
70
 As noted in Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, 194: “The Court’s definition 
embarks on a journey through religion from a substantive perspective and arrives at a 
functional definition (from Amselem, supra, “a particular and comprehensive system of faith 
and worship”) often lack the fluidity that a complex understanding of religion requires.” 
Although Beaman ultimately concludes that the Court in Amselem adopts a functional 
approach, I cannot share that conclusion. As I will argue further on, I consider that both the 
subjectivist-functional and the substantive-content approach serve as the foundation of the 
“Canadian approach” and is also reflected in later case law. 
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approach can fall prey to the complexities of qualifying the ‘sincerity’ of beliefs71. 
Ultimately, it boils down to the credibility of the witness. By drawing on both the 
theories of religion developed by Weber and Geertz, it is possible to understand that 
the focus should not be on the experience of the Church but rather on the 
experience of the individual vis-à-vis the Church. Nevertheless, the subjective-
functional method also illustrates the inherent limits of applying complex social 
sciences approaches to religion to legal discourse on freedom of religion. In this way, 
the subjective-functionalist approach promotes a continual re-evaluation of religion 
by the individual and its relationship with other social orders, making it, in a way, 
‘lived religion’72.  
 
2.2 The Substantive-Content Approach 
 
 The substantive-content approach favours a method that identifies the 
primary characteristics of religion, thereupon eliciting a broad or outer definition of 
religion. However, this approach should not be understood as being entirely rigid 
since it relies on common features; an approach by analogy to religion73 can be 
developed. As explained by Ahdar and Leigh, “[t]hese judgments take on an 
                                               
71
 This approach can however lead to alternate uses and sometimes abuses. On this subject, 
see Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, « Quelques angles morts du débat sur 
l’accommodement raisonnable à la lumière de la question du port de signes religieux à 
l’école publique : réflexions en forme de points d’interrogation » in Myriam Jézéquel, ed., Les 
accommodements raisonnables : quoi, comment, jusqu’où? (Montréal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 
2007), 241-286. 
72
 This approach was developed by Robert Orsi, “Is the Study of Lived Religion Irrelevant to 
the World We Live In?” (2003) 42(2) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 169, 172 who 
argued that “[t]he study of lived religion is not about practice rather than ideas, but about 
ideas, gestures, imaginings, all as media of engagement with the world. Lived religion cannot 
be separated from other practices of everyday life, from the ways that humans do other 
necessary and important things, or from other cultural structures and discourses (legal, 
political, medical, and so on). Nor can sacred spaces be understood in isolation from the 
places where these things are done – workplaces, hospitals, law courts, homes, and streets 
– from the media used to do them, or from the relationships constructed around them.” [Orsi, 
“Lived Religion”] Author Lori G. Beaman has repeatedly advocated this approach when 
attempting to define religion in law. See, for example: Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra 
note 4, 194; Lori G. Beaman, Defining Harm: Religious Freedom and the Limits of the Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 3. 
73
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119. This approach has been termed “definition by analogy”. 
Eduardo Peñalver explains his version as a “category-concept”: see Eduardo Peñalver, 
“Note. The Concept of Religion” (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 791, 809 [Peñalver, “Note”] citing 
John McDowell, “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, in A.W. Moore (ed.), Meaning and 
Reference (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 257 288. 
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essentialist approach, requiring all religions to demonstrate one or more common 
features before qualifying, in law, as a ‘religion’.”74 Just as Sardurski drew on Geertz 
to demonstrate a general order of existence for the functionalist approach, authors 
Ahdar, Leigh and T. Jeremy Gunn, amongst others, have drawn on philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein75 to explain the presence of common features76 for the 
substantive approach. Wittgenstein argued that no one definition of the term ‘games’ 
existed, but rather a series of “family resemblances”77, akin to conceptions of 
language78. Indeed, this approach to defining is novel insofar as it invites or 
promotes flexibility; however, by identifying “feature” elements, one is necessarily 
excluding others, even if recourse to a definition by analogy is available. Although 
Wittgenstein’s approach to language takes unpredictable evolution into account, it 
also highlights the problems with seeking a dictionary-style definition of religion in 
law, according to author Eduardo Peñalver79.  
 
Proponents of this approach in the United States have suggested a method 
rather than a definition of religion. According to George Freeman, the starting point 
must be the value attributed to one thing over another; by using the purpose of 
religion as a starting point, Freeman proposed a paradigm of a religious belief 
system80. Author Kent Greenawalt has argued that adopting this method by analogy 
                                               
74
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119. 
75
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: the German Text, with a Revised 
English Translation (translated by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, 3rd ed., Oxford, 
Blackwell, 2001). 
76
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119; Gunn, supra note 47, 194. Author George C. Freeman, 
draws on Wittgenstein to argue that religion can be understood as having a focus, coupled 
with a set of paradigmatic features; a “definition” of religion would be interpreted as ill-
advised: Freeman, “Misguided Search”, supra note 22, 1565.  
77
 See Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Rights Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 63. 
78
 Wittgenstein, supra note 75, 4e: “We can also think of the whole process of using words in 
(2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native tongue. I will call 
these games “language-games” and will speak of a primitive language as language-game. 
And in the process of naming stones and repeating words after someone might also be called 
language-games. Think much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.”  
79
 Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73, 810 
80
 Freeman, “Misguided Search”, supra note 22, 1553. The author listed, at the same page, 
relevant features of a religious belief system; they are as follows: 
“1. A belief in a Supreme Being 
2. A belief in a transcendent reality 
3. A moral code 
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would ensure ‘sound’ outcomes consistent with Supreme Court decisions81. Fifteen 
years later, Peñalver sought to build upon the framework established by Freeman 
and Greenawalt by addressing the problems of their definitions by analogy82 as well 
as suggesting a methodology for determining whether a belief system is (or is not) a 
religion that satisfies three criteria83. However, like all methods, the substantive 
approach is not infallible and has had a difficult time addressing borderline religions84 
                                                                                                                                      
4. A world view that provides an account of man's role in the universe and around which an 
individual organizes his life 
5. Sacred rituals and holy days 
6. Worship and prayer 
7. A sacred text or scriptures 
8. Membership in a social organization that promotes a religious belief system” 
81
 Kent Greenawalt, “Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law” (1984) 72(5) Cal. L. Rev. 
753, 815 [Greenawalt, “Religion as a Concept”]. The author states that the most important 
guide to this approach is a focus on relevant constitutional purpose. According to Greenawalt 
at 815-816, “for constitutional purposes, religion should be determined by the closeness of 
analogy in the relevant respects between disputed instance and what is indisputably religion.” 
He admits, however, that this approach will likely not help “borderline cases”. This is also 
echoed by George Freeman: see Freeman, “Misguided Search”, supra note 22, at 1565. 
More recently, Kent Greenawalt has stated that the analogical approach is compatible with 
most cases and flexible enough to correspond to a variety of substantive approaches to free 
exercise and establishment rights. He points, however, to what he calls a major challenge to 
the flexible analogical approach: namely, its uncertain application. He argues that “[a]n 
unduly restrictive approach threshold definition may foreclose appropriate relief; an unduly 
generous approach may compel legal relief that is unwarranted.” See Kent Greenawalt, 
Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness, vol. 1 (Princeton (NJ), Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p. 144-145. 
82
 Author Eduardo Peñalver emphasized two problems with their approaches by analogy: 
first, their failure to discuss in more detail the effect of the actual selection of the “paradigm 
cases” of religion on the outcome of the test; second, they [Freeman and Greenawalt] would 
do nothing to constrain the decision making processes of individual judges. See Peñalver, 
“Note”, supra note 73, 815-816. 
83
 Ibid, 814: “[f]irst, it should define religion and not some broader concept, hewing as closely 
as possible to the use of the word “religion” in everyday language; second, it should have the 
potential to evolve along with the colloquial standards governing the use of the word 
“religion”; and third, it should minimize the risk of judicial, particularly pro-western, bias in the 
classification of belief systems by constraining the decisionmaking process.” Author Peñalver 
placed particular emphasis on resolving the issue of western bias operating within the use of 
the word “religion”; these guidelines were considered as “negative guidelines” by Peñalver at 
page 818. 
84
 The decision of Africa v. Pensylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3rd Cir. 1981) [Africa] exemplified 
the issues of dealing with a “borderline religion”. In this case, a prisoner claiming to be a 
‘naturalist minister’ for the MOVE organisation, wanted the correctional authorities to 
recognise his right to a raw food diet; the judge, using the definition by analogy set out in 
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-210 (3rd Cir. 1979) [Malnak] ultimately found that the 
MOVE organization was akin to “philosophical naturalism” rather than a religion: Africa, 1035. 
Author Eduardo Peñalver provided an excellent discussion and analysis of Africa and argued 
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or “New Religious Movements” (NRM)85 in a satisfactory manner. In this way, the 
substantive-content approach is reminiscent of the sacred and profane dichotomy 
put forward by Durkheim86. While certain religious groups will have their religion 
acknowledged or recognised by analogy, others will not meet the criteria developed 
by the proponents of the substantive-content approach, branding them with an 
unrequited title of secularism87.   
 
 Interestingly, this approach has garnered circumscribed case law support in 
the United States as well as in Canada. At issue in Malnak v. Yogi88 was whether the 
“Science of Creative Intelligence – Transcendental Meditation” (known as SCI/TM) 
could be considered a religion. SCI/TM was based on the teachings of Maharishi 
Mahesh Yogi and was offered as an elective class in New Jersey Public high 
schools89; an injunction was sought against the teachings of SCI/TM, arguing that it 
constituted an infringement on the Establishment clause90. Judge Arlin Adams, in a 
concurring opinion, explained that “[u]nder the modern view, "religion" is not confined 
to the relationship of man with his Creator, either as a matter of law or as a matter of 
                                                                                                                                      
that by employing his proposed methodology as well as his negative guidelines, MOVE would 
have been categorized as a religion: see Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73, 799-801, 818-820. 
85
 Author Leonard Hammer explains the goal of current-day New Religious Movements is to 
address the internal, personal, needs of its members and not to transform society, create a 
moral standard, or achieve the status of formal religion. Examples of NRM can be as varied 
and as contrasting as the Salvation Army, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Moon sect. See 
Leonard M. Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience: Some 
Suggestions for its Development and Application (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001), p. 260.  
86
 I cannot claim to take credit for this idea; see Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 121, at footnote 
151, where the authors refer to Stanley Ingber, “Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification 
of the Religion Clauses” (1988-1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 233, at 285-286 who draws on Émile 
Durkheim to explain that religious conscience and obligations must be distinguished: “It is the 
role played by the sacred or the divine that separates religions from other belief systems (i.e. 
ideologies) for legal purposes. Although not necessarily bound by any theistic precept, 
religious duties must be based in the “otherwordly” or the transcendent – transcendent not as 
an abstract concept reachable only by reason and intellect is transcendent but a 
transcendent reality.” [emphasis in original] 
87
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 122. 
88
 Malnak, supra note 84. 
89
 According to the facts in Malnak, ibid, at 198 “[e]very student who participated in the 
SCI/TM course was required to attend a puja as part of the course. A puja was performed by 
the teacher for each student individually; it was conducted off school premises on a Sunday;” 
90
 E. Peñalver, supra note 73, at 799, citing Malnak, supra note 84, at 197-198. Interestingly, 
as noted by authors Ahdar and Leigh, the practitioners of SCI/TM protested that SCI/TM was 
not a religion: see Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119. 
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theology.”91 Under the modern view of religion, three “useful indicia” are purported to 
be basic to or “sufficiently analogous to ‘unquestioned and accepted’”92 religions:  
 
“The first and most important of these indicia is the nature of the ideas in question. 
This means that a court must, at least to a degree, examine the content of the 
supposed religion, not to determine its truth or falsity, or whether it is schismatic or 
orthodox, but to determine whether the subject matter it comprehends is consistent 
with the assertion that it is, or is not, a religion.93 
 
[…] 
 
Thus, the "ultimate" nature of the ideas presented is the most important and 
convincing evidence that they should be treated as religious. Certain isolated 
answers to "ultimate" questions, however, are not necessarily "religious" answers, 
because they lack the element of comprehensiveness, the second of the three 
indicia. A religion is not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it 
has a broader scope. It lays claim to an ultimate and comprehensive "truth."94 
 
[…] 
 
A third element to consider in ascertaining whether a set of ideas should be classified 
as a religion is any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to 
accepted religions. Such signs might include formal services, ceremonial functions, 
the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation 
of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions. 
Of course, a religion may exist without any of these signs, so they are not 
determinative, at least by their absence, in resolving a question of definition.”95 
 
While this approach to religion has earned certain support96, Judge Adams’ ‘useful 
criteria’ are far from decisive. In considering religion by analogy, one must be 
conscious that these features will necessary exclude certain beliefs and favour 
others. Furthermore, if certain of these features are not determinative in nature, then 
                                               
91
 Malnak, supra note 84, 207. Judge Adams warned, however, at the same page that “it is 
one thing to conclude "by analogy" that a particular group or cluster of ideas is religious; it is 
quite another to explain exactly what indicia are to be looked to in making such an analogy 
and justifying it.” [references omitted] 
92
 Ibid, 207-208. These criteria should not been seen as a “final test”, since according to 
Judge Adams, “[d]efining religion is a sensitive and important legal duty.”: Ibid, 210 
[references omitted]. 
93
 Ibid, 208 [references omitted]. 
94
 Ibid, 208-209 [references omitted]. 
95
 Ibid, 209 [references omitted]. 
96
 For example, Africa, supra note 84. In the interest of full disclosure, that Judge Adams also 
presided over the aforementioned case. I consider therefore that the definition by analogy 
approach is irremediably impregnated with his perspective. 
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the question of religion by analogy revolves in the end around the (ultimate) nature of 
ideas.  
 
The substantive-content approach to religion has also been put forth by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Amselem97. As mentioned previously, at issue in 
Amselem was whether the terms of the by-laws in the declaration of co-ownership in 
a luxury building could override individual owners’ right to freedom of religion. More 
specifically, the appellants believed that it was their biblical obligation to set up a 
succah (a small temporary enclosed hut) during Succot, a nine day holiday 
commemorating the time of harvest. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority, 
explained religion must be defined broadly in order to be able to define what religious 
freedom is:  
 
“While it is perhaps not possible to define religion precisely, some outer definition is 
useful since only beliefs, convictions and practices rooted in religion, as opposed to 
those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held, are protected by the 
guarantee of freedom of religion. Defined broadly, religion typically involves a 
particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship.  Religion also tends 
to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power.  In essence, 
religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs 
connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-
definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to 
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual 
faith.”98 
 
By addressing religion by its essence or core characteristics, this approach 
suggests ‘two steps forward one step back’. While Wittgenstein’s approach to 
language as a series of “family resemblances” enhances the substantive-content 
approach to religion by its method by analogy, its success is moderated by the fact 
that one must take into account the ultimate nature of ideas. The notion of a divine 
power is irksome for a few, but questioned by many. The substantive-content 
approach, which boasts what I could call a “non-definition definition” (defining the 
essence of religion) is actually a definition of religion in law. The fact that 
Wittgenstein took into account ‘unpredictable evolution’ of language means that, in a 
                                               
97
 Supra note 3. 
98
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 39. 
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certain way, one must take a certain description (or definition) of religion into 
account99 but remember that we are not bound or limited by it100.  
 
As with the subjectivist-functional approach, subjectivity is central to defining 
religion; the difference however lies in the focus. While the subjective-functional 
approach is determined by the individual, the substantive-content approach is 
decided by the judge. The level of individual discretion allocated to a judge is 
therefore high101. Although I do not believe that the presence of ‘useful indicia’ is per 
se negative, its existence has revealed itself problematic. Consider, for instance, 
whether humanistic and naturalistic groups102 could be recognised under the 
substantive-content approach to religion, or conversely, when practitioners are 
recognised as constituting a religion without soliciting such recognition, by judicial 
powers103. Indeed, by placing unambiguous importance on the presence of the 
supernatural, the substantive-content approach unequivocally draws the line 
between the sacred and the profane. 
 
2.3 The Strasbourg Approach 
 
 The “Strasbourg approach” refers to the jurisprudence decided under Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the European 
Commission on Human Rights (EComHR), and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)104. Article 9 ECHR states that: 
                                               
99
 As explained by Peñalver, “[t]o argue, then, that no definition of religion is necessary is to 
say that “religion” is more like “majority” than it is like “speech”. Such a position, however, 
requires justification. In other words, even to deny the need for definition for the purposes of 
constitutional adjudication is to propose a definition of sorts (that is, “the everyday, clear 
meaning of the term”), one that must be defended.” See Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73, 
792. 
100
 Ibid, 809: “Our decision to apply or not to apply a word to a new situation is affected by the 
nature of our customary use of the word, but at the same time, our decision to apply the word 
in a new situation (or not to apply it) is itself part of the definitional process.” 
101
 One must be conscious of judicial bias in the approach by analogy to law, according to 
Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73 816. 
102
 Greenawalt, “Religion as a Concept”, supra note 81, at 805 as cited in Ahdar & Leigh, 
supra note 4, 121. 
103
 As was done in the case of SCI/TM: see Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119. 
104
 While it is not my objective to examine the practice and procedure surrounding the 
European Convention on Human Rights, I would be remiss not to acknowledge the change in 
structure, from the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to the European Court 
Chapter I. Theoretical Conceptions of Religion: Toward a Better Understanding  
In and Out of Law 
 
 
 
29
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.105 
Religion is listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination106. Finally, the ECHR also 
recognises a parent’s right to educate their child in conformity with their religious and 
philosophical beliefs107. Article 9 ECHR operates as a two-pronged protection, 
protecting both inner thought and outer demonstration, to varying degrees. These 
                                                                                                                                      
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Briefly, Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established 
thereby, Strasbourg, 11.V.1994, ETS No. 155 (Protocol No. 11) was aimed at restructuring 
the ‘control machinery’ established by the European Convention on Human Rights in order to 
maintain efficiency; it came into force on November 1st 1998. In this way, Protocol No. 11 
replaced the existing Commission and Court of Human Rights with a new permanent Court. 
Another significant change associated with Protocol No. 11 was the de facto repealing of 
Protocol No. 9 by article 2(8) of Protocol 11, which addressed the seriousness of the question 
raised before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the effectiveness of the 
European Court of Human Rights has once again been compromised by the ratification of the 
Convention by thirteen new states by 2004; the European Convention on Human Rights was 
open to no fewer than 800 million people by then: see Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of 
the Convention, CETS No. 194 (Explanatory Report), online: < COUNCIL OF EUROPE >, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm (site last accessed 25.05.2009), ¶ 
6.  In an effort to remedy this increasing problem, Protocol No. 14 (signed May 13th 2004) 
was put forth; however, it will only come into force once all member states of the Council of 
Europe ratify the Protocol and Russia has thus far refused to do so: see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
Protocole n° 14 à la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés 
fondamentales, amendant le système de contrôle de la Convention STCE no. : 194, online : 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=194&CM=8&DF=5/19/2009&
CL=FRE (last accessed 25.05. 2009).  
105
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4.XI.1950, art. 9. 
106
 Id., art. 14: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” We note that article 14 has “no independence existence” and 
thus must be associated to another provision of the ECHR: See Malcolm D. Evans, Manual 
on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas, coll. “Council of Europe Manuals, 
Human Rights in Culturally Diverse Societies” (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 35. 
107
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4.XI.1950, Protocol 1, art. 2: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State 
shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religions and philosophical convictions.” 
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spheres of action are better known as the forum internum and the forum externum, 
the former referring to internal (and thus individual) thought, conscience and religion, 
while the latter denotes the external manifestation of religion or beliefs. While it is 
obvious that the inner and outer protections do not cover the same areas, I will limit 
my comments to the following two points. Firstly, religion is the only right that 
receives unequivocal protection both as an individual internal right as well as an 
external manifested right. Nevertheless, “the term “practice” as employed in Article 
9(1) ECHR does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or 
belief.”108 Secondly, while thought and conscience are recognised as solely 
individual protections, belief is perceived only as an outer manifestation109. As such, 
inconsistencies in the interpretation are created, as well as further questions on the 
actual scope of these freedoms. 
 
The Strasbourg approach has been largely dismissed by critics for failing 
almost entirely to confront the issue of defining religion and lacks the intricacies – 
though certainly not above reproach – of the other approaches110. Even though this 
approach has benefited from much interest from authors111 and despite its crisp 
theoretical demarcation, the ECtHR has been slow to develop its interpretation of 
                                               
108
 Arrowsmith v. U.K., App. No. 7050/77, Commission Report of 12 October 1978, Decisions 
and Reports 19 [Arrowsmith 2], p. 5, ¶ 71 as cited in Evans, supra note 106, 14. The author 
adds, at the same page: “[t]hus not all activities undertaken which are motivated or inspired 
by a belief are necessarily protected since not only might they not be related to the forum 
internum and the sphere of ‘inner conviction’ but they may also be considered not to amount 
to a manifestation of the belief for the purposes of Article 9(1).” 
109
 There are three conditions for a claim to be successful under 9(2) ECHR, as stated by 
authors Robin Hopkins and Can V. Yeginsu in “Religious Liberty in British Courts: A Critique 
and Some Guidance” (2008) 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 28, 29, [Hopkins Yeginsu, “Religious 
Liberty in British Courts”] citing Lord Walker in R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment, [2005] 2 A.C. 246, ¶ 77 (H.L.) [Williamson]: “(1) the claimant 
sought to manifest his or her religion or belief; (2) the respondent interfered with this 
manifestation; and (3) this interference was unjustified.” 
110
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 122, citing Peter W. Edge, “Current Problems in Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights” (1996) Jurid. Rev. 42, 43 [Edge, “Current 
Problems”] and C. Evans, supra note 77, 51-66. 
111
 For an excellent sample bibliography on freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
under the ECHR, see: Jean-François Renucci, Traité de droit européen des droits de la 
personne (Paris, L.G.D.J., 2007), 191, 193-194, 206-207. 
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freedom of religion112. Kokkinakis113, in 1993, was the first case that directly 
addressed Article 9 ECHR and explained the provision as followed: 
 
“As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one 
of the foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention. It 
is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the 
identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for 
atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”114 
 
While the court in Kokkinakis was commended for addressing freedom of religion at 
length at last, the pluralism inseparable from a democratic society has been the 
subject of much criticism, bringing to the forefront the level of state discretion that 
should be attributed in matters of religion115. I consider that the Strasbourg approach 
                                               
112
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 122; Edge, supra note 110, 43 and C. Evans, supra note 77, 
51-66; Renucci, ibid, 197; M.D. Evans, supra note 106, 9-14. 
113
 Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A [Kokkinakis]. 
114
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, ¶ 31. 
115
 Consider, most recently, Şahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, ECHR 2005-XI [Şahin], ¶ 109, 
where the Court was faced with the issue of students wearing headscarves in universities in 
Turkey. The Court recognised that the role of the national decision making body must be 
given special importance when opinions differ widely on the relationship between the state 
and religion in a democratic society. Domestic differences are determinate in such cases. 
Author Howard Gilbert, in a case comment on Şahin argued that the ECtHR should clearly 
identify the extent to which it has overruled past jurisprudence. First, the Court must articulate 
what beliefs held by an individual fall within the scope of Art. 9(1). […] The second area of 
development concerns the relationship between the belief and its manifestation. […] The third 
area of development, which the Court has begun to articulate, is under what circumstances is 
the State justified in restricting manifestations of belief?”, see Howard Gilbert, “Case 
Comment. Redefining Manifestation of Belief in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey” (2006) Eur. H.R.L. 
Rev. 308, 326. On the other hand, author Lech Garlicki has observed recently that the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on freedom on religion has developed into an “organized system of 
precedents” and submitted that freedom of religion must be afforded a wider margin of 
appreciation according to national differences: see Lech Garlicki, “Collective Aspects of the 
Religious Freedoms: Recent Developments in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights” in András Sajó, ed., Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a 
Fundamentalist World (Utretch, Eleven International Publishing, 2008), 217 at 230-232. 
Finally author Nicholas Hatzis recently decried Kokkinakis as being an “elliptical judgment” 
that leaves the reader with more questions than answers: see Nicholas Hatzis, “Neutrality, 
Proselytism, and Religious Minorities at the European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. 
Supreme Court” (2009) 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 120, 122. The recent decisions of Dogru c. 
France, App. No. 27058/05, decision of December 12 2008 [Drogu] and Kervanci v. France, 
App. No. 31645/04, decision of December 12 2008 (def. decision on March 4 2009) 
[Kervanci] also found that the right to freedom of religion had not been violated by the State. 
At issue was the claimants’ exclusion from their school, following their refusal to remove their 
veil during physical education classes. In both cases, the Court unanimously found that the 
claimants’ right to freedom of religion, as protected under art. 9 ECHR, as well as under art. 2 
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appropriately reflects the intrinsic difficulties of managing multiple national 
discourses under a supranational umbrella, and thus bringing diverse yet relevant 
considerations to the forefront in the discourse on defining religion in law.  
 
Ahdar and Leigh have expressed disapproval of the ECtHR’s reticence to 
clarify its notion of ‘religion’ and questioned the seemingly haphazard approach in 
protecting religious rights116. Authors Robin Hopkins and Can V. Yeginsu, in their 
recent analysis of religious liberty in British courts, argue that “[c]umulatively, the 
Article 9 apparatus demands too much of claimants and too little of defendants.”117 
Author Paul Taylor, in a comprehensive volume on UN and European human rights 
law and practice on freedom of religion, has suggested that the European Court of 
Human Rights should pay more attention to the global context in general and to the 
United Nations materials in particular when rendering decisions on religious 
minorities118. Finally, authors Malcolm Evans and Peter Petkoff have argued that it is 
time for the ECtHR to adopt a new narrative when deciding on freedom of religion 
cases. More particularly, they argued that “[o]ne specific problem area which 
                                                                                                                                      
of the First Protocol, had not been violated. The Court found, as related in Kervanci, that the 
restriction to the rights of the claimants to manifest their religious convictions was justified 
given the imperatives of laïcité in the shared space of schools: see Kervanci, supra, ¶ 17.  
For further discussion on the margin of appreciation, see infra, Chapter III, section 1.2. 
116
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 124. The authors explain, at the same page, that 
“[c]omplainants from the major religions alleging violation of their Article 9 rights have been 
accepted as falling within its purview with no explanation, as have those from the Druids, 
Scientologists and a new religion, the Divine Light Zentrum. […] The reason why Article 9 has 
been passed over may be the explanation suggested by [Wojciech] Sadurski (although the 
court has never articulated it with this degree of prescience): courts harbour a general 
unwillingness to differentiate religion from other beliefs deemed worthwhile.” [references 
omitted] 
117
 Hopkins & Yeginsu, “Religious Liberty in British Courts”, supra note 109, 38. The authors 
propose that the risk of future injustice could be reduced in two ways, at the same page: 
“First, claimants’ choices should be examined alongside defendants’ conduct under the 
justification test, rather than in isolation under the interference test. Interference should 
simply be treated as a substantial restriction on manifestation. Secondly, defendants should 
not be afforded a deferentially wide margin of appreciation; rigorous judicial scrutiny is 
essential to the protection of religious liberty.” 
118
 Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 351. The author suggested, at the same 
page, that the ECtHR should “derive a greater appreciation of the significance to minority 
religions in European countries of different forms in which religious beliefs is manifested; to 
avoid any unnecessary departure from Human Rights Committee practice; and to forewarn 
the European Court of the significance of certain violations where they are better understood 
by reference to parallel situations in countries outside Europe.” 
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emerges from the jurisprudence of the ECHR is the way in which the Court combines 
neutrality with certain sociological and empirical patterns when considering what is or 
is not ‘religious’.”119  
 
This brief incursion into the issues surrounding article 9 ECHR – and thus the 
Strasbourg approach – has underscored a general lack of cogency when examining 
freedom of religion. In addition to the definitional problem, I also point to the 
unresolved nature of the protection of sects120; the place of beliefs, which receive 
protection only when manifested121; the private-public divide when exercising one’s 
beliefs122; as well as the protection that should be afforded to the (religious) 
community. I consider it necessary, however, to demonstrate the difficulties in 
managing pluralism and democracy in a supranational discourse on freedom of 
religion. 
 
2.4 Conclusion on Defining Religion in Law 
 
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have recently best explained the 
problem of defining religion in law by employing an unlikely source: the dark humour 
of Monty Python. In one skit, a deadly joke is created by the British to counter the 
Germans during the Second World War. The German version of the joke proved to 
be lethal and has its auditors fall into hysterics and explode; a similar fate is also 
reserved for the teller of the joke, which proves to be its fatal flaw123. Eisgruber and 
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 Malcolm Evans and Peter Petkoff, “A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of 
Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2008) 36(3) Relig. 
State Soc. 206, 206 [Evans & Petkoff, “Separation of Convenience”]. The authors 
conclude at page 216 that “[i]n this particular context the neutrality approach, or at least the 
way it has been developed by the ECHR, marks a departure from an understanding of 
human rights as legal tools, and as far as freedom of religion or belief is concerned, has 
resulted in a problematic notion of what neutrality entails.” 
120
 Renucci, supra note 111, 197-198. 
121
 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 124-125; C. Evans, supra note 77, 65-66. 
122
 Renucci, supra note 111, 199-200. 
123
 Authors Eisgruber and Sager note that the Monty Python skit can be viewed at 
YouTube.com, Monty Python: World’s Funniest Joke, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhmnOpoGAPw (site last accessed 03.07.2009), see 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, “Does it really Matter what Religion Is?” 
(2009) 84(2) Notre Dame L. Rev. 807 at 807. 
Chapter I. Theoretical Conceptions of Religion: Toward a Better Understanding  
In and Out of Law 
 
 
 
34
Sager draw a parallel with religious liberty, since its definition proves to be as self-
destructive: 
 
“The problem goes roughly like this: in order to protect religious liberty we have to 
define what religion is, and once we are in the business of saying that some beliefs, 
commitments, and projects are entitled to special treatment as “religion” while others 
are not, we are creating a sphere of orthodoxy of exactly the sort that any plausible 
understanding of religious liberty should deplore.”124 
 
While this situation is particularly apt at describing the American constitutional 
condition and the costs of wading into the debate on freedom of religion – and this, 
contrarily to the Establishment Clause, no less – the implications of this dilemma are 
far reaching. 
 
While both the substantive-content as well as the subjective-functional 
approach provide interesting avenues of discussion of religion in law, they each 
suffer from a fatal flaw. While the latter approach focuses on the sincerity of the 
individual’s belief, the former approach concentrates on the ultimate nature of the 
ideas. Not to be outdone, the Strasbourg approach does not provide a central focus 
to the protection and leaves many questions unanswered in its wake.  
 
 I considered that an examination of religion in life (though the lens of 
sociology and anthropology) would provide a better understanding of defining 
religion in law. I posit that the same questions can be asked of religion in both life 
and law. First, should there be a definition of religion in law? Both the substantive-
content and subjective-functional approaches to religion demonstrate, in my view, 
that it is equally challenging to define religion from the perspective of the individual 
as well as from the perspective of the idea (religion). The subjective-functional 
approach promotes a continual re-evaluation of religion by the individual and its 
relationship with other social orders; the substantive-content approach, by placing 
unwavering importance on the presence of the supernatural, unequivocally draws 
the line between the sacred and the profane. Nevertheless, the substantive-content 
approach, by Wittgenstein’s interim, also makes way for ‘unpredictable evolution’, 
                                               
124
 Ibid. 
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which renders this approach more difficult. In both these discourses, the importance 
of the community is omitted; in doing so, contextualising the definition of religion in 
law becomes improbable. Second, in defining religion, is there necessarily a 
definition of what is to be considered sacred and profane? The result cannot be 
ignored since islands of sacred space are created and secular justifications can 
become misappropriated125 in this discourse on religion in law. Lastly, can religion in 
law be interpreted as being a culture? This approach to defining religion in law can 
be observed in the Strasbourg approach, which points to religion as being part of a 
larger web of influences, lest I say cultures, which indicates to a cacophony of 
voices.  
  
In conclusion, defining religion in law has established that it should not be 
taken as a solitary exercise, but rather that other forces and social orders should be 
taken into account, in order to better grasp the implication of definition and the 
consequence of protection.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Religion has been examined and further understood in both life and law. The 
reservations as well as the complications in defining such a laden concept in both 
settings have also been witnessed. Examining religion through the lenses of Weber, 
Durkheim and Geertz has granted us with a better understanding of the action and 
reaction to religion in life. This socio-anthropological lens on religion has also 
presented an unseen facet of religion in law: the importance of the community. In all 
three discourses on religion in life, the community calibrates the timbre of the 
religious beliefs. However one must also accept that religion, as understood in the 
social sciences, is not entirely transposable in law. As such the limits of 
constitutionalism and more specifically, of constitutional liberalism126, must be 
acknowledged.  
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 See Evans & Petkoff, “Separation of Convenience”, supra note 119. 
126
 See Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20.  
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Both the sincerity approach (subjective-functional) and the sacredness 
approach (substantive-content) pose significant problems to defining religion in law, 
since one relies on the sincerity of the individual’s beliefs and the other depends on 
the sacredness of the belief system, as understood by the judge. While the 
Strasbourg approach focuses at once on freedom of religion as inseparable from 
pluralism and democracy, the results are underwhelming and do not provide a 
consistent discourse on religion. However, unlike the substantive-content and 
subjective-functional approaches, the Strasbourg approach makes place for both 
religious and non-religious beliefs, for both the individual and the community.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that there are no ‘magic 
barometers’ or ‘eureka moments’ to help one discern what can be considered a 
trivial burden on one’s religious beliefs or when one can be considered mature 
enough to make decisions based on their religious beliefs. Justice LeBel’s reference 
to freedom of religion as “highly textured”127 in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony 
fully illustrates the complexity of handling such a fundamental freedom in the Charter 
era. The texture of freedom of religion – if one can use such a term – can differ 
according to the feel, surface, quality, consistency and grain. In examining sincere 
individual beliefs to profoundly communitarian interests of religion, a subtle shift in 
paradigm can be observed. Whereas Amselem defined both religion and sincere 
beliefs, the focus has shifted to the impact of competing beliefs and Charter 
values128. In this manner, we are witnessing, I believe, the intersection of the 
definitions of religion and of sincerely held beliefs. Put differently, this sheds light on 
the reluctant juncture between the subjective functional and substantive content 
approaches to defining religion in law in Canadian constitutional law.   
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 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 181. 
128
 On the rise of “Charter values” and their significance, see Mark Antaki, “The Turn to 
“Values” in Canadian Constitutional Law” in Luc B. Tremblay and Grégoire C. Webber, eds., 
La limitation des droits de la Charte: essais critiques sur l’arrêt R. c. Oakes/The Limitation of 
Charter Rights: Critical Essays on R. v. Oakes (Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 2009), 155-181. 
The author observes at pages 180-181 that in order “[t]o better grasp the significance of 
“values” as our ethical keyword, then, we must inquire into the significance of our having 
become “subjects” – as individuals, groups, societies, even as humanity – and of all beings 
(including ourselves) having become “objects”. […] Changing our “values” may not be much 
more than a first step in achieving some clarity about our world and ourselves, including how 
we live a life in, or of, the law.”  
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I have emphasised that the Canadian approach to religion in law straddles 
the subjective-functional as well substantive-content approach. The survey of religion 
in life (through the social sciences) has helped illustrate the forces at work and the 
powers at play when managing such a concept and balancing it with other rights in 
society. This interpretation differs from the one presented by authors Ahdar and 
Leigh129 who inserted the Canadian approach in the substantive-content typology 
and Beaman130 who concluded on a subjective-functional definition of religion. This 
straddling approach, at times both subjective and substantive, demonstrates and 
exemplifies the Canadian condition, in my view. In a way, the approach put forward 
by the Canadian Supreme Court demonstrates that methods employed to define 
religion should not be exclusive, but rather, should draw from all available sources to 
truly reflect, to the best of their abilities, what religion means in a particular legal 
circumstance. 
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 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 119. 
130
 See Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, 194. 
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Chapter II. The ‘First Freedom’: Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between freedom of conscience 
and freedom of religion, as protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The study of freedom of religion should be understood as the background 
to my study on freedom of conscience. Freedom of religion is present, as is its sister 
freedom of conscience, in constitutional as well as quasi-constitutional documents; 
their fates are unequivocally and conceptually linked. In this sense, I will attempt to 
redress the composition of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience in an effort 
to better understand these two fundamentally interrelated freedoms.  
 
Freedom of religion has benefited from a long tradition of existence in 
Canada. However, this right has never been perceived as being absolute: in this 
way, not only should the development of freedom of religion be examined – as well 
as its limits – but also its accommodation. While it is beyond my scope of study to 
trace a linear history of freedom of religion, I have elected to examine freedom of 
religion under three successive waves: first, before the enactment of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights (1.1); second, under the Canadian Bill of Rights (1.2); lastly, after the 
enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1.3). I have labelled 
these waves as follows: ‘witnessing’ religion; ‘observing’ religion; and ‘protecting’ 
religion. By ‘witnessing’ religion I intend to examine the period under the British North 
America Act and thus before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights. This 
period is of interest since it marks the increasingly visible minority religious groups. 
By ‘observing’ religion, I plan to analyse the situation of religious freedom under the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, where freedom of religion was acknowledged but its 
protection was severely limited in scope. Finally, ‘contextualising’ religion refers to 
freedom of religion as protected as a fundamental freedom under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
 
My objective is to present a jurisprudential view of religion up to the definition 
of religion proffered by the Supreme Court in Amselem (1.3.1). The aftermath of 
Amselem is addressed further on in my study (1.3.2). While it is uncontested that 
freedom of religion has developed most profoundly in the Charter era, I consider it 
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necessary to contextualise its progress. Finally, I will examine how a violation of 
freedom of religion can be addressed in law (1.4), through the duty to accommodate 
religion within reasonable limits (1.4.1) and under the proportionality lens of the 
Oakes’ test (1.4.2). 
 
In a second section, I will address, without purporting to settle them all, 
certain unresolved issues pertaining to freedom of religion in Canada, namely: the 
sincerity of the belief of the individual (2.1), the place of expert evidence and the 
impact on community views of religion (2.2) and a child’s right to freedom of 
conscience and religion (2.3). I will also offer, in closing, a brief conclusion on 
freedom of religion in Canada (2.4). 
 
To the extent that freedom of religion has been, as I shall demonstrate, the 
main concern of Canadian courts since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, I will thus first address the constitutional interpretation of that 
"first freedom". I will examine how freedom of conscience can be disentangled from it 
in the following chapter. 
 
 
1. Freedom of Religion: a Retrospective 
 
1.1 Witnessing Religion: Prior to the Canadian Bill of Rights 
 
 The British North America Act131 established a roadmap for the union of 
Canada and indicated the federal division of powers. It did not, however, confer 
individual rights, never mind religious rights132. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in one of his 
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 British North America Act, (1867) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. (U.K.) [BNA Act]. 
132
 In Saumur v. City of Québec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 [Saumur], Kerwin J. explained that 
Canada did not have a Bill of Rights at page 324: “We have not a Bill of Rights such as is 
contained in the United States Constitution and decisions on that part of the latter are of no 
assistance. While it is true that, as recited in the preamble to the British North America Act 
the three Provinces expressed a desire to be federally united with a constitution similar in 
principle to that of the United Kingdom, a complete division of legislative powers being 
effected by the Act, I assume as it was assumed in Re Adoption Act 18, (with reference, it is 
true, to entirely different matters) that Provincial Legislatures are willing and able to deal with 
matters of importance and substance that are within their legislative jurisdiction. It is perhaps 
Chapter II. The Relationship between Freedom of Conscience and  
Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
 
40
last articles as a law professor, trenchantly set aside the BNA Act for ‘its lack of 
principles, ideals, or other frills”133. Under the BNA Act, religion was conceptualised 
in terms of majority-minority group setting134 and thus special status was granted to 
certain minority groups, namely through education provisions135. For instance, 
whereas the laws on marriage were of federal competence136, the solemnization of 
marriage was deemed a provincial matter137. Moreover, s. 92(13) and 92(16) of the 
BNA Act could also be read as applying to (religious) civil rights138.  
 
In this way, it was not surprising that certain minority religious groups, such 
as Mennonites, Hutterites and Jehovah’s Witnesses, found more than their fair share 
of cases before the courts. In particular, the increasing visibility of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and protracted friction with both the Roman Catholic Church and State 
amplified adjudication before the courts in the 1950s in Québec. During this period, 
religious beliefs were thought to be at odds with criminal code provisions139, 
                                                                                                                                      
needless to say that nothing in the foregoing has reference to matters that are confined to 
Parliament.” 
133
 As quoted by Margaret H. Ogilvie, “Between liberté and égalité : Religion and the state in 
Canada” in Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson and Rosalind F. Croucher, eds., Law and 
Religion: God, the State and the Common Law (London, Routledge, 2005), 134 at 135 
[Ogilvie, “Between liberté and égalité”], citing Kevin J. Christiano, “Church and State in 
Institutional Flux: Canada and the United States” in David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die, 
eds., Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000), 
69 at p. 73. 
134
 According to Ogilvie, ibid, at 137 [notes omitted]: “[b]etween 1867 and 1982, religion was 
subjected to constitutional judicial review in relation to temperance and Sunday closing 
legislation as promoted by the Social Gospel movement, as well as ongoing s 93 
denominational school funding disputes.” 
135
 BNA Act, supra note 131, s. 93. Québec and Newfoundland have opted out of the 
aforementioned educational provisions: see s. 93A of the BNA Act and Constitution 
Amendment, 1997 (Quebec), SI/97-141 and Constitutional Amendment, 1998 
(Newfoundland), SI/98-25.  
136
 Ibid, s. 91(26). 
137
 BNA Act, supra note 131, s. 92(12). 
138
 This was noted by Rand J. in Saumur, supra note 132, 329. See BNA Act, supra note 131, 
s. 92(13) and 92(16): “92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in 
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is 
to say, - 
[…] 
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province. 
[…] 
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.” 
139
 Boucher  v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265 [Boucher]. 
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provincial licensing laws140 as well as municipal by-laws141, implicating each level of 
government in turn.  
 
The distribution of a pamphlet was at the centre of the controversy in Boucher 
and was entitled “Québec’s burning hatred for God and Christ and freedom is the 
shame of all Canada”. While a highly divided Supreme Court (Rinfret C.J., 
Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. dissenting) found that the accusation of 
seditious libel was ultimately unfounded due to lack of evidence in Boucher, the 
hostile passages in the pamphlets questioned the ‘good will’ between the people of 
Québec and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Justice Rand thoughtfully and thoroughly 
dissected the act of sedition142 and opined that differences in ideas were 
indispensable: 
 
“Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every 
conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of critical discussion on 
political, social and religious subjects has too deeply become the stuff of daily 
experience to suggest that mere ill-will as a product of controversy can strike down 
the latter with illegality. A superficial examination of the word shows its insufficiency: 
what is the degree necessary to criminality? Can it ever, as mere subjective 
condition, be so? Controversial fury is aroused constantly by differences in 
abstract conceptions; heresy in some fields is again a mortal sin; there can be 
fanatical puritanism in ideas as well as in mortals; but our compact of free 
society accepts and absorbs these differences and they are exercised at large 
within the frame-work of freedom and order on broader and deeper uniformities 
as bases of social stability. Similarly in discontent, affection and hostility: as 
subjective incidents of controversy, they and the ideas which arouse them are part of 
our living which ultimately serve us in stimulation, in the clarification of thought and, 
as we believe, in the search for the constitution and truth of things generally.”143 
 
While the distributed pamphlet was undoubtedly inflammatory, Justice Rand’s 
comments still resonate, emphasising the need for difference in opinions, difference 
actually strengthens the foundations of the social framework. 
                                               
140
 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli]. 
141
 Saumur, supra note 132. 
142
 For an interesting discussion on the common law definition of sedition, see Luc B. 
Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice, and Interpretation (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1997), 112-115. According to the author at page 122, Justice Cartwright’s 
interpretation of sedition in Boucher “was consistent with the orthodox doctrine of the 
sovereignty of Parliament. The paramount guiding point of view was the legislative intention 
and, insofar as one tries to infer it from the pre-existing state of law, that intention was 
reasonably clear.” 
143
 Boucher, supra note 139, 288 [my emphasis]. 
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The legality of distributing pamphlets was once again raised in Saumur, 
where a less divided Supreme Court (Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau J. dissenting) had 
to determine whether Jehovah’s Witnesses were entitled to free exercise and 
enjoyment of their religious profession and worship144. At issue was clause 2 of By-
Law 184 of the City of Québec, which stipulated that no pamphlets – amongst other 
forms of communication – should be handed out without having previously obtained 
the written permission of the Chief of Police. While By-Law 184 unearthed questions 
of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the plaintiff should not be 
found guilty of contravening the aforementioned municipal by-law. Subjected to 
harsh criticism by certain judges, the by-law was deemed to be overly broad and 
imprecise in the language employed. The unintended outcome of this was a tangle in 
the division of powers and a curtailing of constitutional protections145. Saumur 
furthermore demonstrated the historical legacy of religious freedom in Canada, as 
put once again so eloquently by Justice Rand:  
 
“From 1760, therefore, to the present moment religious freedom has, in our legal 
system, been recognized as a principle of fundamental character; and although we 
have nothing in the nature of an established church, that the untrammelled 
affirmations of ‘religious belief’ and its propagation, personal or institution, 
remain as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout the Dominion 
is unquestionable.”146 
 
                                               
144
 While Kerwin J. noted that even though Jehovah’s Witnesses would not consider 
belonging to a « religion », he stated that they were entitled to enjoy their religious tenets, 
whether they are through worship or sharing the message of their faith: see Saumur, supra 
note 132, 299, 321. 
145
 As stated by Justice Rand in Saumur, supra note 132, 333: “In our political organization, 
as in federal structures generally, that is the condition of legislation by any authority within it: 
the courts must be able from its language and its relevant circumstances, to attribute an 
enactment to a matter in relation to which the legislature acting has been empowered to 
make laws. That principle inheres in the nature of federalism; otherwise, authority, in broad 
and general terms, could be conferred which would end the division of powers. Where the 
language is sufficiently specific and can fairly be interpreted as applying only to matter within 
the enacting jurisdiction, that attribution will be made; and where the requisite elements are 
present, there is the rule of severability. But to authorize action which may be related 
indifferently to a variety of incompatible matters by means of the device of a discretionary 
license cannot be brought within either of these mechanisms; and the Court is powerless, 
under general language that overlaps exclusive jurisdictions, to delineate and preserve valid 
power in a segregated form. If the purpose is street regulation, taxation, registration or 
other local object, the language must, with sufficient precision, define the matter and 
mode of administration; and by no expedient which ignores that requirement can 
constitutional limitations be circumvented.” [my emphasis] 
146
 Saumur, supra note 132, 327 [my emphasis]. 
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“That legislation "in relation" to religion and its profession is not a local or private 
matter would seem to me to be self-evident: the dimensions of this interest are 
nationwide; it is even today embodied in the highest level of the constitutionalism of 
Great Britain; it appertains to a boundless field of ideas, beliefs and faiths with the 
deepest roots and loyalties; a religious incident reverberates from one end of this 
country to the other, and there is nothing to which the "body politic of the 
Dominion" is more sensitive.”147 
 
Reference to the Dominion provided an opening into the affirmation of an 
alleged “implied bill of rights”. The fundamental freedoms of speech, assembly, 
association, press, and religion, inherited from the United Kingdom were made part 
of the Constitution by the preamble of the BNA Act148.  
 
Following the overture in Saumur, equality of religions was addressed in 
Chaput v. Romain149, where Taschereau J. (speaking for Kerwin and Estey JJ.), 
explained that individual liberty existed with regard to religion150. The Supreme Court 
asserted that in this light, the police were wrong to break up a meeting of Jehovah’s 
                                               
147
 Saumur, supra note 132, 329 [my emphasis]. 
148
 As noted by Beetz J. (speaking for the majority) in Attorney General (Canada) and 
Dupond v. City of Montréal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 796 [Dupond]. Dupond is largely credited 
for having “killed” the doctrine of the implied Bill of Rights. The Preamble of the BNA Act, 
supra note 128, states: 
 
“Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their 
Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United 
Kingdom:  
 
And whereas such a Union would conduce to the Welfare of the Provinces and promote the 
Interests of the British Empire:  
 
And whereas on the Establishment of the Union by Authority of Parliament it is expedient, not 
only that the Constitution of the Legislative Authority in the Dominion be provided for, but also 
that the Nature of the Executive Government therein be declared:  
 
And whereas it is expedient that Provision be made for the eventual Admission into the Union 
of other Parts of British North America:” 
 
149
 Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834 [Chaput]. 
150
 Ibid, 840: “In our country there is no state religion. All religions are on an equal footing, 
and Catholics as well as Protestants, Jews, and other adherents to various religious 
denominations, enjoy the most complete liberty of thought. The conscience of each is a 
personal matter and the concern of nobody else. It would be distressing to think that a 
majority might impose its religious views upon a minority, and it would also be a shocking 
error to believe that one serves his country or his religion by denying in one Province, to a 
minority, the same rights which one rightly claims for oneself in another Province.” 
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Witnesses in an individual’s house, especially when accomplished without warrants 
or following appropriate procedure.  
 
Roncarelli provided the final piece of the “witnessing religion” era: although 
primarily a personal action, this case challenged the extent of a public officer’s 
discretionary role. At that time, the defendant Maurice Duplessis was Attorney-
General and Premier of Québec. At issue was whether an individual can be 
sanctioned economically for having expressed his religious views as a Jehovah’s 
Witness. More particularly, the court examined whether a liquor license could be 
revoked because the individual chose to bail out his fellow believers. Once again, as 
noted by author Luc B. Tremblay, Justice Rand’s opinion emerged and was 
accepted as the most important151. Justice Rand found that the permanent 
disqualification of the plaintiff from economic life was above and beyond the realm of 
discretionary powers held by the Premier152. Fundamentally, this case highlighted the 
historic disadvantage of religious subgroups and their often arbitrary treatment by not 
only greater society but also governmental actors153. 
 
 The era prior to the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights proved to be 
very dark for certain minority groups in Canada. Some, such as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, clashed greatly with the established Catholic Church in Québec while 
others found ways to cohabitate more quietly. While statutes protected religious 
beliefs to a certain extent, dating as back as far as the pre-Confederation period154 
                                               
151
 Tremblay, supra note 142, 115. 
152
 Roncarelli, supra note 140, 141 (Rand J.): “To deny or revoke a permit because a citizen 
exercises an unchallengeable right totally irrelevant to the sale of liquor in a restaurant is 
equally beyond the scope of the discretion conferred. There was here not only revocation of 
the existing permit but a declaration of a future, definitive disqualification of the appellant to 
obtain one: it was to be "forever". This purports to divest his citizenship status of its incident 
of membership in the class of those of the public to whom such a privilege could be 
extended. Under the statutory language here, that is not competent to the Commission and a 
fortiori to the government or the respondent.” [references omitted] 
153
 This point was underlined by L’Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting) in Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 609, ¶ 80 [Adler]. 
154
 As cited in Saumur, supra note 132, at 321: “ […] However, an argument was advanced 
based upon a pre-Confederation statute of 1852 of the old Province of Canada, 14-15 Viet. e. 
175, the relevant part of which provides:— 
the free exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession and Worship, without discrimination 
or preference, so as the same be not made an excuse for acts of licentiousness, or a 
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and as recently as the Freedom of Worship Act155 in Québec, the “witnessing 
religion” era provided the observer with fractured dialogues on religious values.   
 
1.2 Observing Religion: Under the Canadian Bill of Rights 
 
 The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960156 presented Canadians 
with a more tangible protection of religion157, though limited to matters within the 
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada158. The Parliament sought, however, 
to make the Canadian Bill of Rights relevant to the society into which this law was to 
be introduced159, by employing verbs such as “recognized” and “declared”160.  
 
The confluence of criminal law and religious freedom was once again at the 
forefront in Robertson and Rosetanni v. R.161, in which the majority of the Supreme 
Court – under Ritchie J. – sought to emphasise the effect of the Lord’s Day Act 
rather than its purpose162. The Lord’s Day Act was recognised as being purely 
“secular and financial”163 rather than having “abrogate[d], abridge[d], or infringe[d] or 
authorize[d] the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of religious freedom.”164 
Therefore, it was deemed not to have contravened the Bill of Rights. The Lord’s Day 
                                                                                                                                      
justification of practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the Province, is by the 
constitution and laws of this Province allowed to all Her Majesty's subjects within the same.” 
155
 Freedom of Worship Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 307. 
156
 Canadian Bill of Rights (1960, c. 44 ) [Canadian Bill of Rights]. 
157
 Ibid, s. 1(c): “It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and 
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion 
or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, 
[…] 
(c) freedom of religion” [my emphasis] 
158
 Ibid, s. 5(2) and 5(3). 
159
 As stated by Ritchie J. in Robertson and Rosetanni v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 651 [Robertson 
and Rosetanni], at p. 654-655. See also s. 5 of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
160
 Robertson and Rosetanni, ibid, 654: “It is to be noted at the outset that the Canadian Bill 
of Rights is not concerned with "human rights and fundamental freedoms" in an abstract 
sense, but rather with such "rights and freedoms" as they existed in Canada immediately 
before the statute was enacted [...] It is therefore the "religious freedom" then existing in this 
country that is safe-guarded by the provisions of s. 2...” 
161
 Ibid. 
162
 Ibid, 567. 
163
 Ibid, 567. 
164
 Ibid, 568. 
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Act was later found to be religious in purpose under the Charter era, where, this 
time, its constitutionality was discussed rather than its application165.  
 
 Before concluding on ‘observing religion’, I consider it necessary to highlight 
the human rights’ progress made at the provincial level, showing that the country 
was indeed operating on two speeds of rights. While not the first province to adopt a 
human rights code in Canada166, it was the breadth of protection afforded to its 
citizens which made Québec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms167 
singular168. Propitious, given the international pacts that came into force around the 
time of its adoption169, the Québec Charter found its meaning within the leading texts 
on human rights170. The Québec Charter sought to protect conscience and religion, 
not only as fundamental freedoms171, but also, in the case of religion, as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination172, except when a distinction based on aptitudes exist173. 
                                               
165
 Robertson and Rosetanni, supra note 159, 560-562. At 562, Cartwright J. stated: 
“Whether the imposition, under penal sanctions, of a certain standard of religious conduct on 
the whole population is desirable is, of course, a question for Parliament to decide. But in 
enacting the Canadian Bill of Rights Parliament has thrown upon the courts the responsibility 
of deciding, in each case in which the question arises, whether such an imposition infringes 
the freedom of religion in Canada.” In Big M. Drug Mart, Dickson J. distinguished between 
the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: the former 
was seen as declarative whereas the latter was interpreted as imperative: see Big M Drug 
Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 114-115. 
166
 See: Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947, S.S. 1947, c.35; Ontario Human Rights Code 
S.O. 1961-62, c.93; Nova Scotia Human Rights Act S.N.S. 1963 c.5; Alberta Human Rights 
Act S.A. 1966, c.39 and Individual Rights Protection Act S.A. 1972, c.2; New Brunswick 
Human Rights Act S.N.B. 1967 c. 13; P.E.I. Human Rights Act S. P.E.I. 1968 c. 24; 
Newfounland Human Rights Act S. Nfld. 1969, No. 75; British Columbia Human Rights Act 
S.B.C. 1969 c.10; Manitoba Human Rights Act S.M 1970, c.104. 
167
 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, L.R.Q. c. C-12 (adopted on June 27th 1975, 
enacted in law on June 28th 1976) [Québec Charter]. 
168
 Professor André Morel, in a 1987 article, referred to the Québec Charter as being of 
unequalled scope since 1975: see André Morel, “La Charte québécoise: un document unique 
dans l’histoire legislative canadienne”, (1987) 21 R.J.T. 1, 16. 
169
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) 999 R.T.N.U. 171; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (1976) 993 R.T.N.U. 3. 
170
 See Michèle Rivet, « Entre stabilité et fluidité : le juge, arbitre des valeurs » in TRIBUNAL 
DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE AND BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, La Charte des droits et libertés de la 
personne : pour qui et jusqu’où? (Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005), 1 at 5-6. 
171
 Québec Charter, supra note 167, art. 3: “Every person is the possessor of the 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of 
opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.” 
172
 Ibid, art. 10: 
“Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and 
freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, 
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 Religion was observed, rather as a passing occurrence than addressed as a 
tangible concern in this section. Limited by its own legislative existence, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights only extended to the “Law of Canada” and the jurisdiction of 
the Parliament174. While its existence was recognised, religion (and by extension 
religious values) did not foster a constructive dialogue in constitutional law, since its 
meaning and scope was deemed frozen to its pre-Canadian Bill of Rights status.  
 
1.3 Protecting Religion: Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
 The Charter heralded a new era for religious freedom in Canada, namely by 
protecting it as a constitutionally recognised175 fundamental freedom176. While it is 
readily acknowledged that the history of freedom of religion under the Charter 
represents a self-contained dissertation and has been addressed in extenso by 
authors177, I have elected to use this as the backdrop of my study. The contextual 
study of freedom of religion will be presented in two parts: from Sunday closings to 
opening prayers (1.3.1) and from sincere individual beliefs to profoundly 
                                                                                                                                      
sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, 
language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to 
palliate a handicap. 
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing such right.” 
173
 Québec Charter, supra note 167, art. 20: “A distinction, exclusion or preference based on 
the aptitudes or qualifications required for an employment, or justified by the charitable, 
philanthropic, religious, political or educational nature of a non-profit institution or of an 
institution devoted exclusively to the well-being of an ethnic group, is deemed non-
discriminatory.” 
174
 Supra, note 158. 
175
 The primacy of the Constitution of Canada is guaranteed by s. 52(1) of the Constitution of 
Canada, which states that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada.  
176
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 1, s. 2a): “Everyone has the 
following fundamental freedoms: 
a) freedom of conscience and religion”. 
177
 See, for example: Paul Horowitz, “The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a 
Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond” (1996) 54 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1 [Horowitz, 
“Sources and Limits”]; David M. Brown, “Freedom from or Freedom for? Religion as a 
Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33 UBC L. Rev. 1 [Brown, 
“Religion as a Case Study”]; José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable 
et l’adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 325 [Woehrling, 
“L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable”]; Benjamin Berger, “The Limits of Belief: 
Freedom of Religion, Secularism and the Liberal State” (2002) 17 C.J.L.S. 39 [Berger, 
“Limits of Belief”]; Pierre Bosset and Paul Eid, « Droit et religion : de l’accommodement 
raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif ? », (2007) 41 R.J.T. 513 [Bosset & Eid, “Droit et 
religion”]; Moon, supra note 4. 
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communitarian interests (1.3.2). While the first part spans both secular and religious 
Sunday closing laws up to requirements of secularism and non-sectarianism in 
public settings, the second part of the study will examine the development of a test 
on the sincerity of belief to the implications for collective beliefs.  
 
1.3.1 From Sunday Closings to Opening Prayers 
 
The Lord’s Day Act has become the connecting thread between epochs of 
religious freedom. Viewed as having an essentially “secular and financial” purpose in 
Robertson and Rosetanni, the Lord’s Day Act took on new meaning in R. v. Big M. 
Drug Mart, where “freedom of conscience and religion” was interpreted for the first 
time. Dickson J. – as he then was, and writing for Beetz, McIntyre, Chouinard and 
Lamer JJ. – explained that the aforementioned act could not be interpreted as having 
secular connotations178, since it brandished its religious purpose overtly179. 
Furthermore, a holistic approach to evaluating the Lord’s Day Act was suggested: it 
should be evaluated on the basis of effect and purpose rather than effect or 
purpose180. This approach also followed Justice Dickson’s interpretation of s. 2(a) as 
a “single integrated concept”181. As such, the religious purpose of the Lord’s Day Act 
was sufficient to demonstrate a breach of freedom of conscience and religion182 and 
no s. 1 analysis was conducted. Hence, Dickson J. encapsulated the fundamental 
freedom as followed: 
                                               
178
 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 68, ¶ 78. Although factually similar to Big M. Drug Mart, 
Robertson and Rosetanni must be distinguished, since the latter case was decided on the 
application and not the constitutionality (and thus purpose) of the legislation: see Big M. Drug 
Mart, supra, ¶ 86-88. This is not to say, however, that all statutes proclaiming a common day 
of rest should be considered as having a religious purpose: see R. v. Edwards Books and Art 
Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books], where the Supreme Court declared that the 
economic burden existed independently of the impugned legislation for the Saturday 
observers. 
179
 As noted by Dickson J., the religious purpose of the Lord’s Day Act had been conceded by 
the Attorney General for Alberta: see Big M Drug Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 79-80. 
180
 In this way, Dickson J. is also rejecting the “shifting purpose” argument presented, which 
suggested “new appreciations” and “re-assessments” of existing legislation. See Big M. Drug 
Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 93: “While the effect of such legislation as the Lord’s Day Act may be 
more secular today than it was in 1677 or in 1906, such a finding cannot justify a conclusion 
that its purpose has similarly changed. In result, therefore, the Lord’s Day Act must be 
characterized as it has always been, a law the primary purpose of which is the compulsion of 
sabbatical observance.” 
181
 Ibid, ¶ 120. 
182
 Ibid, ¶ 79-85. 
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“A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of 
tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.  A free society is one which aims at 
equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and I say this without 
any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter.  Freedom must surely be founded in respect for 
the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person.  The essence of the 
concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that. 
 
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. If a 
person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course of action or inaction 
which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he 
cannot be said to be truly free. One of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, 
within reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such blatant 
forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of 
sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative 
courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both 
the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and 
practices. Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs 
or his conscience.”183 
 
In this way, freedom of conscience and religion – much like all other rights and 
freedoms contained in the Charter – is not an absolute right184, but rather one that is 
subject to limitations, given the intrinsic coexistence of each individual’s fundamental 
freedoms, as well as the reasonable limits imposed within a free and democratic 
society185.  
 
                                               
183
 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 94-95 [my emphasis]. 
184
 As stated in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at ¶ 65 [Oakes]. As noted in Trinity Western 
University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [Trinity Western] by 
Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. (writing for the majority), at ¶ 29-31, “In our opinion, this is a 
case where any potential conflict should be resolved through the proper delineation of the 
rights and values involved. In essence, properly defining the scope of the rights avoids a 
conflict in this case. Neither freedom of religion nor the guarantee against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is absolute. […] In addition, the Charter should be read as a 
whole, so that one right is not privileged at the expense of another.” In TWU, the majority of 
the Supreme Court found that while the TWU Community Standards aimed to circumscribe 
the conduct of its members, one could not conclude that these measures would translate to 
intolerant behaviour in public schools; furthermore, the Court concluded that alternative 
protections existed to protect both minority practices and the population at large: see TWU, ¶ 
32-33. 
185
 The issue of reasonable limits in a free and democratic society will be discussed further 
on. 
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Thus not all Sunday closing laws can be considered religious in nature. The 
Supreme Court in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Limited186, explained that the Ontario 
Retail Business Holiday Act187, was enacted for the secular purpose of providing a 
uniform holidays for retail workers. An exemption was also provided in the act188. 
Nevertheless, while there was an admitted breach of certain shopkeepers’ religious 
and equality rights, the violation was regarded as justified within a free and 
democratic society. Edwards Books granted the Supreme Court with a further 
opportunity to explain the function of s. 2(a) of the Charter, as articulated by Dickson 
C.J. (writing for Chouinard and Le Dain JJ.):  
 
“The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly 
personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in 
some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's 
conduct and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the 
extent that religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a 
state-imposed cost or burden to be proscribed by s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering 
with religious belief or practice. In short, legislative or administrative action which 
increases the cost of practising or otherwise manifesting religious beliefs is not 
prohibited if the burden is trivial or insubstantial”189 
  
Interestingly, Edwards Books also distinguished freedom of conscience from 
freedom of religion. Dickson J. (as he was then) proffered that s. 2(a) of the Charter 
be interpreted as a “single integrated concept” in Big M. Drug Mart but found in 
Edwards Books that freedom of religion, unlike freedom of conscience, had both 
individual and collective aspects190. While this did not create a discrepancy in 
interpretation, it can be inferred that conscience and religion, as fundamental 
freedoms, are not in fact interchangeable. This point will be addressed in further 
detail later on in the study. 
 
The issue of the insubstantial burden on religious beliefs was addressed by 
the Supreme Court the same year in The Queen v. Jones191. The appellant, Thomas 
                                               
186
 Edwards Books, supra note 176.  
187
 Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453, ss. 2(1), 3(4).  
188
 Ibid, ss. 2(1), 3(4). See Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 115-120, ¶ 144. 
189
 Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 97 [references omitted], as stated by Wilson J. 
(dissent.) in R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 [Jones], ¶ 67.    
190
 Edwards Books, ibid, ¶ 144. 
191
 Jones, supra note 189. 
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Larry Jones, pastor of a fundamentalist church, had taken on the education of twenty 
or so children under a schooling programme called “Western Baptist Academy”. This 
case opposed the right of parents to educate their children according to their beliefs 
and provincial compulsory education192. The appellant refused to request a state 
permit for his private school and also refused to send his own children to public 
schools since, in his view, education was mandated by God and not accountable to 
government193. In this way, the appellant argued that the Alberta School Act infringed 
on his s. 2(a) and s. 7 Charter rights. Although both arguments ultimately failed194, 
Justices McIntyre (writing for Beetz and Le Dain JJ.) and Wilson concurred that the 
Alberta School Act accommodated religious freedom. Wilson J. opined alone, 
however, that the appellant’s s. 7 Charter rights were violated195.  
 
Moreover, the Charter has offered “freedom from conformity” for minority 
religious groups; this point was emphasised strongly not only in Big M. Drug Mart, 
but also in the so-called ‘Elgin County’ cases196. These cases concerned the funding 
of education of denominational schools, as formulated by s. 93 of the BNA Act, which 
reflected the political and “historical compromise” between Catholics and Protestants 
leading to Confederation, as noted in Adler197. Both Zylberberg and CCLA questioned 
whether the right to freedom of conscience and religion was breached by the school 
boards in question. Whereas the former decision questioned the constitutionality of 
                                               
192
 School Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-3, ss. 142(1), 143(1) [Alberta School Act]. 
193
 Jones, supra note 189, ¶ 2-3, 19. The stalemate was niftily summed up by the trial judge 
in this case. See Jones, ¶ 6: “Section 143(1)(a) has given rise to what the trial judge has 
described as a standoff between "a stiff-necked parson and a stiff-necked education 
establishment, both demanding the other make the first move in the inquiry to determine 
whether the children are receiving efficient instruction outside the public or separate school 
system".” 
194
 Ibid, ¶ 33, 48-49 (Laforest J., writing for the majority). 
195
 Wilson J. offered a broad interpretation of the concept of liberty, though noting that this 
right did not give carte blanche on how to bring up and educate one’s children: see Ibid, ¶ 76-
77. Perhaps an intersection between freedom of conscience and religion and fundamental 
freedoms (in the sense of s. 7 of the Charter) occurs when Justice Wilson interprets the 
appellant’s real complaint as being effects-based rather than purpose-based; although 
Justice Wilson concludes that the appellant failed to show a substantial impact, this approach 
demonstrates the place of conscience in this context: Ibid, ¶ 67-69. 
196
 Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 96; the ‘Elgin County’ cases are: Zylberberg v. 
Sudbury Board of Education, 1988 CanLII 189 (ON. CA), p. 19 [Zylberberg]; Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 341 (C.A.) [CCLA]. 
See also Adler, supra note 153.  
197
 Adler, supra, ¶ 29. 
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prescribed religious exercises at the beginning or end of each day in public schools, the 
latter case concerned the constitutionality of the regulation and curriculum of the school 
board in question. As stated most recently by Chief Justice McLachlin (writing for 
Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ., concurring) in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony: “Canadian law reflects the fundamental proposition that the state cannot by 
law directly compel religious belief or practice. Thus this Court has held that if the 
purpose of a law is to interfere with religious practices, the law cannot be upheld 
[…] To compel religious practice by force of law deprives the individual of the 
fundamental right to choose his or her mode of religious experience, or lack 
thereof.”198  While the Supreme Court judged it important that membership in a 
“discrete and insular minority” be recognised in Adler, s. 93 of the BNA Act 
nevertheless confered a plenary power to the province. As underlined by Justice 
Iacobucci (writing for Lamer C.J.  and La Forest, Gonthier, Cory JJ.) one must 
distinguish between an ability and an obligation to pass legislation establishing and 
funding particular schools: “[i]f the plenary power is so insulated, then so is the proper 
exercise of it.”199  
 
Freedom of religion was further addressed in 1995 with B. (R.) v. Children’s 
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto200, where the majority of the Supreme Court 
refused to develop internal limits to the scope of freedom of religion. At issue was 
whether parents of a premature infant could object to a blood transfusion on the 
basis on their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses201. The Supreme Court held 
that a broad interpretation of freedom of religion should be favoured, in order to 
                                               
198
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 4 [references omitted]. 
199
 Adler, supra note 153, ¶ 48; see also Wilson J. in Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to amend the 
Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 1198 [Reference Re Bill 30]. 
200
 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [Children’s 
Aid Society]. 
201
 More specifically, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether “s. 19(1)(b)(ix) of the 
Ontario Child Welfare Act [R.S.O. 1980, c. 66 [rep. S.O. 1984, c. 55, s. 208]], which defines 
"child in need of protection", together with the powers in ss. 30(1)2 and 41 and the 
procedures in ss. 21, 27, 28(1), (10) and (12), denied parents a right to choose medical 
treatment for their infants, contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
or infringed the appellants' freedom of religion as guaranteed under s. 2(a) of the Charter, 
and, if so, whether the infringement was justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter: Children’s Aid 
Society, ibid, 316-317. 
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balance competing rights under section one of the Charter202. According to La Forest 
J. (writing for the majority), this approach gave necessary context as well as a broad 
power of judicial review203 when addressing complex and intermingling issues of 
freedom of conscience and religion.  
 
“The protection of a child’s right to life and to health, when it becomes necessary to 
do so, is a basic tenet of our legal system, and legislation to that end accords with the 
principles of fundamental justice, so long, of course, as it also meets the 
requirements of fair procedure.”204    
 
 
                                               
202
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, at 383-384; see also Ross v. New Brunswick 
School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross], at ¶ 73-75. 
203
 Children’s Aid Society, ibid, at 389: “In my view, Charter rights should always be 
interpreted broadly. Apart from the fact that this brings in the full contextual picture in 
balancing them with other rights under s. 1, a narrower interpretation has the effect of forever 
narrowing the ambit of judicial review, and so limiting the scope of judicial intervention for the 
protection of the individual rights guaranteed under the Charter.” Justices Iacobucci and 
Major, agreeing with the result reached by La Forest J., opined that an outer boundary can 
also be ascribed to s. 2(a) of the Charter, much like that of s. 2(d), as remarked upon in 
Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne], at 320-
21 (Laforest J.). An outer boundary was explained as follows by Justice Laforest in Lavigne 
at pages 320-321: “At the very fundamental level, it could certainly not have been intended that 
s. 2(d) protect us against the association with others that is a necessary and inevitable part of 
membership in a democratic community, the existence of which the Charter clearly 
assumes. […] Thus I doubt that s. 2(d) can entitle us to be free of all legal obligations that flow 
from membership in a family.  And the same can be said of the workplace.  In short, there are 
certain associations which are accepted because they are integral to the very structure of 
society.” Returning to the s. 2(a) Charter scope of Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, at 438-
439), Justices Iacobucci and Major explained that “[i]f s. 2(d) will not encompass the right to 
dissociate from institutions integral to the structure of society, we conclude by analogy that 
neither s. 2(a) nor the liberty interest of s. 7 permits parents to endanger the lives of their 
children. Expanding the substantive rights guarantees to cover such activity would, with 
greatest respect, render them meaningless owing to a lack of definition. Just because it is 
self-evident that a rights limitation shall be upheld as comporting with fundamental 
justice or s. 1 does not mean that it is necessary to proceed to this level of analysis.” 
204
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, 319. There must be a distinction, however, in the 
protection of children and of adolescents, since their ‘best interests’ differ, much like their 
capacity for autonomous choice. This was underscored recently by the Supreme Court in 
A.C. where the court discerned (Binnie J. dissenting) that the doctrine of the mature minor 
must be taken into account when faced with a decision concerning the liberty and security of 
the person: see A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 102-108 (Abella J., writing for LeBel, Deschamps and 
Charron JJ. concurring). This decision will be examined in depth further on in our study. 
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The intrinsic vulnerability of young children also highlighted the importance of the 
State’s role, as underlined by Laforest J, as well as the amply justified restrictions on 
parental rights under the s. 1 Charter analysis205.  
 
Freedom from religious discrimination, and more specifically freedom from 
constraint or coercion, has also appeared as a facet of freedom of conscience and 
religion206. This aspect could be better understood, I contend, if it were examined as 
freedom of religion as well as freedom of conscience. In this way, an argument can 
be made for a more substantial case law for freedom of conscience, all the while 
clarifying the reach of freedom of religion207. For example, in Freitag v. 
Penetanguishene208, the recital of a Christian prayer to commence a city council 
meeting was interpreted as imposing a Christian moral tone to the gathering209. 
Within an educational setting such as faced in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District 
                                               
205
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, 385-386. In an addendum to his analysis, La 
Forest J. discussed the interpretation of his opinion by his colleagues Iacobucci and Major 
JJ., and noted at pages 387-388 that “The sole issue before us was that raised by the 
parents, i.e. that their constitutional rights were infringed in the circumstances in which 
medical treatment was given to the child. In such a case, the parent's rights must, under s. 1, 
be balanced against the interests of others in a free and democratic society -- in this 
particular case the right of their child. In that situation, I, not surprisingly, found the parent's 
rights were clearly overridden. If a situation arose where it was alleged that the child's right 
was violated, other rights might be raised as reasonable limits, but if the right alleged was the 
security of the child as in the present case, then the child's right would again prevail over a 
parent's rights. In short the issue raised governs the form, but not the substance of the 
analysis. […] I am happy to see that my colleagues concede that the balancing of the 
competing rights could be integrated in a s. 1 analysis, since apart from specific provisions 
such as "fundamental justice", that is the only balancing mechanism provided under the 
Charter. The Charter makes no provision for directly balancing constitutional rights against 
one another. It is aimed rather at governmental and legislative intrusion against the protected 
rights; see s. 32 of the Charter.” [emphasis in original] 
206
 Big M. Drug Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 96-97. 
207
 This point will be addressed in depth further on in our study. 
208
 Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 1999 CanLII 3786 (Ont. C.A.) [Freitag]. 
209
 Freitag, supra note 208. The Québec Tribunal for Human Rights has arrived at similar 
conclusions under the Québec Charter : see Québec (Commission des droits de la personne 
et droits de la jeunesse) c. Laval (Ville), 2006 CanLII 33156 (QC T.D.P) [Laval]. The 
Commission des droits de la personne et droits de la jeunesse recently appealed for a 
respectful discussion of diverse opinions, following a recommendation that the town of Trois-
Rivières stop reciting a prayer at the beginning of their municipal council meetings and 
replace it with a moment of contemplation instead. See COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA 
PERSONNE ET DROITS DE LA JEUNESSE, <Communiqués>, <La prière au conseil municipal de 
Trois-Rivières (20.01.2009)>, http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/fr/communiques/docs-
2009/COM_PriereTroisRivieres.pdf (site last accessed 31.03.2009. 
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No. 36210, it was found that requirements of secularism and non-sectarianism should 
prevail over religious considerations, thus conferring freedom from religion. These 
cases accentuate colliding interests of vulnerable groups, minority groups and those 
who make up the majority: ultimately, the neutrality of the state must prevail in order 
to safeguard the rights of not only the minorities but also the “interests of the 
majority”.  Nevertheless, the very concept of the ‘neutral state’ also raises important 
questions in Canadian society. The notions of neutrality and freedom from religion, 
which have been traditionally articulated from the point of view of freedom of religion, 
would benefit from being re-examined from the perspective of freedom of 
conscience. 
 
The first half of the study of case law under the Charter has exemplified some 
of the important principles of freedom of religion: the presence of a positive right and 
a negative obligation of religious freedom211; the interpretation of s. 2(a) as a ‘single 
integrated concept’; the presence of trivial or unsubstantial burdens on freedom of 
religion (which do not qualify as “violations” of this freedom); the need to favour a 
broad interpretation of freedom of religion; and the obligation to justify State 
deference or intervention with regard to religious freedom under s. 1 of the 
Charter212. In examining Sunday closings and opening prayers, the groundwork for 
freedom of religion has been set down, but certainly not in stone. Questions remain, 
therefore, as to the religious relationship between parent and child, the balance 
between individual beliefs and collective interests as well as the necessary balancing 
of rights and values in light of the Charter. This will be the focus of the following 
section. 
 
1.3.2 From Sincere Individual Beliefs to Profoundly Communitarian 
Interests  
 
                                               
210
 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 CSC 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 
[Chamberlain], at ¶ 27: “The school board is the elected proxy of the collective local 
community, made up as it typically is of diverse subcommunities. The requirement of 
secularism means that the school board must consider the interests of all its constituents and 
not permit itself to act as the proxy of a particular religious view held by some members of the 
community, even if that group holds the majority of seats on the board.” 
211
 As previously discussed, supra, Chapter 1, section 2.1. 
212
 For further discussion on section 1 Charter analysis, see infra section 1.4.2. 
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Freedom of religion became overwhelming present at the Supreme Court in 
2004, developing a broad definition of religion on the one hand213 and determining 
the religious neutrality of the State on the other214.  
 
I have elected to examine the case law unaccompanied by academic 
commentary in this section; the comments, criticisms and intellectual reflections of 
the legal community will be addressed in the final sections of my chapter when 
attending to unresolved issues pertaining to freedoms of conscience and religion. 
 
As mentioned earlier, at issue in Amselem was whether Orthodox Jews could 
erect succahs215 on their balconies in pursuance to their religious beliefs but contrary 
to the declaration of co-ownership.  Whereas the appellants claimed a breach under 
the Québec Charter, the majority of the Supreme Court explained that these 
principles were equally applicable under the Québec Charter and the Charter216. All 
judges agreed that the right to freedom of religion is not absolute217. However, it is 
with respect to the definition and scope of freedom of religion that Amselem is 
especially interesting. Iacobucci J. (writing for himself as well as for McLachlin C.J. 
and Major, Arbour and Fish JJ.) first explained that while defining religion precisely 
might not be possible, it would be useful to distinguish between what is considered to 
be rooted in religion and what is outside of the protection of freedom of religion 
(namely secular, socially based or conscientiously held beliefs):  
 
“[d]efined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system 
of faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman 
or controlling power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held 
personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and 
integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of 
                                               
213
 Amselem, supra note 3. 
214
 Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de Saint-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 [Lafontaine].  
215
 The succah is explained as follows in Amselem, supra note 5, at ¶ 5. 
216
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 37. 
217
 This point was however strongly stressed by Bastarache J., writing for the minority: see 
Amselem, supra, ¶ 136. Freedom of religion under the Charter as well as the Québec Charter 
is subjected to reasonable limits, as established by sections 1 of the Charter as well as 9.1 of 
the Québec Charter, supra note 162. See also Amselem, supra, ¶ 152 with regard to the 
scope of action of section 9.1 of the Québec Charter.  
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which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the 
subject or object of that spiritual faith.”218  
 
Beyond this ‘outer’ definition of religion, Iacobucci J. explained that both obligatory 
as well as voluntary expressions of faith should be protected by the relevant 
Charters219. The emphasis on the individual’s subjective conception of freedom of 
religion resounds unmistakably220. Nevertheless, the right to freedom of religion will 
only be triggered once the individual has demonstrated the sincerity of his or her 
belief, which is determined according to the following test:  
 
“(1) he or she has a practice or belief, having a nexus with religion, which calls for a 
particular line of conduct, either by being objectively or subjectively obligatory or 
customary, or by, in general, subjectively engendering a personal connection with the 
divine or with the subject or object of an individual’s spiritual faith, irrespective of 
whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in 
conformity with the position of religious officials; and (2) he or she is sincere in his or 
her belief. » 221 
 
While readily admitting that the Court should not become the arbiter of religious 
dogma222, Amselem also acknowledged that expert testimony should not form the 
basis of the decision, distinguishing between what is relevant and what is necessary 
to satisfy the burden of proof223.  
 
Although the majority opinion in Amselem represents a new era of religious 
freedom claims in the Charter era, it would be remiss if the significant minority 
opinions went unaddressed (Binnie J. writing for himself224; Bastarache J., writing for 
                                               
218
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 39 [my emphasis]. 
219
 Ibid, ¶ 47. 
220
 Ibid, ¶ 42, where Iacobucci J. referred to Professor José Woehrling’s seminal text on 
freedom of religion, where he explained that the subjective aspect of the believer’s personal 
sincerity is in conformity with the established doctrine on this matter: see Woehrling, 
“L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable”, supra note 177, at 385. 
221
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 56 
222
 Ibid, ¶ 50 
223
 Ibid, ¶ 54. On this point, see also Binnie J.’s opinion at ¶ 190. 
224
 Binnie J. emphasised, from the start, due to the weight placed on the “private contract 
voluntarily made among the parties to govern their mutual rights and obligations, including 
the contractual rules contained in the declaration of co-ownership, as well as on the co-
owners’ offer of accommodation.”: see Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 184-185. This approach is 
also echoed in his interpretation of the Québec Charter, which, in his view, is “concerned not 
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Deschamps and LeBel JJ.). While the approach proposed by Bastarache J. did not 
differ substantially225 from that of the majority insofar as a suggesting a test based on 
beliefs, he endorsed a more objective test. Two other points also stand out in Justice 
Bastarache’s interpretation of freedom of religion. First, expert testimony seemed to 
have been more valued226. Second, Bastarache J. also mentioned that the Québec 
Charter must be interpreted in harmony with the Civil Code of Québec227; in this 
sense, a distinction is made between the purpose of freedom of religion and the right 
to freedom of religion228. The minority opinions triangulated the wronged rights in a 
manner distinct from that of the majority229 and given the framing of the issue230, it is 
not surprising that the appeal would have been dismissed231.  
 
At issue in Lafontaine was the unjustified refusal of the municipality of the 
village of Lafontaine following repeated zoning requests from the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. In this way, the municipality did not satisfy its obligation of procedural 
fairness toward the appellants. In a once again divided Court, the majority 
(composed of McLachlin C.J. as well as Iacobucci, Arbour, Fish and Binnie JJ.) held 
that the municipality had breached its obligation and sent the matter back before the 
municipality for reconsideration of the application; the majority addressed the facts of 
this case in a purely administrative perspective, whereas LeBel J., writing for minority 
ventured into the obligation of state neutrality. The minority opinion was voiced by 
the same as in Amselem, namely Lebel, Bastarache and Deschamps JJ. (Major J., 
writing a separate opinion). The minority, as expressed by LeBel J., underlined the 
importance of the negative aspect of freedom of religion by asserting the duty of 
                                                                                                                                      
only with rights and freedoms but with a citizen’s responsibilities to other citizens in the 
exercise of those rights and freedoms.”: Amselem, supra note 3 ¶ 186. 
225
 Ibid, ¶ 144 
226
 Ibid, ¶ 140, 159. Bastarache J. employs “useful” to describe the input of expert testimony 
in discerning the fundamental precepts and practices of a religion.  
227
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 146, 165. I refer, of course, to the Civil Code of Québec, 
(L.Q., 1991, c. 64.)  [C.c.Q.]. 
228
 Ibid, ¶ 146. 
229
 Ibid, ¶ 176: “not only is there a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and 
property rights, but the right to freedom of religion is also in conflict with the right to life and 
personal security, and with contractual rights.” 
230
 Ibid, ¶ 180. 
231
 Ibid, ¶ 182. Binnie J. would have also dismissed the appeal at ¶ 210. 
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religious neutrality of the state and public authorities232. As such, the municipality 
would be breaching its obligation of neutrality by providing the appellants with further 
assistance233. LeBel J. would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the 
religious beliefs and practices of the Jehovah’s Witnesses do not exempt them from 
complying with municipal by-laws234. I note that LeBel J. continued his judgment in 
view of a hypothetical situation in which no land was available in the designated 
zone, alluding to potential positive obligations imposed upon the state institution on 
the basis of freedom of religion235. Finally, I mention that Major J. would agree with 
the result in the judgment of LeBel J., but limits himself to the findings of fact236. 
 
Bruker v. Marcovitz237 provided further fertile terrrain for the development of 
freedom of religion by the Supreme Court in 2007. At issue in this case was the 
refusal of the husband to give his wife a get, a divorce under Jewish law (Halakhic 
law) after obtaining a divorce under civil law238, and this, despite the fact that a 
standing agreement that had been negotiated, known as the Consent to Corollary 
Relief. More specifically, Clause 12 of the aforementioned agreement239 stipulated 
that the parties would appear before the Jewish rabbinical court known as the Beth 
Din, to obtain a get immediately. The husband did not comply with this clause and 
only appeared before the Beth Din fifteen years later. The wife chose to institute civil 
proceedings against her husband, alledging that he had been in breach of contract 
and was thus liable under civil law for damages. Under Jewish law, only the husband 
is apt to give the get; without consent, the wife remains an agunah, or a “woman in 
                                               
232
 Lafontaine, supra note 214, ¶ 65. 
233
 Ibid, ¶ 71 in fine. 
234
 Ibid, ¶ 72. 
235
 Lafontaine, supra note 214, ¶ 73-93. 
236
 Ibid, ¶ 36. 
237
 Bruker, supra note 4.  
238
 See note 8 on the reform of the Divorce Act. Although article 21.1 of the Divorce Act 
provides the opportunity for either side to initiate proceedings and submit an affidavit to 
remove the barriers to religious remarriage, this article does not prove to be helpful in our 
situation, since it would have been up to Mr. Marcovitz to submit the affidavit. 
239
 At issue in this case is the interpretation of paragraph 12 of the Consent to Corollary Relief 
found in S.B.B. v. J.B.M., [2003] Q.J. No. 2896 (C.S.) (QL) [S.B.B.]: "The parties appear 
before the Rabbinical authorities in the City and District of Montreal for the purpose of 
obtaining the traditional religious Get, immediately upon a Decree Nisi of Divorce being 
granted." (hereinafter “the Consent”) 
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chains” or “wife in chains”240. The husband argued that the agreement was not valid 
under civil law and that by seeking damages, his right to freedom of religion under 
the Québec Charter had been breached. Seen as a civil obligation with religious 
undertones by the Superior Court241, compensation was awarded to the ex-wife, due 
to the long delays engendered by the husband’s refusal to give the get. Perceived as 
a religious obligation with civil undercurrents by the Court of Appeal242 – therefore 
not enforceable due to its nature as a moral obligation – the inferior decision was 
overturned, citing the principle of non-interference of the state in religious and private 
matters. Pitting religion against civil society obligations at the Supreme Court, Justice 
Abella (writing for the majority243) opined that “the invocation of freedom of religion 
does not, by itself, grant immunity from the need to weigh the assertion against 
competing values or harm.”244 This need for balance or reconciliation amongst 
                                               
240
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 4 (Abella J.). The status of agunah also affects any children borne 
out of a subsequent civil marriage. They would be considered illegitimate (mamzerim) under 
Jewish law and would only be able to marry similarly placed people: see Ibid, ¶ 4, 125. 
241
 S.B.B., supra note 239. 
242
 Marcovitz v. Bruker, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 55, No. 500-09-013353-032 (C.A.Q.) (QL) 
[Marcovitz] 
243
 Justice Deschamps wrote a lengthly dissenting opinion (also on behalf of Charron J.), 
where they concluded that it would be inappropriate “to impose on them [courts] an additional 
burden of sanctioning religious precepts and undertakings.” (Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 102). 
According to Deschamps J., one must distinguish asking the courts from considering 
questions of a religious nature – as was done in Lafontaine, supra note 9 – and asking the 
courts to assess the impact of the respondent’s failure to consent to the get, therein creating 
a new recourse (Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 124-125). Moreover, intervention in religious 
practices, according to Justice Deschamps, would defeat the point of adopting Amselem’s 
subjective standard of sincere belief (Bruker, supra, ¶ 131). Justice Deschamps concluded 
that the restraint shown by Canadian civil courts with regard to religious matters 
demonstrates the limits and maintains “a neutrality that is indispensable in a pluralistic and 
multicultural society.” (Bruker, supra, ¶ 181, 184).  
244
 Bruker, ibid, ¶ 73. Justice Abella articulated this point of view at the outset of her opinion 
as well and we believe it important to reproduce it in its entirety: “Canada rightly prides itself 
on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity and pluralism.  This journey has included a growing 
appreciation for multiculturalism, including the recognition that ethnic, religious or cultural 
differences will be acknowledged and respected.  Endorsed in legal instruments ranging from 
the statutory protections found in human rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to integrate into Canada’s 
mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences has become a defining part of 
our national character. […] The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean 
that those differences are always hegemonic.  Not all differences are compatible with 
Canada’s fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers to their expression are 
arbitrary.  Determining when the assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more 
pressing public interest is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line 
application.  It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary 
integrity of both multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance.” (Ibid, ¶ 1-2) 
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fundamental rights is reflected, according to Abella J., in article 9.1 of the Québec 
Charter245. The majority of the Supreme Court found that a dispute with a religious 
aspect can be appropriately interpreted as justiciable246 as well as civilly viable247 
and thus legally binding248. Justice Abella completed her analysis by noting that she 
did not believe that Mr. Marcovitz objected to giving the get to Ms. Bruker on 
religious grounds249, thereby questioning his sincerity. Moreover, when balanced with 
Ms. Bruker’s curtailed “ability to live her life fully as a Jewish woman in Canada”250, it 
was found that the breach of Mr. Marcovitz’s rights was indeed inconsequential251.  
 
The right to freedom of religion was challenged lately in A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services)252, where a child of fourteen years and ten 
months objected to a blood transfusion on the basis of her religious beliefs as a 
Jehovah’s Witness. Considered as a ‘minor’ since under the age of sixteen by 
provincial child and family services legislation standards, the “best interest of the 
child” was determined according to State authorities253. Alternatively, if a child is over 
sixteen, no medical treatment could be ordered by the court, unless it is satisfied that 
the child lacks the ability to understand the consequences of the treatment254. Built 
into that legislation is an acknowledgement of a child’s capacity in the decision-
making capacity over the age of sixteen. In the case at bar, A.C. refused a blood 
transfusion following internal bleeding due to Crohn’s disease after being admitted to 
a hospital. Months before this incident, A.C. had completed an “advance medical 
directive”, stating that she was not to receive a blood transfusion under any 
                                               
245
 Québec Charter, supra note 167, art. 9.1: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and 
rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the 
general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” See Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 76-82. 
246
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 41-43, 47. 
247
 Ibid, ¶ 51. 
248
 Ibid, ¶ 62-64. 
249
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 78-79. 
250
 Ibid, ¶ 93. 
251
 The majority did not discern any errors in the assessment of damages by the trial judge 
and therefore elected to leave them undisturbed: Ibid, ¶ 97-99. Given the minority position, 
damages would not have been awarded, since the issue of this case falls outside the 
jurisdiction of civil courts: Ibid, ¶ 177-180. 
252
 A.C., supra note 4. 
253
 Child and Family Services Act, C.C.S.M. c. C80, s. 25(8) [CFSA]. 
254
 Ibid, s. 25(9). 
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circumstance255. In the day following A.C.’s admission to the hospital, a psychiatric 
assessment was performed in order to determine A.C.’s “capacity to understanding 
death”256. Shortly after experiencing further internal bleeding, A.C.’s doctors wanted 
to give her a blood transfusion, but she once again refused, at which point she was 
apprehended as a ‘child in need of protection’ by the Director of Child and Family 
Services257. The motions judge granted the treatment order on two grounds: first, 
that there were no legislated restrictions of the authority to order medical treatment in 
the “best interest of the child” and second, that A.C. was in immediate medical 
danger258. The treatment order was appealed by A.C. and her parents, arguing on 
the one hand that s. 25(8) of the CFSA should not have been applied to her and on 
the other, that ss. 25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA were unconstitutional since they 
violated A.C.’s ss. 2(a), 7 and 15 Charter rights259. Steel J.A., for a unanimous court, 
summarised their conclusions as follows: 
 
“While this section does represent an infringement of the child’s religious freedom 
under s. 2(a), such violation is saved by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the Charter).  Medical treatment against one’s wishes is also an 
infringement of one’s liberty and right to security under s. 7 of the Charter.  However, 
in this case, given the countervailing concerns of sanctity of life and protection of 
children, the infringement is not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.  The 
state does have a continuing interest in the welfare of a child, even one with 
capacity.  Moreover, the infringement occurs in a procedurally fair manner.  While 
children are treated differently than adults, and children under 16 are treated 
differently than children 16 and over, this is not discriminatory as understood by s. 15 
of the Charter.  Age-based distinctions are a common and necessary way of ordering 
society.  Analyzing these distinctions in a contextual manner, there is a valid 
correspondence between the differential treatment and the increased vulnerability 
and varying maturity of minors in a child protection situation.”260 
 
The interpretation of s. 25(8) of the CFSA proved to be the only real source of 
disagreement between the majority opinion of the Supreme Court written by Justice 
Abella (writing for LeBel, Deschamps and Charron JJ. concurring) and the Manitoba 
                                               
255
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 6. 
256
 Ibid, ¶ 6. 
257
 Ibid, ¶ 7-8. 
258
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 12. A.C. received the blood transfusions a few hours later and the 
treatments were successful, leading to her full recovery; following this development, the 
Director of Child and Family Services withdrew its application: see Ibid, ¶ 13. 
259
 Ibid, ¶ 14. 
260
 Director of Child and Family Services v. A.C., 2007 MBCA 9 (CanLII), ¶ 4 [Director of 
Family Services]. 
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Court of Appeal. Justice Abella argued that one should adopt a ‘sliding scale of 
scrutiny’261 rather than a strict one: in this way, place is made for the doctrine of the 
mature minor, while all the while addressing the best interests of the child262. 
According to the common law approach to medical treatment of minors, the doctrine 
of the mature minor should not be understood as “dictating guaranteed outcomes, 
particularly when the consequences for the young person are catastrophic”263, but 
rather “granting adolescents a degree of autonomy that is reflective of their evolving 
                                               
261
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 21-22. See esp. ¶ 23: “This interpretation of the “best interests” 
standard in s. 25(8) of the Act is not only more consistent with the actual developmental 
reality of young people; it is also conceptually consistent with the evolutionary development 
of the common law “mature minor” doctrine in both the Canadian and international 
jurisprudence.  Under this doctrine, courts have readily accepted that an adolescent’s 
treatment wishes should be granted a degree of deference that is reflective of his or her 
evolving maturity.  Notably, however, they have rarely viewed this mandate as being 
inconsistent with their overarching responsibility to protect children from harm.” 
262
 Section 2(1) of the CFSA, supra note 253, sets out the “best interests of the child 
standard”. While this section of the Act has been modified since the hearing before the Court 
(A.C., supra note 4, ¶  32), I reproduce the Act as it was at the time of the hearing [emphasis 
in original]: 
 
2(1) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration of the director, an 
authority, the children’s advocate, an agency and a court in all proceedings under this Act 
affecting a child, other than proceedings to determine whether a child is in need of protection, 
and in determining the best interests of the child all relevant matters shall be considered, 
including  
  
(a)   the child’s opportunity to have a parent-child relationship as a wanted and needed 
member within a family structure;  
  
(b)   the mental, emotional, physical and educational needs of the child and the appropriate 
care or treatment, or both, to meet such needs; 
  
(c)   the child’s mental, emotional and physical stage of development;  
 
(d)   the child’s sense of continuity and need for permanency with the least possible 
disruption;  
  
(e)   the merits and the risks of any plan proposed by the agency that would be caring for the 
child compared with the merits and the risks of the child returning to or remaining within the 
family;  
  
(f)   the views and preferences of the child where they can reasonably be ascertained;  
  
(g)   the effect upon the child of any delay in the final disposition of the proceedings; and  
  
(h)   the child’s cultural, linguistic, racial and religious heritage. 
  
263
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 69.  
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maturity”264. In this way, there is no “eureka moment”265 delineating the child from the 
adolescent, dividing between those who are in need of protection from harm from 
those who have the capacity to understand its effects266. The contrasting, if not to 
say conflicting, interpretations of A.C.’s right to freedom of religion provide ample 
terrain for discussion. Whereas Justice Abella argued that a commensurate 
approach allows for a proper balancing between interests267, she did not even 
proceed to an acknowledgment of the sincerity of A.C.’s belief. This did not go 
unnoticed by Chief Justice McLachlin (also writing for Rothstein J.)268 or Justice 
Binnie (dissenting)269, who both agreed that s. 25(8) of the CFSA violated A.C.’s right 
to freedom of religion270. This is, however, where McLachlin C.J. and Binnie J. part 
ways, since the former opined that upon closer analysis, s. 2(a) and 7 Charter claims 
merge: 
 
“Either the Charter requires that an ostensibly “mature” child under 16 have an 
unfettered right to make all medical treatment decisions, or it does not, 
regardless of the individual child’s motivation for refusing treatment. The fact 
that A.C.’s aversion to receiving a blood transfusion springs from religious conviction 
does not change the essential nature of the claim as one for absolute personal 
autonomy in medical decision-making.”271 
 
                                               
264
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 69. Abella J., at ¶ 96, offered a non-exhaustive list of factors that 
may be of assistance in the decision-making process, but cautioned that it should not 
become a formulaic response to all situations.   
265
 Ibid, ¶ 4. 
266
 This approach also permits the Supreme Court to hold that A.C.’s s. 7 and 15 Charter 
rights are not violated. With respect to her liberty and security of the person under s. 7, Abella 
J. noted that “[i]nterpreting the best interests standard so that a young person is afforded a 
degree of bodily autonomy and integrity commensurate with his or her maturity navigates the 
tension between an adolescent’s increasing entitlement to autonomy as he or she matures 
and society’s interest in ensuring that young people who are vulnerable are protected from 
harm. […] The balance is thus achieved between autonomy and protection, and the 
provisions are, accordingly, not arbitrary.” (A.C., supra, ¶ 108) With regard to the claim of 
distinction based on age, the Court noted that the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act 
functions on the basis of maturity level rather than an age cut-off: see A.C., supra, ¶ 111. 
267
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 115. 
268
 Ibid, ¶ 153. 
269
 Ibid, ¶ 214. 
270
 Ibid, ¶ 154 (McLachlin C.J.); ¶ 215 (Binnie J.) 
271
 Ibid, ¶ 155 [my emphasis]. 
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Given this either/or approach and by demonstrating that the objective of the 
legislation remains sound, McLachlin C.J. explained that the limit on religious 
practices emerges as justified under s. 1 of the Charter272.  
 
Unlike the majority opinions, Justice Binnie argued that the crux of the 
dispute lay in the fact that the presumption of incapacity contained in s. 25 CFSA 
remained irrebutable273. Therefore, beyond the violation of s. 2(a) and 7 of the 
Charter, the CFSA was conceptually closed to A.C. being considered a “mature 
minor”274. Amongst the divergent and convergent layers of analysis and levels of 
discontent, we see that A.C. has emerged from the hands of the Supreme Court as a 
“wait-and-see” approach. Although a commensurate approach is logical and the 
proposal of a compendium of factors furthers our understanding of how to evaluate a 
child’s maturity, it does not sufficiently explain how one is to treat a child’s religious 
wishes when confronted with serious issues, such as medical conditions275.  
 
                                               
272
 Ibid, ¶ 156. McLachlin C.J. goes on to note, in the same paragraph, that given the sound 
objective of the CFSA – namely to ensure the health and safety of vulnerable people – the 
CFSA cannot be considered arbitrary for the purposes of s. 7 of the Charter.  
273
 Ibid, ¶ 225, 231. 
274
 A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 224. 
275
 In considering the spiritual and physical consequences of choices, Professor Shauna Van 
Praagh wrote an opinion piece following A.C., supra note 4, where she suggested that one 
might find a fuller picture of teenage turbulence and personal autonomy by looking at the 
fictional world of Harry Potter, where she concluded that “All of us, including the Supreme 
Court, may want to stand in line for a movie ticket.”: Shauna Van Praagh, “Harry Potter and 
the real story of A.C.”, Globe and Mail (July 15th 2009), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/harry-potter-and-the-real-story-of-
ac/article1218335/ (site last accessed 30.07.2009. On this subject, see also Shauna VAN 
PRAAGH, “Adolescence, autonomy and Harry Potter: the child as the decision-maker” (2005) 
1(4) Int’l J.L.C. 335, at 369 [Van Praagh, “Adolescence, Autonomy and Harry Potter”], 
who suggested that “the law of civil wrongs concerns itself both with recognising the agency 
of the individual and with protecting that individual’s interests. Replacing ‘individual’ with 
‘young person’ challenges us to examine more closely the promise of both recognition and 
protection.” Christopher Bird put the question more directly when commenting A.C., supra 
note 4: “[t]he pressing question in A.C. is not specifically the constitutionality of the sections 
of the Child and Family Services Act; that question is a legal hobbyhorse for the real issue at 
stake in the case, which was “where do we draw the line when a child in a religious family 
wishes to essentially commit suicide by refusing treatment?””: see Christopher Bird, “A.C. v. 
Manitoba: Saving Pressing Questions for Later”, The Court,  
http://www.thecourt.ca/2009/07/10/ac-v-manitoba-saving-pressing-questions-for-later/ (site 
last accessed 30.07.2009. Posing the question in this manner, I consider that freedom of 
conscience becomes more relevant as well as the family’s role as a locus of indoctrination. 
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A relatively clear-cut case of freedom of religion that took an unexpected turn 
was brought before the Supreme Court in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony276. New regulations regarding drivers’ licenses277 were instituted by the 
Alberta government, upsetting a careful balance that had existed with the Hutterian 
Colony for the last thirty years278. More specifically, all drivers’ licenses were to be 
issued with photographs. The Hutterian Brethren believed that graven images, such 
as those obtained by the process of photography, would contravene the Second 
commandment279. Whereas the Albertan government had issued these new 
regulations in an effort to heighten highway safety as well as reduce identity theft, 
the Hutterian Brethren argued that these ‘willing images’ would violate their right to 
freedom of religion. An impasse was reached after additional measures proposed280 
by the government to alleviate the infringement on their right to freedom of religion 
were rejected, as was the Hutterian Brethren’s counter-suggestion of a non-photo 
driver’s license marked “not for identification purposes”. Adjudication ensued on “the 
basis that the universal photo requirement constitute[d] a limit on the freedom of 
religion of Colony members who wish to obtain a driver’s licence and thus infringe[d] 
s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”281.  
 
                                               
276
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4. 
277
 Supra note 15. 
278
 The Hutterian Brethren had benefited from an exemption, obtaining a Code G license: see 
supra note 16. 
279
 “You shall not make for yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on 
the earth beneath or in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4): Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 29. 
280
 More specifically, the government of Alberta proposed the following measures: “first, that 
they have their photograph taken and printed on their licences.  Each licence would then be 
placed in a special package which the licensee would never be required to open, preventing 
the licensee from ever coming into physical contact with the printed photo.  The photographs 
would be stored in digital form in the database.  The second proposal was that a photograph 
would be taken but not actually printed on their licences.  Only the digital images would be 
stored in the facial recognition database.” (Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, 
¶ 122 (Abella J., diss.). See also Ibid, ¶ 12 (McLachlin C.J.). 
281
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 3 (McLachlin C.J., for majority). We 
note that the Hutterites argued that the new regulations discriminated on the basis of religion 
and thus invoked a second argument based on s. 15 of the Charter. This claim was 
dismissed by McLachlin C.J. (at ¶ 108) and was not addressed in the minority opinions. 
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Whereas both lower courts ruled in favour of the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony282 and despite the Albertan government’s admission of its infringement of 
their rights, the majority of the Supreme Court (Abella, LeBel and Fish JJ. dissenting) 
found that “the Charter guarantees freedom of religion, but does not indemnify 
practitioners against all costs incident to the practice of religion.”283  
 
 Although the sincerity of the Hutterites’ belief was not challenged284 and its 
nexus with religion had been conceded by the province, the weight of the incurred 
burden was contentious, since this point had not been admitted by the province. 
According to McLachlin C.J. (writing for Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ), the 
lower courts seemed to have proceeded on the assumption that the universal photo 
requirement constituted a burden “capable of interfering with the religious belief or 
practice” and continued by examining whether this burden constituted a reasonable 
limit.285. Moreover, it was acknowledged by McLachlin C.J. that freedom of religion 
can pose a particular challenge to the universality of many regulatory programs286. In 
this way, rights must be balanced and limits justified within a free and democratic 
society: this is the purpose of the Oakes’ test. The province’s primary objective was 
to ensure traffic safety; identity theft was seen as a collateral problem to the existing 
traffic safety system287. This interpretation was thus considered a ‘measure 
prescribed by law’ and constituted a substantial and pressing objective288, according 
to the majority. The rational connexion between the universal photo requirement and 
the goal of protecting the integrity of the driver’s licensing system was established as 
                                               
282
 See Hutterian Brethern of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2006 ABQB 338 (CanLII), Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160 (CanLII). Slatter J.A. would have 
allowed the appeal, since further accommodations by the province, according to him, “would 
require it to significantly compromise a central feature of the security of the licensing system, 
and would amount to undue hardship.” (Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, 2007 
ABCA 160 (CanLII), ¶ 124). 
283
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 95. 
284
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 7, 33. 
285
 Ibid, ¶ 34 citing Edwards Books, supra note 176, at 759. 
286
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 36. McLachlin C.J. also explained 
that regulations are the “life blood” of the administrative state and do not imperil the rule of 
law. One should therefore not distinguish between law and regulation in this case: Ibid, ¶ 41. 
McLachlin C.J. also explains that freedom of religion cases, such as this one, often present 
an “all or nothing dilemma”: see Ibid, ¶ 61. 
287
 Ibid, ¶ 45. 
288
 Ibid, ¶ 47. 
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well as preventing it from being used for the purposes of identity theft289. Indeed, 
while the objective and rational connexion of the regulation were generally accepted, 
the condition of minimal impairment proved to be decisive as well as divisive for the 
Supreme Court. Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that the measure presented by 
the Albertan government proved to be the least intrusive given the goal of 
maintaining the integrity of the driver’s licensing system290. While debates and 
litigation about freedom of religion often prove to be multifaceted as well as laden, I 
believe that it was essential for McLachlin C.J. to have clarified the uses and 
misuses of the Oakes’ test and that of the analysis of reasonable accommodation as 
a result of the approach used by the lower courts291. As such, she held that:   
 
“where the validity of a law of general application is at stake, reasonable 
accommodation is not an appropriate substitute for a proper s. 1 analysis based on 
the methodology of Oakes. Where the government has passed a measure into law, 
the provisions of s. 1 apply. The government is entitled to justify the law, not by 
showing that it has accommodated the claimant, but by establishing that the 
measure is rationally connected to a pressing and substantial goal, minimally 
impairing of the right and proportionate in its effects.”292 
 
This represents a significant divergence from the result in British Columbia (Public 
Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU293, insofar as a difference is 
established between legislative and general standards.  
 
In the final step of balancing the salutary and deleterious effects, McLachlin 
C.J. distinguished speculative risk from real risk as well as the impact in terms of 
Charter values. Although the risk cannot be qualified as “definite”, McLachlin C.J. 
                                               
289
 Ibid, ¶ 52. 
290
 Ibid, ¶ 63. McLachlin C.J. rejects Abella J.’s casting of the situation, noting that the risk 
should be evaluated not on the basis of the comparison of a “few religious dissenters” versus 
over 700 000 unlicensed Albertans, but rather whether permitting any exceptions pose a real 
risk to the integrity of the licensing system: see Ibid, ¶ 63, 64.  
291
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 65.  
292
 Ibid, ¶ 71 [my emphasis]. 
293
 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 
3 S.C.R. 3 [Meiorin]. McLachlin C.J., for the Court, found that not only the Government’s 
aerobic standard was prima facie discriminatory but also that the Government’s standard did 
not establish that it was a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR). Whereas the onus 
was on the government to prove that it was a BFOR previously, it now only has to establish 
that the measure meet the s. 1 Charter test, namely a rational goal, minimal impairment and 
proportionality. The onus of demonstrating a “legislatively embedded” accommodation is 
therefore removed from the government, creating an alternate interpretation of responsibility.  
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argued that waiting for “proof positive” would decrease the number of laws passed 
as well as make public interest suffer294. However, in saying that one cannot wait for 
“proof positive”, McLachlin C.J. is herself speculating on the certainty of the risk. It is 
difficult to comprehend how this could constitute a firm argument, when the risk 
remains physically unquantifiable. In examining the deleterious effects of such 
legislation, McLachlin C.J. admitted that there is no “magic barometer” to measure 
the implication of a particular limit on a religious practice: “[r]eligion is a matter of 
faith, intermingled with culture.”295 Just as one must distinguish between speculative 
and real risk, one must also discern between incidental effects and meaningful 
choices to one’s religious practice: according to the majority of the Supreme Court 
and based on the evidence submitted, the Hutterian claimants were not deprived of 
this capacity296.  Although it was acknowledged that the universal photo requirement 
curtailed the claimants’ right to freedom of religion, the majority of the Supreme 
Court concluded that limit imposed was justified under s. 1 of the Charter297.  
 
Justice Abella’s dissenting opinion has provided the reader with certain facets 
that deserve particular attention when balancing majority and minority rights. While it 
has already been acknowledged that the majority and minority opinions parted ways 
on the condition of minimal impairment298, I believe that Justice Abella’s use of 
freedom of religion case law from the European Court of Human Rights proved to be 
at the same time “novel and inconsistent”, to borrow her own words299 and 
                                               
294
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 85.  
295
 Ibid, ¶ 89, 90. 
296
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 94-96. At ¶ 97, McLachlin C.J. noted 
that the claimants’ affidavit does not explain why they can devise or obtain alternate 
transport. In her view, there is no evidence that this alternative would be prohibitive. 
Moreover, at ¶ 98, it is noted that driving automobiles on highways is not a right but a 
privilege; this point is contested by Abella J. at ¶ 171, who argued that the majority’s 
approach was at the same time novel and inconsistent with the principle enunciated in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.  
297
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 104. The s. 15 Charter claim was not 
treated at any length by the majority and the universal photo requirement was justified as 
follows at ¶ 108: “Assuming the respondents could show that the regulation creates a 
distinction on the enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any demeaning stereotype 
but from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice.” The s. 15 Charter claim in A.C. 
was similarly dismissed: see A.C., supra note 4, ¶ 111. 
298
 Ibid, ¶ 143 (Abella J.). 
299
 Ibid, ¶ 171 (Abella J.). To my knowledge, this also constituted the first time that ECtHR 
case law was used for freedom of religion. 
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dangerous, to add my own300. Indeed, there are unmistakable similarities between 
the constitutional systems, such as the existence of a comparable principle of 
proportionality, as well as similar rights to freedom of religion. Nevertheless, one 
must be aware of the inherent differences between national and supranational 
constitutional systems of law as well as the context from which these cases emerge. 
Despite her relatively short tenure thus far at the Supreme Court, Justice Abella has 
emerged as a conscientious interpreter of tensions involved in claims of freedom of 
religion301 and although this case does not break pattern, the justifications employed 
are contentious, to say the least. Abella J. began her opinion by contrasting the 
necessary balance that must occur between the benefits sought and the harm 
imposed by new measures and the fate of minorities living in a world of majority 
law302. In her view, the absence of an exemption to the universal photo requirement 
                                               
300
 Given the European Court of Human Rights’ most recent ruling on freedom of religion, 
which included an unprecedented discussion on that topic, it seems as though the ECtHR is 
turning a page and proceeding to a more sensitive analysis of freedom of religion. While no 
decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court on this topic since its release, it will be 
interesting to see how (or if) it handles the ECtHR’s nascent ouverture on religion, and 
religious difference. One cannot lose sight of the fact that Lautsi c. Italie, decision of 3 
November 2009, App. No. 30814/06 [Lautsi], took place in the very particular context of 
public schools, and thus public institutions, compounded by the vulnerability of children. The 
ECtHR was “unable to grasp how the display, in classrooms in State schools, of a symbol 
that could reasonably be associated with Catholicism (the majority religion in Italy) could 
serve the educational pluralism that was essential to the preservation of a “democratic 
society” as that was conceived by the Convention, a pluralism that was recognised by the 
Italian Constitutional Court.”: see Lautsi, ¶ 56-57 and European Court of Human Rights, 
Press Release Issued by the Registrar of the Chamber judgment in Lautsi c. Italie, “Crucifix 
in Classrooms: Contrary to Parents’ Right to Educate their Children in Line with Their 
Convictions and To Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion”, online: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=857732&portal=hbkm&
source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (site last 
accessed 25.11.2009) 
301
 See, for example: Bruker, supra note 4; A.C., supra note 4. I note that Justice Abella did 
not engage in an examination of the sincerity of A.C.’s beliefs, however: see A.C., supra note 
4, ¶ 153. 
302
 Abella J. quotes a passage from author Martha C. Nussbaum’s Liberty of Conscience: In 
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York, Basic Books, 2008) at ¶ 110, 
but does not share the entire sentence, which betrays, in my view, Abella J.’s actual opinion 
of the harm to the constitutional rights of the Hutterians. I believe it is therefore important to 
reproduce the sentence in full: “Some such burdens to religion may have to be borne, if the 
peace and safety of the state are really at stake, or if there is some other extremely strong 
state interest. But it seems deeply wrong for the state to put citizens in such a tragic position 
needlessly, or in matters of less weight. And often matters lying behind laws of general 
applicability are not so weighty; sometimes they come down to the mere desire for 
homogeneity and an unexamined reluctance to delve into the details of a little known 
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proved to be dramatic303 for the Hutterian colony members, both in terms of 
ramifications on our multicultural society, as well as curtailing the autonomous nature 
of certain religious communities.  
 
Freedom of religion, according to Justice Abella, should be understood as not 
only personal rights, but also as forming a collective conscience of ‘permissible 
beliefs’; these values were emphasised in Big M Drug Mart as well as Edwards 
Books304. Justice Abella goes on to say that the ECtHR has espoused a similar 
liberal conception of freedom of religion in Kokkinakis and Şahin305. I cannot adopt 
that view, however, for two reasons. Firstly, freedom of religion was only examined in 
a substantive manner by the ECtHR for the first time some fifty years after the 
enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a point of comparison, 
Big M Drug Mart was released three years following the enactment of the Charter; 
since then, the case law on freedom of religion has developed greatly. In this way, it 
seems as though one might be moving at two different speeds and discrediting 
progress and discussion in Canada. Second, the definitions of freedom of religion set 
forward in the aforementioned cases are done without consideration to context. At 
issue in Kokkinakis was the criminal prosecution of a Jehovah’s Witness for 
proselytising; at issue in Şahin was the prohibition of students wearing headscarves 
in universities in Turkey. Whereas the former dealt with the clash of a minority 
religious group with the ‘recognised dominant religion’306, the later dealt with the 
collision between the manifestation of religious beliefs and the established secular 
(laik) State307. In both cases, the national constitution entrenched the relationship 
with the State with regards to religion; in both cases, the European Convention on 
Human Rights was found to be at odds with the established national regimes. The 
                                                                                                                                      
or unpopular religion.”: M.C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s 
Tradition of Religious Equality (New York, Basic Books, 2008), p. 117 [my emphasis] 
303
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 114 (Abella J.) [my emphasis]. 
304
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 127 (Abella J.), citing Big M Drug 
Mart, supra note 67, at 759 and Edwards Books, supra note 176 at 346. 
305
 Supra, notes 113 and 115. 
306
 Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution (Greece).  
307
 Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution (Turkey). For an enlightening discussion on the re-
invention of secularism in Turkey, see Amélie Barras, “A rights-based discourse to contest 
the boundaries of state secularism? The case of the headscarf bans in France and Turkey” 
(2009) 16(6) Democratization 1237.  
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foundation of a “democratic society” was employed by the ECtHR to demonstrate a 
breach in M. Kokkinakis’ rights as well as defend national policies in Şahin. These 
‘liberal conceptions’ of freedom of religion espoused by the ECtHR must be 
understood as the other side of the rights pendulum, often used to accord deference 
to national orders rather than defences to particular claimants through the doctrine of 
the “national margin of appreciation”. While comparative law in general and the 
recognition of pluralistic societies in particular has served the Supreme Court of 
Canada well, it is necessary to acknowledge the differing motivations of the states 
and individuals.  
 
Although the emphasis on the individual’s subjective conception of freedom 
of religion has been clearly resounding since Amselem, the implication of profoundly 
communitarian interests, as experienced by the Hutterites, has been emphasised of 
late by Abella J.. In this manner, her appreciation of both individual and collective 
aspects of religion is welcomed, since religion is not only about performed rites and 
individual beliefs, but also the interface with the greater community.  
 
The use of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova308 to 
illustrate the communitarian appeal of religion should be mitigated, however, since 
the respective state objectives differ greatly, as do their consequences. At issue in 
this case was Moldova’s refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia; 
the State’s refusal, it was argued, constituted an infringement to their right of 
freedom of religion (article 9 ECHR) and amounted to discrimination on the grounds 
of religion (article 14 ECHR). By not proceeding to its recognition, the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia remained without rights under the Religious Denominations 
Act309, and this, despite the fact that freedom of religion (without regard to 
denomination) was recognised in Article 31 of the Moldovan Constitution of 1994310. 
The government argued that the case concerned an ecclesiastical conflict and that 
                                               
308
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII 
[Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia] 
309
 Religious Denominations Act, (Law no. 979-XII of 24 March 1992) as cited in Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia, supra note 19, ¶ 13. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia could 
therefore not operate or practice as a church: see Ibid, ¶ 104-105. 
310
 Ibid, ¶ 89. 
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any recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessabaria would provoke conflict 
within the Orthodox Church311. Before the ECtHR, while it was agreed that public 
order could constitute a legitimate aim, it must remain proportional. The State’s 
outright refusal of recognition the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia could not be 
considered proportionate312. While Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia rightly 
illustrated that not all state objectives are created equal, it remains clear that further 
attention needs to be placed on context. As previously stated, it is important to 
recognise the individual as well as collective components of religion313. Nevertheless, 
I believe it imprudent to employ the conclusions on freedom of religion in 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony without 
closer attention to the facts that gave rise to the case. The costs of not recognising a 
church or religion by the authorities cannot be equated with the consequences of a 
universal photo requirement for drivers’ licenses. First, by refusing to recognise a 
particular group, such as the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, their legal voice 
and powers of representation are rendered nil before the State institutions. By 
enforcing a universal photo requirement, the State may be seen as curtailing certain 
                                               
311
 Ibid, ¶ 23, 98. Moldova had achieved independence only in 1991 and the government 
argued that one factor conducive to stability was religion, since the majority of Moldovans 
were of Greek Orthodox faith (Ibid, ¶ 111); this reasoning did not, however, stop the 
government from recognising other religions, however: see ibid, ¶ 30. The Moldovan Court of 
Appeal dismissed the State’s arguments, noting that the term denomination should not be 
restricted to the meanings of Catholicism or Orthodoxy and therefore constituted an 
unfounded breach to the right of freedom of religion: see Ibid, ¶ 24. 
312
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, supra note 308, ¶ 130. The Court noted at ¶ 118-119 
that while a certain margin of appreciation is left to the member states by the ECHR, it should 
not go unchecked. In this sense, by refusing to recognise the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia, the State contravened other rights, such as the right of association and the right 
to a fair trial. Moreover, the ECtHR noted that the arguments related to discrimination on the 
basis of religion amounted to a repetition of the freedom of religion claim and there was no 
need to examine them separately: see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, supra note 19, ¶ 
134. Lebel J. explained that both the ECHR and the Oakes’ test belong to Thomas Aquinas’ 
philosophical tradition, namely that proportionate burdens should be imposed on citizens: see 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 184.  
313
 Perhaps LeBel J., in his dissent, framed the issue as well as the context in a more 
comprehensive fashion, since according to him, “[t]hat decision reflects the complex and 
highly textured nature of freedom of religion. […] Religion is about religious beliefs, but also 
about religious relationships. The present appeal signals the importance of this aspect. It 
raises issues about belief, but also about the maintenance of communities of faith. We are 
discussing the fate not only of a group of farmers, but of a community that shares a common 
faith and a way of life that is viewed by its members as a way of living that faith and of 
passing it on to future generations.” See Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 
181-182. 
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habits, but is not impeding their legal voice. Second, by refusing to legally recognise 
the existence of a particular group, such as the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, a 
perception or aura of illegitimacy cloaks the group. By enforcing a universal photo 
requirement, the civil rights of the Hutterites’ remain intact, though perhaps a little 
bruised. Indeed, Justice Abella was right to point out that the Hutterites rely on their 
self-sufficiency and that aspect must be taken into account when understanding the 
consequences of one’s free choice and personal autonomy314. In conclusion, Abella 
J. (Lebel and Fish JJ. agreeing) would have dismissed the appeal, but suspend a 
declaration of invalidity for one year in order to give the Albertan government an 
opportunity to fashion a responsive amendment315. While this case considered the 
right to freedom of religion in particular, it demonstrated that more attention should 
be heeded to the rights of particular groups and their relationship with the State. 
 
Justice LeBel’s reference to freedom of religion as “highly textured”316 in 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony eloquently illustrates the complexity in handling 
such a fundamental freedom in the Charter era. The texture of freedom of religion – 
if one can use such a term – can differ according to the feel, surface, quality, 
consistency and grain. In examining sincere individual beliefs to profoundly 
communitarian interests of religion, a subtle shift in paradigm can be observed. 
Whereas Amselem defined both religion and sincere beliefs, the focus has shifted to 
the impact of competing beliefs, veiled under the discourse on Charter values317. 
Thus, the reluctant juncture between the subjective functional and substantive 
content approaches is acknowledged when defining religion in law in Canadian 
constitutional setting.  The consequences of such a conjunction will be discussed 
further on in the study. 
 
 
                                               
314
 See Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 165, where Hofer v. Hofer, 
[1970] S.C.R. 958 [Hofer] illustrated the community’s self-sufficiency. 
315
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 177. 
316
 Ibid, ¶ 181. 
317
 On the rise of “Charter values” and their significance, see supra note 128.  
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1.4 Violation of Freedom of Religion: The Duty to Reasonably Accommodate 
Religion and Proportionality under the Oakes’ Test 
 
 As seen previously in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony318, claims of 
freedom of religion can be treated in one of two ways, depending on whether it is the 
validity of the law that is at stake or that of a government action or administrative 
practice. While the former employs the s. 1 justification analysis better known as the 
Oakes’ test, the latter draws on the doctrine of reasonable accommodation. The 
remedies also vary, according to the path chosen: if the law is found to be 
unconstitutional, remedy lies under s. 52 of the Charter whereas if the government 
action or administrative practice violates Charter rights, the remedy is found under s. 
24(1) of the Charter319. With these distinctions in mind, I will proceed to a short 
overview of reasonable accommodation (1.4.1) and revisit proportionality under the 
Oakes’ test (1.4.2.). 
 
1.4.1 The Duty to Reasonably Accommodate Religion 
 
1.4.1.1 The Case Law of Reasonable Accommodation 
 
 Much has been written on the subject of reasonable accommodation of 
religion in the last ten years320 and even more so since the Bouchard-Taylor Report 
in Québec in 2007321. Reasonable accommodation should remain, however, a legal 
                                               
318
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 66-67. McLachlin C.J. also adds, at ¶ 
68-69, that minimal impairment and reasonable accommodation are conceptually distinct, 
since the former deals with laws of general application and the latter must tailor their 
relationships by respecting the existing human rights’ legislation.  
319
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 66-67.   
320
 See, for example: Woehrling, « L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 
177; Christian Brunelle, Discrimination et obligation d’accommodement raisonnable en milieu 
de travail syndiqué (Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2001); Myriam Jézéquel, ed., La 
justice à l’épreuve de la diversité culturelle (Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2006). 
321
 See, for example: Jézéquel, supra note 71; Stéphane Bernatchez, « Les enjeux juridiques 
du débat québécois sur les accommodements raisonnables », (2007) 38 R.D.U.S. 233 
[Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques »]; Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 177; 
José Woehrling, «  La place de la religion à l’école publique » (2007) 41 R.J.T. 651 
[Woehrling, « Religion à l’école »]; Sébastien Grammond, « Conceptions canadienne et 
québécoise des droits fondamentaux et de la religion : convergence ou conflit? » (2009) 43 
R.J.T. 83 [Grammond, « Conceptions canadienne et québécoise»]; Jean-François 
Gaudreault-Desbiens, ed., Le droit, la religion et le « raisonnable » (Montréal, Les Éditions 
Thémis, 2009); Paul Eid, Pierre Bosset, Micheline Milot and Sébastien Lebel-Grenier, eds., 
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obligation rather than a political tool to address public opinion322. The objective here 
is not to provide an in depth-analysis of the reasonable accommodation of religion, 
but rather a synopsis of relevant principles as applied under the Charter era.  
 
In its earliest inception, reasonable accommodation sought to find balance with 
the rights of others in order to preserve a society’s social structure323; it was not (and 
is not) seen as an absolute right. While first utilised to counter discriminatory 
practices found in employer-employee relations, the framework of reasonable 
accommodation has since been expanded into other areas of civil rights. 
Reasonable accommodation, therefore, was defined by the Supreme Court in 
O’Malley as  
 
“[t]he duty in a case of adverse effect discrimination on the basis of religion or creed is to 
take reasonable steps to accommodate the complainant, short of undue hardship: in other 
words, to take such steps as may be reasonable to accommodate without undue 
interference in the operation of the employer's business and without undue expense to the 
employer.”324 
 
An ultimate aspect of undue hardship was developed later in Central Okanagan 
School District No. 23 v. Renaud325 and Commission scolaire de Chambly v. 
Bergevin326, as noted by Bosset and Eid327, whereby the duty to accommodate one 
employee should not come at the expense of another employee’s rights, nor should 
it affect their morale. The Supreme Court, when faced with a collision between an 
employer’s requirements and an employee’s religious beliefs, explained that “bona fide 
occupational qualification and bona fide occupational requirement are equivalent and 
                                                                                                                                      
Appartenances religieuses, appartenance citoyenne : un équilibre en tension (Québec, Les 
Presses de l’Université Laval, 2009). 
322
 On that subject, see Pauline Côté, “Québec and Reasonable Accommodation: Uses and 
Misuses of Public Consultation” in Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer, eds., Religion and 
Diversity in Canada (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 41-65. 
323
 Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
536, ¶ 22 [O’Malley]. 
324
 Ibid, ¶ 23. 
325
 Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [Central 
Okanagan School District]. 
326
 Commission scolaire de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525 [Bergevin]. 
327
 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 177, ¶ 13. 
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co-extensive terms.”328 Nevertheless, reasonable accommodation has been employed 
beyond the realm of bona fide occupational requirements since British Columbia 
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU329 and British 
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human 
Rights)330, thus extending the duty to accommodate to all persons governed by human 
rights legislation. Meorin also signalled the end of a lengthy controversy between 
doctrine and jurisprudence, according to José Woehrling, on the question of whether 
reasonable accommodation should extend to both direct and indirect discrimination331. 
Hence, certain conditions must be met in order to obtain an accommodation on the 
basis of freedom of religion, according to Professor Woehrling: first, they must be 
substantive moral or religious convictions; second, not only must these religious 
convictions exist, they must also be sincere; finally, the claimant must demonstrate that 
the restriction on his or her freedom of religion is serious332. 
 
The minority of the Supreme Court in Amselem opined that the duty of 
reasonable accommodation could not be imported to rights other than equality rights. 
Unlike Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc.333 and Prud’homme v. Prud’homme334, where 
two fundamental freedoms were balanced under the proviso of s. 9.1 of the Québec 
Charter335, the minority in Amselem held it inapplicable due to the impossible balancing 
                                               
328
 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 
[emphasis in original] [Alberta Dairy Pool]. This approach effectively overruled Bhinder v. 
C.N.R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 [Bhinder], where the majority of the Supreme Court 
distinguished O’Malley from Bhinder, since the latter was concerned by the presence of s. 
14(a) in the Canadian Human Rights Act (which explicitly created a bona fide occupational 
requirement defence) whereas the former was governed by provisions of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code: see Bhinder, ¶ 41. 
329
 Meiorin, supra note 293, as cited in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [Multani], at ¶ 130. 
330
 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of 
Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 [Grismer], as cited in Multani, supra note 329, at ¶ 130. 
331
 See Meiorin, supra note 293, at 32 as cited by Woehrling, « Religion à l’école », supra 
note 321, 668 and footnote 33. 
332
 Woehrling, «L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 177, 384-398.  
333
 Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 [Aubry]. 
334
 Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 [Prud’homme]. 
335
 Québec Charter, supra note 167, art. 9.1: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and 
rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the 
general well-being of the citizens of Québec.  
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be 
fixed by law.” 
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of rights and further complicated by the subjective nature of the test at hand336. While 
Stéphane Bernatchez treated this point as an unresolved question, which is disputed by 
some337, I have elected to address it under the lens of case-law since it represents a 
question mark in the evolution of the duty to reasonably accommodate.   
 
 More recently, the distinction between reasonable accommodation and minimal 
impairment has wavered, as seen in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys338. At issue was whether an orthodox Sikh boy could be allowed to wear his 
kirpan to school, which was in conformity with his religious beliefs but in seeming 
contradiction with the school board’s code of conduct. While essentially an 
administrative law decision, Multani was re-framed as a case of religious freedom 
rather than one base on the validity of an administrative decision. Although the majority 
observed the correspondence between the concepts of reasonable accommodation 
and minimal impairment339, Justices Deschamps and Abella JJ., in a concurring 
opinion, viewed that they belonged to two different analytical categories340. This 
                                               
336
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 154, citing Devine v. Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 
2 S.C.R. 790, 818 [Devine]. 
337
 See Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 321, ¶ 37-38. According to Bernatchez, 
authors José Woehrling and Christian Brunelle maintain instead that an infringement of the 
right to freedom of religion could create a duty of reasonable accommodation: see Christian 
Brunelle, « La sécurité et l’égalité en conflit » in TRIBUNAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE AND 
BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, supra note 170, 343 at 357-359; Woehrling, «L’obligation 
d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 177, 357 and following.  
338
 Multani, supra note 329. 
339
 Ibid, ¶ 53. Quoting Professor Woehrling, « Celui qui veut repousser l’obligation 
d’accommodement doit démontrer que l’application intégrale de la norme, sans les 
exceptions réclamées par le demandeur, est nécessaire pour atteindre un objectif législatif 
légitime et important.  Plus précisément, sous l’empire de l’article 1 de la Charte canadienne, 
en appliquant le test de l’arrêt R. c. Oakes, il faudra démontrer successivement que 
l’application entière de la norme constitue un moyen rationnel d’atteindre l’objectif législatif; 
qu’il n’existe pas de moyens d’y parvenir qui soient moins attentatoires aux droits en cause 
(critère de l’atteinte minimale); enfin, qu’il y a proportionnalité entre les effets bénéfiques de 
la mesure et ses effets restrictifs.  En fait, le critère de l’atteinte minimale, qui est au cœur du 
test de l’article 1, correspond en grande partie, pour ce qui est des concepts, à la défense de 
contrainte excessive qui permet de s’opposer à l’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable 
dans le cadre des lois sur les droits de la personne.  C’est ce qui ressort du jugement de la 
Cour suprême dans l’affaire Edwards Books, où l’application du critère de l’atteinte minimale 
amène la Cour à se demander si le législateur ontarien, en interdisant l’ouverture des 
magasins le dimanche et en prévoyant certaines exceptions pour ceux qui ferment déjà le 
samedi, a suffisamment fait d’efforts pour accommoder les commerçants qui, pour des 
raisons religieuses, doivent respecter un jour de repos autre que le dimanche. » : Woehrling, 
«L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable », supra note 177, 360. 
340
 Multani, supra note 329, ¶ 129. 
Chapter II. The Relationship between Freedom of Conscience and  
Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
 
79
intellectual quandary over whether there should be correspondence or dissonance 
between reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment raises further concerns 
about the boundaries of reasonable accommodation, and more importantly, about 
freedom of religion. As seen below, a jurisdictional line is drawn between these 
concepts on the basis of the remedy sought. 
 
Reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment were conceptually 
distinguished most recently in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. As discussed 
earlier, the obligation of a universal photo for drivers’ licenses resulted in questions 
related to the limits of freedom of religion and that of the doctrine of reasonable 
accommodation. On this point, the majority of the Supreme Court noted that “a 
distinction must be maintained between the reasonable accommodation analysis 
undertaken when applying human rights laws, and the s. 1 justification analysis that 
applies to a claim that a law infringes the Charter.”341 As mentioned previously, it is 
therefore not the outcome (namely the fact that there is a Charter violation) but rather 
the source of the infringement that determines the jurisdictional remedy. If a 
government action or administrative practice infringes on Charter rights, remedy is 
sought under s. 24(1) of the Charter; if the validity of the law is at stake – and is not 
justified under the Oakes’ test – then remedy is found under s. 52 of the Constitutional 
Act342. The scope of judicial accountability varies, therefore, according to the form of 
action sought:  while the relationship between employer and employee can be 
envisaged as dynamic343, the same cannot be said about the application of general 
laws. Although the relationship between a legislature and the people subject to its laws 
should not be understood as static (as opposed to dynamic), the majority of the Court 
explains that  
 
“[b]y their very nature, laws of general application are not tailored to the unique needs 
of individual claimants. The legislature has no capacity or legal obligation to engage 
in such an individualized determination, and in many cases would have no advance 
notice of a law’s potential to infringe Charter rights.  It cannot be expected to tailor a 
law to every possible future contingency, or every sincerely held religious belief.  
Laws of general application affect the general public, not just the claimants before the 
                                               
341
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 66. 
342
 Ibid, ¶ 66-67. 
343
 Ibid, ¶ 67-68. 
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court.  The broader societal context in which the law operates must inform the s. 1 
justification analysis. ”344 
 
In conceiving that no legal obligation exists between the legislature and the 
individual, the majority of the Court was effectively stating that a law does not have 
to be a priori facially neutral before the citizen. This approach to the responsibility 
and accountability of the legislature is worrisome, since it handily provides an exit 
strategy or carte blanche to the legislature under the auspices of a “societal 
perspective”345. 
 
While the following cases do not deal with the reasonable accommodation of 
religion, McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des 
employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal346 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des 
employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section 
locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ)347, heralded, in my view, the shift in the burden of 
demonstration of the State found in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. In both 
McGill Health Centre and Hydro-Québec, the employer had authorized absences 
that were not provided for in the collective agreement348. In Hydro-Québec, the 
interpretation and application of the undue hardship standard constituted the central 
question349, whereas the application of a termination employment clause was pivotal 
in McGill Health Centre350. Both cases converged on the issue of the employer’s 
obligation: “the employer’s duty to accommodate ends where the employee is no 
                                               
344
 Ibid, ¶ 69 [my emphasis]. 
345
 Ibid, ¶ 70-71.   
346
 McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de 
l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 [McGill Health Centre]. 
347
 Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau 
d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 561 [Hydro-Québec]. 
348
 McGill Health Centre, supra note 346, ¶ 32; Hydro-Québec, ibid, ¶ 17. 
349
 Hydro-Québec, ibid, ¶ 9. The test for undue hardship was described as follows at 
paragraph 18 of Hydro-Québec: “Thus, the test for undue hardship is not total unfitness for 
work in the foreseeable future. If the characteristics of an illness are such that the proper 
operation of the business is hampered excessively or if an employee with such an illness 
remains unable to work for the reasonably foreseeable future even though the employer has 
tried to accommodate him or her, the employer will have satisfied the test. In these 
circumstances, the impact of the standard will be legitimate and the dismissal will be deemed 
to be non-discriminatory.” The Supreme Court in McGill Health Centre stressed that “[u]ndue 
hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the 
beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three-year period.” 
350
 McGill Health Centre, supra note 346, ¶ 10, 25. 
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longer able to fulfill the basic obligations associated with the employment relationship 
for the foreseeable future.”351 Undue hardship, therefore, should benefit from a global 
analysis, which commences at the time that the first instance occurred, rather than 
be addressed as an afterthought to the situation352. Both McGill Health Centre and 
Hydro-Québec demonstrated that despite the employer’s measures of 
accommodation, the employee was incapable of resuming their duties; the employer 
was therefore discharged of his duty of accommodation. Shifting to Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony, the majority of the Court opined that the Charter does not 
indemnify practitioners against all incidental costs related to the practice of religion, 
even though freedom of religion is guaranteed353. 
 
This approach signals that unaddressed criticisms and shortfalls of the 
doctrine of reasonable accommodation, as applied to freedom of religion, persist. In 
the following section, I will attempt to address the concerns raised by authors. 
 
1.4.1.2 The Doctrine of Reasonable Accommodation 
 
 
 The legal framework of reasonable accommodation as applied to freedom of 
religion has endured as a subject of pointed criticism by authors. In the aftermath of the 
Bouchard-Taylor Report, many of these legal question marks were addressed, though 
certain answers remain unclear and at times unsatisfactory. 
 
 As seen most recently in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the very 
application of legal framework of reasonable accommodation to the constitutional 
context – and in our case freedom of religion – has elicited questions. While the 
concepts of reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment were reasonably 
                                               
351
 Hydro-Québec, supra note 347, ¶ 19; see also McGill Health Centre, ibid, ¶ 37-38. 
352
 McGill Health Centre, ibid, ¶ 33. 
353
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 95-96. In Lavallée c. Commission 
scolaire des Chênes, 2009 QCCS 3875 at ¶ 36 [Lavallée], it became possible to discount 
perceived injustices by attempting to rely only on hard and proven facts. However, Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony was not treated under the same angle as Lavallée, since the 
former was interested by the justification of the law under s. 1 of the Charter, whereas the 
latter was focused on the qualification of the harm. 
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associated in Multani, these concepts were intellectually distinguished in Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony. This about-face on the cabal between reasonable 
accommodation and minimal impairment goes a long way in addressing the concerns 
expressed by various authors since Multani. As expressed by Jean-François 
Gaudreault-DesBiens, when referring with approval to Justices Deschamps and 
Abella’s minority opinion in Multani, a qualitative difference reigns between these 
concepts354. The importance of conceiving of these legal concepts as intellectually 
distinct is crucial, since it should oblige the adjudicator to pay close attention to the 
context in which these demands are made. This point, however, should not be taken for 
granted, as seen below. 
 
In its current state, according to authors Bosset and Eid, the legal framework of 
reasonable accommodation does not accurately reflect the vocation and responsibilities 
held by a public institution, since the obligation of reasonable accommodation and the 
criterion of excessive burden have been used almost exclusively in the particular 
employer-employee relationship355. This comment was made in reaction to Multani, 
since it dealt with a school environment where there was marked relationship of 
unequal forces. The cost-benefit analysis will differ, therefore, according to the nature of 
the relationship, as well as the implications of such an accommodation in a particular 
environment356. A further example demonstrating the difficulty of transposing the 
framework of reasonable accommodation to public institutions is Québec’s now-
obscured Bill 16, entitled Loi favorisant l’action de l’Administration à l’égard de la 
                                               
354
 Gaudreault-Desbiens, « Quelques angles morts », supra note 71, 241 at 272. See also 
Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 321, ¶ 40-42. 
355
 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 177, ¶ 14. The authors offer the example of 
a school, which has a different vocation and environment than that of an employer: see 
Multani, supra note 329, ¶ 53, 65. See also Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 
321, ¶ 40-42. 
356
 For a specific discussion on the implications of different actors requesting a reasonable 
accommodation of freedom of religion in schools, see Woehrling, « Religion à l’école », supra 
note 321; Bergman Fleury, “Obligation d’accommodements et services publics au Québec” in 
Christian Brunelle and Patrick A. Molinari, eds., Reasonable Accommodation and the Role of 
the State : A Democratic Challenge/Accommodements raisonnables et rôle de l’État : un défi 
démocratique, coll. Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice/Institut canadien 
d’administration de la justice, 2008, at pages 339-361. 
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diversité culturelle357. In an effort to better respond to the cultural diversity of 
immigrants and their religious practices in particular, the government had tabled a bill 
to enable government organisations to adopt directives to fight against 
discrimination. The fate of this bill has become uncertain given the politically charged 
atmosphere surrounding these debates in Québec. 
 
The balance between the demands of reasonable accommodation and the 
other values enshrined by a charter of rights provides a third point of contention for 
the legal framework of reasonable accommodation. More particularly, when a 
request for reasonable accommodation of religious practices affronts another 
underlying value of the charter of rights, the legitimacy of the solution comes into 
question358. In an effort to remedy this possible clash of values, the Québec 
government, following the Bouchard-Taylor Report, instituted changes to the Québec 
Charter in order to reflect this new hierarchy of principles. According to the Québec 
Charter, the rights and freedoms declared are explicitly equally guaranteed to women 
and men359. 
 
The doctrine of reasonable accommodation, as applied to claims of religious 
freedom, must proceed with caution, as illustrated through our brief overview. It must 
also take into account the context in which the accommodation is asserted, the rights 
and implications for the various actors involved and the consequential management of 
multiple rights.  
 
                                               
357
 Loi favorisant l’action de l’Administration à l’égard de la diversité culturelle, Bill no16 
(Specific consultations – 07-08.10.2009), 1st Sess., 39th Legis., (Qc). According to sources, 
says journalist Denis Lessard, the controversial Bill 16 will simply not follow the usual path at 
the National Assembly, launching it into the realm of obscurity: Denis Lessard, 
“Accommodements raisonnables: le projet de loi 16 jeté aux oubliettes”, La Presse (October 
22, 2009), online: http://www.cyberpresse.ca/actualites/quebec-canada/politique-
quebecoise/200910/22/01-913792-accomodements-raisonnables-le-projet-de-loi-16-jete-aux-
oubliettes.php (site last accessed 22.10.2009)  
358
 Bosset & Eid, « Droit et religion », supra note 177, ¶ 15. The authors add, at the same 
paragraph : « Pour ce motif, il arrive que la légitimité des solutions juridiques fondées sur 
l’accommodement raisonnable soit remise en question. Cela semble être le cas, en 
particulier, lorsque l’égalité des sexes est un élément essentiel du débat. » See also 
Bernatchez, « Enjeux juridiques », supra note 321, ¶ 35-36. 
359
 See Québec Charter, supra note 167, Preamble and art. 50.1. 
Chapter II. The Relationship between Freedom of Conscience and  
Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
 
84
Balancing rights and obligations can be accomplished under the doctrine of 
reasonable accommodation, but also under the proportionality test, know as the Oakes’ 
test. I now turn to this form of managing multiple rights. 
 
1.4.2 Proportionality under the Charter: Oakes’ Test Revisited 
 
R. v. Oakes360 set out the appropriate standard of proof to adopt under s. 1 of 
the Charter361. The Oakes’ test represented the second step in determining an 
infringement of rights: firstly, one must demonstrate that a Charter right or freedom 
was breached; secondly, one must determine whether this breach represented a 
reasonable limit within a free and democratic society. Two central criteria must 
therefore be satisfied to answer whether the limit is reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society: 
 
“First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or 
freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom"” 
 
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking s. 
1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. […] 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in 
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In 
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if 
rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little as 
possible" the right or freedom in question: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p. 352. 
Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are 
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been 
identified as of "sufficient importance".362 
 
Applied to cases where freedom of religion is threatened, as explained by Chief 
Justice Dickson (writing for Chouinard and Le Dain JJ.) in Edwards Books, “[i]t matters 
not […] whether a coercive burden is direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, 
                                               
360
 Oakes, supra note 184. 
361
 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 1, establishes the 
following: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” [my emphasis]. A similar limit is imposed by s. 9(1) 
of the Québec Charter, supra note 167, which reads that “[i]n exercising his fundamental 
freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, 
public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” [my emphasis] 
362
 Oakes, supra note 184, ¶ 69-70. 
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foreseeable or unforeseeable. All coercive burdens on the exercise of religious beliefs 
are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a).”363 This should not be interpreted, however, 
as warns Chief Justice Dickson, to mean any and all burdens on religious practices: a 
difference thus reigns between costs that are considered substantial and those that 
are considered trivial364. Nevertheless, as stated in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony, no “magic barometer” exists to measure the seriousness of a particular limit 
on a religious practice365; every case must be evaluated on its own merits and 
implications. While the implications of the incidental and unintended consequences in 
Edwards Books and Multani led to a curtailment of ‘meaningful choices’, the notion of 
social good prevailed over that of religious practice in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony, according to the majority366. Achieving balance between the salutary and 
deleterious effects under the ambit of s. 1 Charter analysis also compels us to 
consider the underlying Charter values in this equation, such as liberty, human dignity, 
equality, autonomy and the enhancement of democracy367.  
 
When invoked, the Oakes’ test obliges us to find balance between individual 
and collective rights but also asks us to manage the concrete and underlying 
discourses in the Charter368. In so doing, one attempts to balance on one side while 
accommodating on the other, all the while paying heed to the underlying discourse of 
Charter values.  Given the result in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, I believe that 
                                               
363
 Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 96. 
364
 Ibid, ¶ 97. Dickson C.J. provided necessary insight into the tenets of freedom of religion, 
as well as the balancing act that must occur between this fundamental freedom and other 
rights protected: “The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with 
profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in 
some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct 
and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious 
beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a state-imposed cost or 
burden to be proscribed by s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering with religious belief or 
practice.” (Ibid, ¶ 97) 
365
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 89. 
366
 Ibid, ¶ 96. 
367
 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, ¶ 125 
[Thomson Newspapers] and Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Association v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, ¶ 81 [Health Services and Support], 
as cited in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 88. 
368
 See Benjamin L. Berger, « Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and the Constitutional 
Protection of Religion » (2008) 40 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 513, 534 [Berger, “Moral 
Judgment”]. 
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claims related to freedom of religion will increasingly be treated under the banner of 
proportionality, rather than that of accommodation. 
 
2. Unresolved Issues Pertaining to Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 As the title indicates, I will proceed to a discussion of the unresolved issues 
pertaining to freedom of religion in Canada; freedom of conscience, in its various 
interpretations, will be addressed in the following section. I have elected to focus on 
three interrelated points that have not reached consensus in the legal community: 
the sincerity of the belief and the individual (2.1), the place of expert evidence and 
the impact on community views of religion (2.2) and a child’s right to freedom of 
conscience and religion (2.3). In closing, I will offer a brief conclusion on freedom of 
religion in Canada (2.4). 
 
2.1 The Sincerity of the Belief and the Individual 
 
In establishing a test based on the sincerity of a claimant’s beliefs369, the 
majority of the Supreme Court in Amselem effectively offered a “hypersubjective 
definition of religion”370. While this approach can be applauded for bestowing 
unparalleled flexibility to a customarily formalistic subject, it has also been criticised 
for painting (and subsequently endorsing) a reductionist view of religion and beliefs 
in law. The sincerity of belief test will be addressed from three different yet 
                                               
369
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 53: “Assessment of sincerity is a question of fact that can be 
based on several non-exhaustive criteria, including the credibility of a claimant’s testimony, 
as well as an analysis of whether the alleged belief is consistent with his or her other current 
religious practices.  It is important to underscore, however, that it is inappropriate for courts 
rigorously to study and focus on the past practices of claimants in order to determine whether 
their current beliefs are sincerely held.  Over the course of a lifetime, individuals change and 
so can their beliefs.  Religious beliefs, by their very nature, are fluid and rarely static.  A 
person’s connection to or relationship with the divine or with the subject or object of his or her 
spiritual faith, or his or her perceptions of religious obligation emanating from such a 
relationship, may well change and evolve over time.  Because of the vacillating nature of 
religious belief, a court’s inquiry into sincerity, if anything, should focus not on past practice or 
past belief but on a person’s belief at the time of the alleged interference with his or her 
religious freedom.” 
370
 Solange Lefebvre, “Between Law and Public Opinion” in Beaman & Beyer, supra note 
322, 175 at 194. 
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interrelated points: the very notion of “sincerity”; the public implications of private 
beliefs; and the paradigmatic shift from these public implications to cultural identity. 
 
 Being “sincere” generally implies “proceeding from or characterized by 
genuine feelings; free from deceit” according to the Compact Oxford English 
Dictionary371. Applied to the context of freedom of religion and sincerely held beliefs, 
sincerity requires the good faith of the claimant372. As articulated by Benjamin 
Berger, “[v]eracity is for the public, sincerity is for the private, and all that the law 
requires of religion is sincerity of belief.”373 A distinction is therefore established 
between what constitutes good faith and what is factually correct, which falls in line 
with the Supreme Court’s approach not to challenge the character of the belief. 
Beyond this initial point on the semantics of sincerity, a more serious argument is 
made against the actual construction of the sincerity test. The Supreme Court’s 
justification of the existence of the “sincerity test” before Amselem has irked authors 
Margaret Ogilvie and Lori Beaman, who argue that such a construction is 
unfounded374. In both R. v. Jones375 and Attis v. New Brunswick School District No. 
15376, claims of subjective sincerity were simply accepted or assumed377. This differs 
from the actual language used by the Supreme Court, who implied a historical use of 
a subjective test. Although subjective claims were accepted in aforementioned 
cases, Ogilivie also points to Bruker378 where the Supreme Court doubted the 
sincerity of the husband’s beliefs for the first time. She notes that “Bruker 
demonstrates how the subjective sincerity test for s. 2(a) has the potential to bring 
the courts into disrepute by appearing to be taking sides in a religious dispute.”379 To 
this example, I add that of Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, where sincerity of 
                                               
371
 COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY “sincere”, supra note 2, 
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/sincere?view=uk (site last accessed 05.11.2009). 
372
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 51. 
373
 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 308. 
374
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 44, 51. 
375
 Jones, supra note 189, at 295. 
376
 Ross, supra note 202. 
377
 Margaret H. Ogilvie, “Bruker v. Marcovitz: (Get)ting Over Freedoms (Like Contract and 
Religion) in Canada, (2008/2009) 24 N.J.C.L. 173, 187 [Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over 
Freedoms”]; Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, 205. 
378
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 68-69. 
379
 Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”, supra note 377, 187-188. This was also suggested by 
Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 303. 
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belief was acknowledged, but the majority of the Supreme Court cautioned that this 
alone did not guarantee protection380. Nevertheless, it is not so much the issue of 
“taking sides”, since by nature that is what courts are meant to do as adjudicators. 
Rather, the problem is offering strong reasons in support of taking one side and not 
the other, in my opinion. Perhaps the most vocal critic of the subjective sincerity test, 
Margaret Ogilvie has not minced words when expressing her distaste for the avenue 
chosen by the Supreme Court, calling it a “flimsy and unstable basis for protecting 
religion.”381 
 
 When engaging in a test of sincerely-held beliefs, it is becomes difficult to 
ignore that “[r]eligious beliefs or values have public implications.”382 Solange 
Lefebvre noted that it is important to reflect on the “reasonable” interval within which 
the sincerity of the belief should be located383. She adds that although an individual 
can seek emancipation from religious constraints, an individual can alternatively also 
reaffirm conformity to religious orthodoxy384. The consequences of private beliefs 
underscore the general ambiguity of where religious beliefs should be situated on a 
societal scale. More specifically, the consequences of private beliefs on public 
spheres of activity in Canadian constitutional law illustrate the awkward silence 
between individual and “collective dimension of religious life”385. Benjamin Berger 
has referred to this as the “deafness to the centrality of the community.”386 
Nevertheless, this approach reflects the individual’s choice and personal autonomy 
vis-à-vis that of the community and more generally, the political culture of liberalism, 
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 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 4, ¶ 8, 69. 
381
 Margaret H. Ogilvie, “And Then There was One: Freedom of Religion in Canada – the 
Incredibly Shrinking Concept” (2008) 10 Eccl. L.J. 197, 203 [Ogilvie, “Incredibly Shrinking 
Concept”]; Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”, supra note 377, 187. M.H. Ogilvie also 
remarked that “[a]pparently, it is easier to determine whether a claimant sincerely believes a 
self-defined belief than the content of, say, the Nicene creed!”: Ogilvie, “Incredibly Shrinking 
Concept”, ibid, at 199. 
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 Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002-2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563, 571 [Moon, “Liberty, 
Neturality and Inclusion”]; Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 201, 219 [Moon, “Religious 
Commitment and Identity]. 
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 Solange Lefebvre, “La liberté religieuse modelée par les effets paradoxaux de la 
modernité” in Gaudreault-Desbiens, supra note 321, 195 at 211. 
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 Ibid, 202-203. 
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 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 290. 
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 Ibid, 290. 
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argues Berger387. Moreover, he has suggested that the community is essential to 
determining what inevitably can be considered religion388. Seen from a different 
perspective, although the beliefs espoused by the individual might not be those of 
the ‘community’ at the end of the day, there is an undeniable role played by the 
community as actor and reactor to the opinions of the members389.  
 
 More recently, the justification of the protection of freedom of conscience and 
religion has been re-branded as a question of (cultural) identity rather than 
(personal) autonomy390. One needs only to turn to the opening sentences of Bruker 
to feel this operational shift391. While this “partial or ambiguous shift” has been 
                                               
387
 Ibid, 283. The author concludes, at page 314, that “[m]ore profoundly, there is a 
fundamental, though eminently explicable, shortfall at the core of liberal legal discourse. 
Religion is not only what law imagines it to be. Law is blind to critical aspects of religion as 
culture.” 
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 Bruce Ryder, “State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005) 29 Sup. 
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 169, 197 [Ryder, “State Neutrality”]: “Without any demonstrated religious 
connection apart from the claimant’s asserted sincere belief, is it possible to determine when 
personal opinions become “religious”?”; see also Rosalie Jukier and Shauna Van Praagh, 
“Civil Law and Religion in the Supreme Court of Canada: What Should We Get out of Bruker 
v. Marcovitz?” (2008) 43 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 381 [Jukier & Van Praagh, “Civil Law and 
Religion”]. On the relationship between the individual’s beliefs and the religious community 
in the specific realm of a child’s rights, see Shauna Van Praagh, “Faith, Belonging, and the 
Protection of “Our Children”” (1999) 17 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 154 [Van Praagh, 
“Protection of “Our” Children”]. 
389
 Richard Moon speaks of the importance of the community in shaping religious opinions 
and perspectives of the individual and providing a “moral framework” for the individual: see 
Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra note 382, 234; Richard Moon, “Bruker v. 
Marcovitz”: Divorce and the Marriage of Law and Religion (2008) 42 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 37, 
58 [Moon, “Marriage of Law and Religion”]. 
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 While this has been treated previously in the discussion on freedom of conscience 
(section 2), I will address the shift from the perspective of freedom of religion. 
391
 Bruker, supra note 4, ¶ 1-2: 
“[1] Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity and pluralism.  This 
journey has included a growing appreciation for multiculturalism, including the recognition 
that ethnic, religious or cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected.  Endorsed in 
legal instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in human rights codes to their 
constitutional enshrinement in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to 
integrate into Canada’s mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences has 
become a defining part of our national character. 
 [2] The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean that those differences 
are always hegemonic.  Not all differences are compatible with Canada’s fundamental values 
and, accordingly, not all barriers to their expression are arbitrary.  Determining when the 
assertion of a right based on difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a 
complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright- line application.  It is, at the same 
time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both multiculturalism and 
public confidence in its importance.” 
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observed by Moon, it can be attributed in part due to a rise of secularism but also be 
understood through the courts’ ambiguous view of religion and its value392. 
Interestingly, while Berger concedes the appeal of the logic of equality and its natural 
note in law’s understanding of religion, he ultimately concludes that the overarching 
liberal tone is always one of choice and autonomy393, as reflected by Law v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration)394. However, he remarked that “perhaps 
the most contentious current point of debate is the relationship between culture itself 
and choice.”395 While I agree that this reformulation of the problem focuses on 
culture’s understanding of ‘voluntariness and free will’396, I consider that this 
ultimately remains a question of how one goes about defining religion in law. I draw 
on Richard Moon to support my conclusion on this point. As expressed by Moon, “to 
regard a religious community as an association that members join and quit at will, is 
to miss both the value of religious association and its potential to limit and 
sometimes even oppress its members.”397 Beyond my scope of study but of deep 
interest, the interweaving of exit theory and minority rights, especially when coupled 
with religion, merits further analysis within the Canadian constitutional context. Given 
the prior analysis, I consider that a more contextual approach to religion in law will 
enable a better appreciation of the unequivocal cultural component of religion and 
perhaps lessen the focus on political liberalism and by extension, the ‘autonomous’ 
individual. 
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 Richard Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice” in Moon, supra note 4, 217 at 
218-219. 
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 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 298; Benjamin Berger, “Law’s Religion” in Moon, 
supra note 4, 264 at 276. The author continues at the same page in his Osgoode Hall Law 
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 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 
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 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 299-300 (footnote 83). On the pull between 
culture itself and choice, Berger refers to Natasha Bakht’s recent study for the National 
Association of Women and the Law in 2005 entitled Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: 
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 Moon, “Marriage of Law and Religion”, supra note 389, 62. See also Beaman, “Defining 
Religion”, supra note 4, 206. 
Chapter II. The Relationship between Freedom of Conscience and  
Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
 
91
 
 
2.2 The Place of Expert Evidence and the Impact on Community Views of 
Religion 
 
In devising a test based on the sincerity of beliefs, the Supreme Court in 
Amselem discouraged recourse to expert testimony. The consequences of the 
Court’s positioning were twofold: First, the use of expert evidence testimony to 
circumscribe the content of a religion was set aside; second, the importance of 
“community religious views as determinate aspects of religion”398 was also 
abandoned. The majority view of the Supreme Court’s choice was explained as 
follows: 
 
“[a] claimant may choose to adduce expert evidence to demonstrate that his or her 
belief is consistent with the practices and beliefs of other adherents of the faith.  
While such evidence may be relevant to a demonstration of sincerity, it is not 
necessary.  Since the focus of the inquiry is not on what others view the claimant’s 
religious obligations as being, but rather what the claimant views these personal   
religious “obligations” to be, it is inappropriate to require expert opinions to show 
sincerity of belief.  An “expert” or an authority on religious law is not the 
surrogate for an individual’s affirmation of what his or her religious beliefs are. 
Religious belief is intensely personal and can easily vary from one individual to 
another.  Requiring proof of the established practices of a religion to gauge the 
sincerity of belief diminishes the very freedom we seek to protect.”399 
 
This position is comprehensible since it follows the Court’s choice not to become the 
arbiter of religious dogma400; it is regrettable, since it restricts the terms of the debate 
on components of religion. In light of Amselem, Lori Beaman distinguishes between 
an expert providing evidence about the sincerity of belief (“individual experiences”) 
and giving evidence about the content of a particular religion (“essences”)401. This 
push-and-pull between experiences and essences becomes another expression of 
the dilemma of defining religion in law. The case-law has since vacillated on this 
point, causing one to question how the issue of expert testimony should be dealt with 
when faced with claims of religious freedom. Multani presented an example of 
                                               
398
 Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20, 286 (at footnote 29). 
399
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400
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Chapter II. The Relationship between Freedom of Conscience and  
Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
 
 
92
drawing on both individual experiences and essences402, leading to inconsistent 
interpretations as to the weight attributed to evidence in religious claims403. 
According to Mahmud Jamal, Multani provided an interesting approach to finding 
creative (and economical) sources in lieu of expert evidence404. The public domain of 
religion as addressed in Multani – also explained as a surgical approach to 
constructing an evidentiary record, according to the author405 - warrants closer 
examination. The source of affidavits explaining the tenets of Sikhism remains 
religious, since they were offered by Sikh chaplains: although no “expert testimony” 
was presented, ‘expert’ religious opinions were offered on a code of belief. At best, 
the line between direct approbation of the existence of a religion and that of its 
religious expression becomes conceptually hazy. The evidence in Multani was 
interpreted in a different way by Solange Lefebvre, who considered that recourse to 
Sikh chaplains signalled that religious experts’ opinions could be taken into account 
in judgments406. The question now becomes whether this religious opinion evidence 
should be part of the foreground or background of a judgment. While the question of 
expert testimony is seemingly innocuous at the outset, it points to a deeper question 
of how law views the place of religion within the public or private sphere407.   
 
This approach was not followed, however, in the next pre-eminent case on 
freedom of religion at the Supreme Court. In Bruker, it was inferred by the Supreme 
Court that Mass J. of the Québec Superior Court came to a conclusion on whether 
the get should be granted immediately based on the expert evidence presented408. 
                                               
402
 Ibid. 
403
 Multani, supra note 329, ¶ 36. 
404
 Mahmud Jamal, “Freedom of Religion in the Supreme Court: Some Lessons from 
Multani” (2006/2007) 21 N.J.C.L. 291, 306 [Jamal, “Some Lessons from Multani”]. The 
evidentiary record was relatively modest, according to the author at the same page, 
consisting of affidavit evidence explaining the tenets of Sikhism; documents relating to the 
interaction with school authorities and several newspaper articles filed with the courts below 
on the experiences of other school boards’ across Canada in accommodating the kirpan. 
405
 Ibid, 306. 
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 Lefebvre, « Liberté religieuse modelée » in Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra note 321, 195 at 
208. 
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 See Ogilvie, “Incredibly Shrinking Concept”, supra note 381, 202; Berger, “Law’s 
Religion”, supra note 20, 286; Ogilvie, “(Get)ting Over Freedoms”, supra note 377, 183-188; 
Beaman, “Defining Religion”, supra note 4, 202; Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, 
supra note 382, 218. 
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More recently, expert opinion evidence was employed to demonstrate the religious 
beliefs and attitudes in relation to gay marriage409. More particularly, Dr. Bryan Hillis 
testified in the case of an appeal of a complaint made to the Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Commission, which had found that the marriage commissioner had 
discriminated against the complainant when he refused to perform a marriage on the 
basis of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. According to the expert 
evidence, no marked difference exists in attitudes between Christianity and other 
religions that mariage is a sacred act410. McMurty J., for the Queen’s Bench, found 
that the marriage commissioner’s personal religious beliefs should ultimately be set 
aside given his role as a government official411.  
 
Interestingly, expert evidence has also been used to demonstrate that Falun 
Gong should be recognised as a creed within the meaning of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code412. Indeed, while the evidence was used to demonstrate the existence 
of a creed or religion, it had to do so by relying on the practices that constitute Falun 
Gong. This creates a strange standard for Falun Gong, since it is “legitimised” by 
western standards but “vilified” as a cult where practioners face persecution in 
China.  
 
Just as expert evidence has been used to adduce the existence of certain 
religious practices or religions, expert evidence can also serve to discredit or render 
religious claims suspect in the eyes of the law. The issue of “spirituality” when 
addressing Aboriginal claims illustrates the dischord between ancestral rights and 
interpretation of freedom of religion. For example, although the Charter was not 
enacted when Jack and Charlie v. The Queen413 was brought before the courts, the 
decision remains central in understanding how the parcelling of identity can occur, 
according to Lori Beaman414. According to Jean Leclair, the Aboriginal world is one 
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 Nichols v. M.J., 2009 SKQB 299 [Nichols], ¶ 17. 
410
 Ibid, ¶ 17. 
411
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 Huang v. 1233065 Ontario Inc. (Ottawa Senior Chinese Cultural Association), 2006 HRTO 
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 Jack and Charlie v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332 [Jack and Charlie].   
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where the sacred and the profane coincide415. By conceiving of space in a different 
manner, it is not surprising that Aboriginal claims are not often addressed within the 
discourse on freedom of religion, but rather framed as issues pertaining to treaty 
rights or title rights416. In doing so, rarely are claims assessed on an individual basis 
but rather in terms of group rights and according to the pre-existence of aboriginal 
societies417, the latter known as “autochtonité” according to Ghislain Otis418. The 
                                                                                                                                      
and Innovations, Toronto, Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2006, p. 229 at page 233-234 
[Beaman, “Aboriginal Spirituality”]. In Jack and Charlie, the Court opined that the killing of 
a deer was not an integral part of the sacred ceremony. This rejoins Ghislain Otis’ comment 
when wondering if “[l]a plus haute juridiction canadienne ne s’érige-t-elle pas en grand 
tribunal religieux lorsqu’elle s’arroge l’autorité de décréter quelles coutumes ou pratiques 
religieuses d’origine précoloniale peuvent être reconnues comme des « caractéristiques 
déterminantes de la culture distinctive » d’une collectivité autochtone? » : see Ghislain Otis, 
“Revendications foncières, “autochtonité” et liberté de religion au Canada” (1999) 40 C. de D. 
741, 764 [references omitted] [Otis, « Autochtonité »]. 
415
 Jean Leclair, “Le droit et le sacré ou la recherche d’un point d’appui absolu” in Gaudreault-
Desbiens, supra note 321, 475 at 481. 
416
 Beaman, “Aboriginal Spirituality”, supra note 414, at 234, 238; Otis, « Autochtonité », 
supra note 414, 772. 
417
 See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet], ¶ 30-31 as cited by Otis, 
« Autochtonité », supra note 414, 750 (footnote 21). The case of Thomas v. Norris, [1992] 2 
C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C.S.C.) [Thomas], as cited and discussed by Jean-François Gaudreault-
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was whether non-pecuniary aggravated, punitive and special damages should be awarded to 
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during the “Spirit Dancing” tradition. David Thomas, the plaintiff, was considered an “Indian” 
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defenses provided, the defendants claimed that they had a legal right to initiate the plaintiff, 
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the meaning of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The aboriginal right claimed by the 
defendants is their right to carry on and exercise the Tradition, which is called the Coast 
Salish Spirit Dance.” (Thomas, supra, 3-4). According to Mr. Justice Hood, “s. 35(1) is not 
applicable in the case at bar. Assuming that spirit dancing was an aboriginal right, and that it 
existed and was practised prior to the assertion of British sovereignty over Vancouver Island, 
and the imposition of English law, in my opinion those aspects of it which were contrary to 
English common law, such as the use of force, assault, battery and wrongful imprisonment, 
did not survive the coming into force of that law, which occurred on Vancouver Island in 1846 
or, at the latest, in 1866, when the two colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 
were merged.” (Thomas, supra, 24) A distinction is also drawn between a right and a 
freedom by the judge, noting that the former is not absolute in the case and does not include 
civil immunity from unlawful tortious conduct (Thomas, supra, 25). Nonpecuniary damages, 
including exemplary damages, were ultimately awarded to the plaintiff for pain and suffering 
during his ordeal (Thomas, supra, 26-27). 
418
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coupling of religious freedom with the pre-existence of aboriginal rights warrants a 
discussion in and of itself; my purpose here is only to highlight the difficulty of 
resolving such a dispute in the face of conflicting ‘expert’ views of the individual and 
the community.  
 
The weight of expert evidence testimony in cases of religious freedom should 
also be considered in light of the doctrine of judicial notice. In 2005, the judicial 
notice of social facts was clarified by Justice Binnie in R. v. Spence419. While the 
Supreme Court said that recourse to expert testimony was unnecessary in Amselem 
in 2004, it found that legislative and “social facts” should be established by expert 
testimony in Spence in 2005420.  
 
At issue in Spence was whether the trial judge was right in refusing to permit 
the following question that was directed to the jury: “[w]ould your ability to judge the 
evidence in this case without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that 
the accused person is a black man charged with robbing an East Indian person?”421 
As such, did the trial judge’s refusal constitute an infringement on the accused’s right 
to an impartial jury and therefore a fair trial? Justice Binnie stipulates that judicial 
notice of facts should be done on a sliding scale: the more central the fact is to the 
case, the more stringent the test of judicial notice, whereas if a fact is of reference or 
background, it is more likely to be admitted. This method reflects the approach 
                                                                                                                                      
Constitutional Act) and not as a bearer of freedom of religion, which presupposes the 
absence of constraint: see Otis, “Autochtonité”, supra note 414, 762. 
419
 R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 [Spence]. The section on judicial notice 
and R. v. Spence was originally written as part of a paper entitled “Speaking (Out?) in 
Tongues: The Impact of R. v. R.D.S.”, submitted to Professor Danielle Pinard in partial 
fulfilment of requirements for “Droit constitutionnel avancé” (DRT 6845A) given at the Faculty 
of Law of Université de Montréal (Fall 2006 term).  
420
 Spence, supra, ¶ 68: “The suggestion that even legislative and social “facts” should be 
established by expert testimony rather than reliance on judicial notice was also made in 
cases as different from one another as Find, Moysa, Danson, at p. 1101, Symes v. Canada, 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, Waldick v. Malcolm, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 456, at pp. 472-73, Stoffman v. 
Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, at pp. 549-50, R. v. Penno, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 865, at pp. 881-82, and MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357.  Litigants who 
disregard the suggestion proceed at some risk.” 
421
 Spence, supra note 419, ¶ 1. It should be noted that the question draws from R. v. Parks, 
(1993), 84 C.C.C. (3rd) 353 (Ont. C.A.), 353, where the question was: “[w]ould your ability to 
judge the evidence in the case without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that 
the person charged is … black … and the deceased is a white man?” 
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favoured by author K.C. Davis, where “the permissible scope of judicial notice should 
vary according to the nature of the issue under consideration.”422 Therefore, 
according to Binnie J.,  
 
“When asked to take judicial notice of matters falling between the high end already 
discussed where the Morgan criteria will be insisted upon, and the low end of 
background facts where the court will likely proceed (consciously or unconsciously) 
on the basis that the matter is beyond serious controversy, I believe a court ought to 
ask itself whether such “fact” would be accepted by reasonable people who have 
taken the trouble to inform themselves on the topic as not being the subject of 
reasonable dispute for the particular purpose for which it is to be used, keeping in 
mind that the need for reliability and trustworthiness increases directly with the 
centrality of the “fact” to the disposition of the controversy.”423  
 
Justice Binnie is suggesting the creation of a mid-level test for judicially noticing facts 
that lie in between the centre and the extreme periphery of the case424. One could 
imagine such a test of judicial notice as being represented by a funnel. By 
introducing the requirement of the ‘reasonable person’, an additional burden is put 
on said person, since it is no longer the test of a reasonable person placed in the 
same circumstances, but rather, a reasonable person, placed in the same 
circumstances, and also having gone to the trouble of informing themselves on the 
topic at bar. The additional criterion of information on the case at bar would serve as 
a safeguard to insure the reliability and trustworthiness of the reasonable person. I 
am of the opinion that although the creation of such a test is necessary to consider 
and judicially notice certain facts, it creates a substantial burden on the reasonable 
person.  
 
 For the Court, Binnie J. surmises that the submissions put forth by the ACLC 
[African Canadian Legal Clinic] and the respondent represent a shift that would be 
too fundamental, and declines to take judicial notice of different aspects of racism. In 
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 Spence, supra note 419, ¶ 60. It should be noted that paragraph 60 of R. v. Spence is 
treated and cited in Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en 
matière factuelle: pistes de réflexion” (20.11.2006), p.17. 
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closing, he adds a comment that has the potential to forever change the face of 
judicial notice of social science facts evidence:  
 
“The suggestion that even legislative and social “facts” should be established by 
expert testimony rather than reliance on judicial notice was also made in cases as 
different from one another as Find, Moysa, Danson, at p. 1101, Symes v. Canada, 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, Waldick v. Malcolm, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 456, at pp. 472-73, 
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, at pp. 549-50, R. v. 
Penno, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865, at pp. 881-82, and MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
357.  Litigants who disregard the suggestion proceed at some risk.”425 
 
Justice Binnie admits that this approach would disadvantage certain litigants, but 
determines that considerations related to trial fairness should be dealt with 
separately in order to avoid diluting the doctrine of judicial notice426. This attempt at 
regulation of the doctrine of judicial notice is thorny, as certain authors have 
admitted427, though the parameters are far from finalised.  Given the slightly 
disjointed nature of the classification of facts in R. v. Spence, with legislative facts – 
derived from the Davis model – on one side, and “social facts” – stemming from the 
Monahan and Walker model – on the other, I consider that a further attempt should 
be made in understanding the doctrine of judicial notice in order to not weaken it by 
misrepresentation. 
 
 Although the issue of expert evidence and the impact on community views of 
religion is addressed in a secondary manner by the Supreme Court in Amselem, it is 
clear that it is essential to a better understanding of religion in law. Insofar as the 
                                               
425Spence, supra note 419, ¶ 68 [my emphasis]. It should be noted that paragraph 68 of R. v. 
Spence is treated and cited in Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance 
d’office en matière factuelle: pistes de réflexion” (20.11.2006), p.19-20.  
426
 Spence, supra note 419, ¶ 69. In conclusion, at paragraph 77: “But in this case, with 
respect, I do not think fairness to the accused or the vitally necessary appearance of fairness 
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identification.  In the circumstances of this case, the trial judge did not think that leaving the 
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entitled to make.  We should not interfere simply because we might have concluded in his 
place that greater reassurance might have been given to the accused had the full Parks 
question been put.” [my emphasis]. It should be noted that paragraph 69 of R. v. Spence is 
treated and cited in Professor Danielle Pinard’s outline entitled “La connaissance d’office en 
matière factuelle: pistes de réflexion” (20.11.2006), p.20. 
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opinions of experts should be carefully assessed and appreciated, as noted by the 
courts, one must distinguish between protecting a community practice at the 
expense of an individual’s beliefs and protecting a community practice in the 
interests of preserving a religious tradition.  
 
2.3 A Child’s Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
 
 Although children are recognised as rights holders by the Supreme Court of 
Canada428, their right to freedom of religion has posed a particular challenged when 
coupled with their “best interest”, since judgment must be passed in the absence of a 
“eureka moment”429 determining a child’s competency. Recent issues such as a 
child’s right to refuse a blood transfusion for religious reasons in Manitoba430 and 
British Columbia431, the wearing of religious symbols in schools in Québec432, a 
parent’s right to remove a child from ethics and religious culture class in Québec433 
or exempt a child from religious “instruction or exercise” in Alberta434 as well as 
funding of religious schools in Ontario435 demonstrate that a child’s right to freedom 
of religion is anything but clear-cut in Canada in 2009. Decisions on a child’s right to 
freedom of religion require not only an evaluation of the child’s rights but also those 
of the parents. The religious community - whose perpetuation can hang in the 
balance - has also emerged as an under-examined site of influence436. Moreover, the 
Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child has argued, in its 2009 report, that the 
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September 2007. The Conservatives ultimately lost the election and the contested issue of 
funding of religious schools was cast aside by the Ontario Liberals. See Jennifer Wilson, 
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best interest of the child can be instrumentalised in one of two ways with regard to 
religious practices. First, religious practices either ignore or are given priority over 
any consideration of the child’s interest. Second, religious beliefs are used to justify 
actions that run counter to the provisions of the Convention [on the Rights of the 
Child]437. By playing on the variable geometry of the best interest of the child, it can 
be argued that both the State and parents aim to regulate the extent of a child’s 
religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the subtle and direct influences of the religious 
community must also enter into this equation. 
 
 The recent case of A.C. embodies the difficulty in identifying whether a proper 
age exists at which a child’s beliefs should be upheld in a court of law. Framed as a 
question of “competing values” between a child’s interests and that of society 
‘legitimate’ interest, the shift toward “values” is unmistakable438. While sliding scales 
to determine maturity provide a certain amount of manoeuvring room for the 
adjudicator, it can nonetheless diminish this fundamental freedom to a checklist 
before the law, albeit a contextualised one. A question worthy of further exploration 
is whether such emphasis should be placed on autonomy and free choice, at the 
expense, it seems, of the relationship between the child, parents and the religious 
community. Indeed, this question has been raised both within439 and outside440 of the 
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 CANADIAN COALITION FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, The Best Interests of the 
Child: Meaning and Application in Canada (Report June 25th 2009), online: 
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(October 30, 2009). University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 60, 2010 [Leckey, “Language 
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Canadian context. This approach could also provide a counterargument to those 
who suggest that a child’s right to freedom of religion carries little weight moral 
weight and does not constitute, strictly speaking, a fundamental right within the 
Canadian context441. This suggestion is mitigated by the fact that freedom of religion 
could be used as a guise to secure non-religious interests, such as the relationship 
between the child, the parents and the community; such crafting of a relationship 
could be interpreted as opportunistic. Moreover, the question of children’s right to 
religious freedom is not limited to the scope of medical decisions, education-related 
cases, but also questions child custody and access, as seen in Young v. Young442 
and P. (D.) v. S. (C.)443, where the Supreme Court had confirmed both decisions on 
the basis on the best interests test444. While this study has only touched upon the 
issue of a child’s right to freedom of religion in its broadest sense, this multifaceted 
subject would benefit greatly from further discussion and exchanges in a 
constitutional law setting. 
  
  
2.4 Conclusion on Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
“You say I took the name in vain 
I don't even know the name 
But if I did, well really, what's it to you? 
There's a blaze of light 
In every word 
It doesn't matter which you heard 
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 See Sylvie Langlaude, “Children and Religion under Article 14 UNCRC: A Critical 
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The holy or the broken Hallelujah” 
 
- Leonard Cohen, Hallelujah 
 
 
While poet and singer Leonard Cohen will not strike many (if any) as a 
leading expert in the field of freedom of religion, his crafting of ideas remains 
unparalleled. Within the lyrics of Hallelujah, we uncover the individual and the 
community, the believed and the perceived, and the crafting of public and private 
space. 
 
 This study of freedom of religion in Canada has led us from a time where 
religious freedoms were marginally protected to recognition as a fundamental 
freedom. In a first section, freedom of religion was examined in three waves, in order 
to arrive at our current constitutional standing. The period before the enactment of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights proved itself to be a very dark era for certain minority 
groups; in this way, “witnessing” religion provided the observer with fractured 
dialogues on religious values. The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights offered 
latent or passive protection of religion, simply “observed” in by the legislation, without 
conferring concrete safeguards. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
heralded, since it marked a “contextualised” approach to freedom of religion and was 
entrenched as a fundamental freedom. While the framework established by the 
Supreme Court in Big M Drug Mart still stands, having adduced a positive and 
negative freedom, freedom of religion has emerged further as a multifaceted, 
multilayered and complex right, engaging the State, the individual and the 
community in a heady constitutional discourse. From Sunday closings to opening 
prayers, the significance of the individual becomes clear, as does the need to 
balance competing views. From sincere individual beliefs to profoundly 
communitarian interests, nevertheless, freedom of religion is confronted by the 
reluctant juncture of definitions of religion and sincerely held beliefs. This intersection 
engenders a re-positioning of individual and community interests with regard to 
freedom of religion. Moreover, this juncture points to unresolved issues pertaining to 
freedom of religion. In an effort to address how claims of freedom of religion are 
addressed, the duty to accommodate religion as well as the proportional exercise 
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under Oakes was also briefly considered. Exiting our study of freedom of religion, it 
remains clear that the content of that freedom is variable, illustrating the changeable 
ebb and flow of commitments between the individual and the community, on the one 
hand, and the adjustable nature of beliefs, on the other. 
 
The unresolved issues pertaining to freedom of religion in Canada were 
addressed in a second section. First, the sincerity of the belief of the individual 
provided a heated legal literature discussion on the importance of individual views as 
well as the many drawbacks implicated in this approach, namely the conscious 
choice of ignoring the importance of the community.  Second, the place of expert 
evidence and the impact on community views of religion actually conceal a deeper 
problem of how to handle official religion within the legal discourse. While the courts 
do (and should) not want to become arbiters of religious dogma, it becomes difficult 
to distinguish the line between arbiter and adjudicator. Moreover, the issue of expert 
testimony also points to who is considered apt to demarcate these public and private 
zones of importance, effectively redefining of public and private space. A question of 
judicial notice also enters this discussion, since what constitutes social facts is no 
longer clear-cut445. Lastly, a child’s right to freedom of conscience and religion has 
been highlighted as a further issue of discussion and exchange in Canada. The 
variable geometry of the best interest of the child invites a re-imagining of 
belonging446 and therefore a greater attribution of credence to a community’s vision. 
  
Conceptualising the freedoms of religion and conscience in law calls for, I 
believe, a re-examination of the quality of the elements composing the belief as well 
as a more profound acknowledgement of the implications of political liberalism in 
constitutional discourse.  
 
                                               
445
 The very question of admitting “social facts” and “social framework facts” as per Monahan 
and Walker is challengeable and constitutes another subject of study. 
446
 Playing on and with apologies to James Tully’s “Reimagining Belonging in Circumstances 
of Cultural Diversity: A Citizen Approach” in Ulf Hedtoft and Mette Hjort, eds., The 
Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (Minneapolis (MN), University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), 152-177. 
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Chapter III. Whither Conscience? The Place of “Freedom of Conscience” in 
“Freedom of Conscience and Religion” 
 
 Deconstructing the concept of freedom of conscience can be akin to peeling 
back the layers of an onion. It can be a tedious, sometimes teary job, with nary an 
end in sight. Conscience, like many other concepts in law, can be conceptualised in 
religious447, philosophical448 and sociological terms449, amongst others. The concept 
of conscience (and thus by extension freedom of conscience) is therefore permeable 
to other disciplines, prompting unexpected consequences and taking on unwanted 
meanings. Within the scope of law in Canada, freedom of conscience can be seen 
as a broad moral order; it can also be seen as an expression of one’s moral 
                                               
447
 See Michel Desplant, “Conscience” in Lindsay Jones, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd 
ed. (Detroit, MacMillan Reference USA, 2005), 1939-1946. 
448
 See Nicholas Dent, « Conscience » in Craig, supra note 23. Retrieved November 11, 
2008, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L012  
449
 See Robert Cipriani, « Conscience » in William H. Swatos, Jr., ed., Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Society (Walnut Creek, CA, AltaMira Press, 1998). Retrieved November 13th, 
2008, from http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/conscience.htm. Sociologist Émile Durkheim referred 
to collective or communal conscience in a variety of settings. In De la division du travail, 
Durkeim explained that conscience call be conceived in collective or communal manner 
(“conscience collective ou commune”) and that it should be distinguished from what he 
termed “individual conscience” so as to avoid confusion. We note, however, that Durkheim 
chose not to enter into the specifics of this discussion, preferring rather to designate the 
totality of social similarities (“similitudes sociales”). Collective conscience, for Durkheim, is 
defined according to what it ignites. More specifically, an act is defined as criminal when it 
offends the collective conscience. See Émile Durkheim, De la division du travail, 8th ed. 
(Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). Online: 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/division_du_travail/division_travail_1.pd
f (site last accessed 27.05.2009), p. 81-82. Durkeim also spoke of conscience when 
explaining the collective state that gives rise to religion, referring to the “communion of 
consciences” (“la communion des consciences”). See Émile Durkheim, “Le problème 
religieux et la dualité de la nature humaine”, (1913) as reproduced in Émile Durkheim, 
Textes. 2. Religion, morale, anomie, coll. Le sens commun (Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1975). 
Online: 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/textes_2/textes_2_01/probleme_religie
ux.pdf (site last accessed 27.05.2009), p. 17. Within Les formes élémentaires de la vie 
religieuse, Durkeim acknowledged that society cannot solely exist by and within individual 
conscience: « Car la force collective ne nous est pas tout entière extérieure ; elle ne nous 
meut pas toute du dehors ; mais, puisque la société ne peut exister que dans les 
consciences individuelles et par elles, il faut bien qu'elle pénètre et s'organise en nous ; elle 
devient ainsi partie intégrante de notre être et, par cela même, elle l'élève et le grandit. » : 
see Émile Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, 5th ed., Paris, Les 
Presses universitaires de France, 1968, Livre 2. Online: 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/formes_vie_religieuse/formes_element
aires_2.pdf (site last accessed 01.06.2009), p. 206 (and footnote 468).  
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convictions. Very often coupled with its sister provision of freedom of religion, 
freedom of conscience takes on a secondary – one could say perfunctory – role.  
 
On the one hand, freedom of conscience has been at times portrayed as the 
freedom from which freedom of religion is derived; this approach was retained by the 
authors of the recent Bouchard-Taylor Report. Accordingly, freedom of religion is but 
an aspect of freedom of conscience450. On the other hand, freedom of conscience 
has also been depicted as “freedom from religion”; in that sense, freedom of 
conscience is described as protecting the right to abstain from religion or refuse it. 
Discussions on freedom of conscience can appeal to individual right and foster a 
sense of a moral discourse. Despite the encompassing nature of freedom of 
conscience, it suffers from an inherent problem: although often invoked within the 
greater protection of “freedom of conscience and religion”, it is rarely explained. It is 
in this perspective that I propose a study of freedom of conscience, in order to lay 
the groundwork for future claims of conscience.  
 
Two main reasons justify this analysis of freedom of conscience in Canada 
and open the door to a comparative approach. First, freedom of conscience provides 
a different viewpoint to freedom of religion; although conscience does not infer 
neutrality, it offers a view that is not per se religious (though not to say a-religious). 
Second, and flowing from the first reason, the study of freedom of conscience can 
provide a new point of reference for understanding the relationship between the 
individual and the State and thus between public and private spheres of action in 
society.  
 
I will therefore examine how freedom of conscience has been framed within 
the Canadian constitutional debate, exemplifying freedom of conscience as related 
to free choice and personal autonomy on the one hand (1.1) and on the other, the 
                                               
450
 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building for the Future: A Time for Reconciliation: 
Report, Québec: Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées 
aux différences culturelles, 2008, 
http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf, 
144. Authors Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh also put this point forward: “Religious conscience is 
often viewed as part of a larger respect for freedom of conscience.” See Ahdar & Leigh, 
supra note 4, 59. 
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absence of autonomy of freedom of conscience in the interpretation of “freedom of 
conscience and religion” (1.2). An examination of the legal literature surrounding 
freedom of conscience will then be addressed, where freedom of conscience is 
discerned as lesser than, equivalent to or broader than freedom of religion (2.1.1, 
2.1.2, 2.1.3). Finally, the future of freedom of conscience is discussed, where I posit 
that although freedom of conscience as broader than freedom of religion represents 
the ideal standard, since it makes no a priori judgments about beliefs, so long as 
they are deep seated, the most realistic standard would be to interpret freedom of 
conscience as equivalent to freedom of religion. Freedom of conscience should be 
interpreted as regrouping all deep-seated beliefs within the Canadian constitutional 
context (3). 
 
 
1. The Theoretical Framework of Freedom of Conscience as seen through 
the Case Law on Freedom of Conscience in Canada 
 
“Freedom of conscience”, as defined by Canadian legal dictionaries, does not 
seem to merit its own entry. Rather, one finds a standalone concept of 
“conscience”451 or it is lumped into the catchall proviso of “freedom of conscience 
and religion”452.  
 
The definition of “conscience” in the previously mentioned dictionaries of 
Canadian law was provided for in the context of MacKay v. Manitoba453. At issue was 
whether certain provisions of the Elections Finances Act454  were inconsistent with 
section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and more specifically, 
                                               
451
 See “conscience” in Daphne Dukelow, Pocket Dictionary of Canadian Law, 4th ed. 
(Toronto, Thomson Carswell, 2006), 103 and Daphne Dukelow, The Dictionary of Canadian 
Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Thomson Carswell, 2004), 242. 
452
 See “freedom of conscience and religion” in Dukelow, Pocket Dictionary of Canadian Law, 
supra, at 206 and Dukelow, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, supra, at 508. “Freedom of 
religion” does however, merit its own entry. 
453
 MacKay v. Manitoba, 1985 CanLII 128 (MB C.A.), p. 5 [Mackay] as cited in Dukelow, 
Dictionary of Canadian Law, supra note 451, at 103 and Dukelow, The Dictionary of 
Canadian Law, supra note 451, at 242: “[S]elf-judgment [sic] on the moral quality of one’s 
conduct or the lack of it …” 
454
 Election Finances Act, C.C.S.M. chap. E32, sec. 71(2), 71(3), 72(1), 72(2), 72(3), 73(1), 
75 and 76. 
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with the freedoms of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion and expression. 
The Elections Finances Act provided reimbursement, out of the Consolidated Fund, 
of a portion of expenses incurred by certain candidates for membership in the 
legislative assembly and by registered political parties. To qualify for monetary 
support, the candidate must have obtained, individually or in the aggregate, 10% of 
the votes cast in the electoral division in question or the province455. The appellants 
argued that this extended form of financing by the Elections Finances Act curbed 
their freedom of thought as well as restricted expression of their own views. More 
particularly, the Elections Finances Act was argued to be constitutionally 
objectionable by the appellants on the basis that “(i) they require citizens "... to make 
compulsory contributions ..."; (ii) they involve support of political parties which may 
espouse Communism, Fascism, or other forms of totalitarianism which are inimicable 
(sic) to citizens ...".”456 This conceptualisation of the violation of freedom of 
conscience by the appellants ultimately led to their downfall, since the majority of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal, Twaddle J.A. (Philp J.A. concurring), noted that a citizen’s 
conscience cannot be offended by this form of governmental action and that 
“[d]isproval of the thoughts or conduct of another person is not a matter of 
conscience.”457  
 
The definition of “freedom of conscience and religion” in the earlier mentioned 
dictionaries of Canadian law drew from the cases of Big M Drug Mart and 
Morgentaler as follows: 
 
“…[B]roadly construed to extend to consciously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion 
or in a secular morality….” […] [W]hatever else freedom of conscience [in s. 2(a) of the 
Charter] may mean, it must at the very least mean this: government may not coerce 
individuals to affirm a specific religious belief or to manifest a specific religious practice 
for a sectarian purpose …. Freedom from compulsory religious observance.”458 
 
                                               
455
 MacKay, supra note 453, 3. 
456
 Ibid, 7. 
457
 Ibid, 5. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal as well, citing that the 
absence of a factual base should be considered a fatal flaw rather than a technicality: 
Mackay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357. Moreover, it should also be noted that the appeal 
to the Supreme Court was only crafted as a violation of freedom of expression; in this way, 
the right to freedom of conscience was dropped by the appellants.  
458
 Dukelow, supra note 452 [references omitted]. 
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Whether intentional or not, this lends itself to both secular and religious beliefs. A 
tension exists incontrovertibly between concepts of conscience and religion, perhaps 
due to a definitional breakdown. While premature to speculate on the cause of this 
tension, “freedom of conscience” is rarely addressed as a separate entity from 
“freedom of conscience and religion”. This approach is detrimental to freedom of 
conscience, since it lends itself to a categorical approach to content of both freedom 
of religion and freedom of conscience. 
 
I will now explore the main issues related to the case law and legal literature of 
freedom of conscience. I will focus on two problems in the first section: the absence 
of autonomy of freedom of conscience in the interpretation of “freedom of conscience 
and religion” (1.1.); and freedom of conscience as related to free choice and 
personal autonomy (1.2). In a second section, I will examine the significance of 
freedom of conscience in Canadian legal literature (2.1.). I will then conclude with a 
discussion on the future of freedom of conscience in Canada (3). 
 
 
1.1  The Absence of Autonomy of Freedom of Conscience in the 
Interpretation of “Freedom of Conscience and Religion” 
 
As previously stated, freedom of conscience is rarely addressed 
independently from freedom of religion when interpreting the scope of “freedom of 
conscience and religion”. This signifies that freedom of conscience is seldom 
referred to in a non-religious manner and thus lacks definitional clarity. Adding to this 
sense of vagueness within the greater scheme of “freedom of conscience and 
religion” is the referral by the court to both “religious conscience” 459 as opposed to 
“secular conscience”. The question therefore is raised as to the independent 
character of “freedom of conscience” in “freedom of conscience and religion”. 
 
Freedom of non-religious conscience has rarely been invoked on its own. 
Although defined by Chief Justice Dickson (as he was then) in R. v. Big M Drug 
                                               
459
 The reader is directed most recently to Bruker, supra note 4.  
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Mart460, the concept of freedom of conscience remained (and remains) elusive in 
Canadian jurisprudence. In its seminal decision on Sunday closing laws, the 
Supreme Court described ‘non-religious’ beliefs and opinions as also being protected 
by the Charter:  
 
“Viewed in this context, the purpose of freedom of conscience and religion becomes 
clear. The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand that 
every individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or 
her conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not 
injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and 
opinions of their own. Religious belief and practice are historically prototypical and, in 
many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations and are 
therefore protected by the Charter.”461  
 
In this way, conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations were afforded analogous 
protection to that of religious beliefs. This approach followed the will of the Supreme 
Court to interpret religion and conscience as a ‘single integrated concept’462. This 
approach was again taken by Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Edwards Books and Art 
Ltd.463. The Retail Business Holiday Act464 of Ontario required that retail businesses 
close on Sundays, so as to ensure a ‘common day of pause’. Nevertheless, this 
secular day of rest imposed a burden on those who, for religious reasons, closed 
their business on Saturdays; section 3(4) of the Retail Business Holiday Act provided 
a partial exemption, however. The Supreme Court – though Justice Wilson dissented 
in part – determined that the limitations imposed on Saturday observers were 
reasonable and within the limits of a free and democratic society. Invoking both Big 
M Drug Mart and section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Chief 
Justice Dickson noted that no difference should be made between direct and indirect 
coercive burdens on religious beliefs465. In addition, Edwards Books addressed the 
issue of freedom from religion, as stemming from an analogy drawn between the 
Retail Business Holiday Act and the Lord’s Day Act (and generally Sunday closing 
                                               
460
 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 67. 
461
 Ibid, ¶ 123. 
462
 Ibid, ¶ 120. 
463
 Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 97: “The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society 
does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, 
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in 
turn, govern one's conduct and practices.” 
464
 Retail Business Holiday Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453.  
465
 Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 96. 
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legislation). Longo Brothers, one of the appellants, argued that the Retail Business 
Holiday Act required retailers to conform to religious practices of dominant Christian 
sects466. Nevertheless, as stated by Chief Justice Dickson, there was no evidentiary 
foundation to substantiate that claim; alleged coercion contrary to freedom from 
religion was not established467. The Retail Business Holiday Act was ultimately 
upheld by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Dickson also provided additional insight 
on the scope of those two freedoms, remarking that “[i]n this context, I note that 
freedom of religion, perhaps unlike freedom of conscience, has both individual and 
collective aspects.”468 Freedom from religion, I believe, constitutes more accurately 
an aspect of freedom of conscience rather than an aspect of freedom of religion. 
Nevertheless, freedom from religion is routinely presented as an aspect of freedom 
of religion. In my view, an important element of freedom of conscience is recognised 
therein but it is wrongly considered as having arisen only from freedom of religion. 
As such, freedom of religion does imply the right to refuse religion. 
 
Freedom of conscience was also examined in R. v. Morgentaler469, where 
Justice Wilson spoke of conscience in two spheres: as a necessary component of 
personal choice as related to “liberty” and “security of the person” under s. 7 of the 
Charter and as pertaining to the “freedom of conscience and religion”. The former 
point will be addressed later on. At issue in Morgentaler was whether Criminal Code 
provisions prohibiting abortion470 could infringe on the rights protected under sections 
2(a), 7, 12, 15, 27 and 28 of the Charter. More specifically, a strict administrative 
procedure was set out if a therapeutic abortion was sought; failing to respect the 
                                               
466
 Edwards Books, supra note 176, ¶ 98. 
467
 Ibid, ¶ 101. 
468
 Ibid, ¶ 145. 
469
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler]. 
470
 At issue in Morgentaler was s. 251 of the Criminal Code, which considered abortion an 
indictable offence for both the pregnant woman as well as the medical practitioner. The 
article set out the exceptions to the rule but circumscribed the provider as well as the hospital 
to strict requirements. Therefore, the hospital had to be accredited according to the Canadian 
Council on Hospital Accreditation and the permit given by a committee, the Therapeutic 
Abortion Committee (TAC), which was comprised of not less than three members, each of 
whom is a qualified medical practitioner, appointed by the board of that hospital with the 
purpose of considering and determining questions related to terminations of pregnancy within 
that hospital. A written certificate had to be obtained, stating clearly that the continuation of 
the pregnancy would or would likely result in endangering her life or health. A copy of this 
certificate had to be given to the qualified medical practitioner.  
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criteria resulted in criminal charges. By a majority of 5 to 2 (McIntyre and La Forest 
JJ. dissenting), the Supreme Court stated that s. 251 of the Criminal Code infringed 
upon s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On the question of 
whether section 251 upon of the Criminal Code infringed section 2(a) of the Charter, 
Justice Wilson, speaking only for herself, sought to broaden the notion of conscience 
and as such, insisted in the following way on the autonomous status of freedom of 
conscience, as distinguished from freedom of religion: 
 
“It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society "freedom of conscience 
and religion" should be broadly construed to extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, 
whether grounded in religion or in a secular morality. Indeed, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, "conscience" and "religion" should not be treated as tautologous if capable 
of independent, although related, meaning.”471 
 
Justice Wilson had thus opened the door to all conscientiously-held beliefs472.  
 
 Although Morgentaler struck down certain Criminal Code provisions, the 
abortion debate continues on to this day; in this context, “freedom of conscience” has 
been interpreted as pertaining to a “moral or ethical decision” in recent cases473. 
Most interestingly, it has been advocated under a collective banner, more precisely, 
a class-action lawsuit. At issue in Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. Manitoba (The 
Government of)474, was the constitutionality of certain sections of the Manitoba 
Regulation 46/93 and the Health Services Act, R.S.M. H-35, which allegedly 
infringed rights under section 2(a), 7 and 15 of the Charter. According to Jane Doe 1 
and Jane Doe 2, the existing legislative structure made it impossible to carry out their 
choice. If a woman wished to have an abortion, her choice of where to go was 
restricted by a conscripted list of hospitals475. By seeking treatment outside of 
                                               
471
 Morgentaler, supra note 469, ¶ 222 [my emphasis]. 
472
 This broader approach to freedom of conscience was endorsed by Justice LaForest, 
writing for a plurality, in Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 80-81. I specify that this 
endorsement was made in the context of Justice Wilson’s opinion of “liberty” under section 7 
of the Charter rather than “freedom of conscience”. This point will be discussed in depth 
further on. 
473
 See Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. Manitoba (The Government of), 2008 MBQB 217 
(CanLII) [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2]. 
474
 Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. Manitoba (The Government of), 2004 MBQB 285 (CanLII).   
475
 For a detailed background of this action, the reader is referred to Doe et al. v. The 
Government of Manitoba, 2004 MBQB 285 [Doe et al.] (Oliphant J.), at ¶ 18-19. Oliphant J. 
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publicly-funded health care system, severe emotional stress and increased physical 
risk was incurred. The Court initially found in their favour, but the summary 
conviction was reversed on appeal and further appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada was refused476. However, a class action lawsuit has since been certified477. 
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 argued that their right to freedom of conscience under 
section 2(a) of the Charter had been violated, “by the impugned legislation […] That 
is because the impugned legislation interferes with a woman’s ability to make a 
moral or ethical decision as to whether or not she wishes to terminate a 
pregnancy.”478 One must however question if the ‘severe emotional stress and 
increased physical risk’ was engendered by a violation of their freedom of 
conscience or better yet, as a result of modalities in obtaining an abortion479. While 
this case has yet to be decided, this class-action lawsuit will provide a notable 
opportunity for freedom of conscience to be re-examined. 
 
 Objections of conscience were also considered in Roach v. Canada (Minister 
of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship)480, where the Court had to establish 
whether the oath of allegiance contained in the Citizenship Act481 was 
unconstitutional since Roach claimed that his right to freedom of conscience was 
infringed by the oath. Containing a pledge of allegiance to her Majesty the Queen as 
                                                                                                                                      
dismissed the Government’s motion and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed. See Jane Doe 1 
and Jane Doe 2, supra note 473, ¶ 2. 
476
 Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. Manitoba, 2005 MBCA 109, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. 
Manitoba, [2005] SCCA 513. See Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, supra note 473, ¶ 2. 
477
 The Court of Appeal defined the class as being “pregnant women who were insured 
persons pursuant to The Health Services Act, C.C.S.M., c. H35, and who paid for or were 
indebted for an abortion service performed at a private clinic in Manitoba before November 
15, 2005.”: Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, supra note 473, ¶ 3. 
478
 Doe et al., supra note 475, ¶ 39. The plaintiffs also argued that the impugned legislation 
also violated their right to security of the person, as guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter: 
Ibid, ¶ 34. 
479
 This situation differs from Morgentaler, where the question was one of criminal law. The 
stakes were much higher, therefore, since the terms of the choice were contingent on an 
evaluation of the culpability of the individual. 
480
 Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship, [1994] CanLII 
3453 (F.C.A.) [Roach]. The respondent has re-litigated the matter recently and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal has confirmed the trial judge’s findings on the preliminary motion: Roach v. 
Canada (Secretary of State), 2008 ONCA 124 (CanLII), ¶ 2 [Roach 2]. To consult the class 
action lawsuit, see Canadians for a Canadian Republic, http://www.canadian-
republic.ca/pdf_files/Charles_Roach-Class_Action_2005.pdf (site last consulted 25.11.2008). 
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 Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29, ss. 2, 5 (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 44, 
s. 1), 10, 12(3), 24. 
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well as to all heirs and successors482, this ran counter to his republican views. 
Although the appeal was ultimately dismissed, Justice Linden (dissenting in part) 
provided an interesting definition of freedom of conscience: “[t]he latter [freedom of 
religion] relates more to religious views derived from established religious 
institutions, whereas the former [freedom of conscience] is aimed at protecting views 
based on strongly held moral ideas of right and wrong, not necessarily founded on 
any organized religious principles.”483 Herein lies an element of definition for freedom 
of conscience, essentially based on a moral stance of what constitutes right and 
wrong. Charles Roach has since undertaken the re-litigation of his case and cause. 
As it stands, no decision has been rendered in the class-action lawsuit brought 
against the Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship. It will be interesting 
to see whether the right to freedom of conscience is given a more specific definition 
fifteen years later.  
In the setting of correctional services, freedom of conscience has been 
upheld in Maurice v. Canada484. At issue was the refusal of Correctional Services 
Canada (CSC) to recognise that vegetarianism could be seen as validly claimed on 
the basis of non-religious beliefs; after leaving the Hare Krishna faith, Jack Maurice 
elected to pursue his vegetarian diet. He did not “eat meat, fish, eggs, poultry, 
onions, mushrooms and garlic because of his conscientiously held belief that eating 
those food items is “morally reprehensible and poisonous to society as a whole””485. 
According to Campbell J., an inconsistency reigned between the CSC’s legal duty to 
facilitate freedom of religion and that of freedom of conscience and criticised the 
CSC’s piecemeal approach to s. 2(a) of the Charter486. Vegetarianism, as freedom of 
conscience, was explained as followed by Campbell J.:  
                                               
482
 The Oath of Citizenship, available on the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website, 
reads as follows: “I swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will 
faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen.”: CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION CANADA, <Home>, <Applying for citizenship>, <The citizenship ceremony>, online: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/citizenship/cit-ceremony.asp#oath (site last accessed 20.01.2010). 
483
 Roach, supra note 480, ¶ 45. 
484
 Maurice v. Canada (Attorney-General), 2002 FC 69 [Maurice]. 
485
 Ibid, ¶ 1.  
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 Ibid, ¶ 8. 
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“Vegetarianism is a dietary choice, which is founded in a belief that consumption of 
animal products is morally wrong. Motivation for practising vegetarianism may vary, 
but, in my opinion, its underlying belief system may fall under an expression of 
“conscience”. 
[…] 
Therefore, in my opinion, just as the entitlement for a religious diet may be found in s. 
2(a) of the Charter, a similar entitlement for a vegetarian diet exists based on the 
right to freedom of conscience.”487 
 
The Court recognised that vegetarianism, even if not based on religious beliefs, was 
a conscientious choice488, referring to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights to buttress its position489. Although Campbell J. ordered that Mr. 
Maurice be allowed to follow his conscientious beliefs, religious and conscientious 
claims were depicted as similar490, framing the quest for freedom of conscience as 
pursuit of a just moral order. While the recognition of freedom of conscience cannot 
be faulted in this case, the moral approach of what constitutes a just moral order 
reduces the discourse to black and white, while most issues related to consciously-
held beliefs would be considered as part of the grey zone.  
 
                                               
487
 Maurice, supra note 484, ¶ 9, 11. 
488
 The CSC has since published a handbook on Religious and Spiritual Accommodation in 
CSC Institutions: CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA, Religious and Spiritual 
Accommodation in CSC Institutions (last updated November 2006), http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/chap/chaplaincy/chaplaincy_e.pdf (last consulted 27.08.2008). As well, 
the Québec Human Rights Commission published a report on dietary restrictions in prisons in 
1991. See COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DROITS DE LA 
JEUNESSE, Le régime alimentaire des détenus de foi hébraïque : obligations des autorités 
carcérales, Cat. 2.113.2.4 (Mai 1991), Online : 
http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/fr/publications/docs/aliments_hebraique.pdf (site last accessed 
12.08.2009). In R. v. Chan, 2005 ABQB 615 (CanLII) [Chan], the Calgary Remand Centre 
(CRC) was also criticised for refusing to recognise religious conversions; the case at bar 
dealt with a conversion to Buddhism, which required a change in diet, as well as accessories 
to prayer. The issue of Mr. Chan’s vegetarian diet was resolved and the initial refusal did not 
arise from any specific malice directed at Mr. Chan, according to McIntyre J. of the Queen’s 
Bench. As such, the remedy should not be sought under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but rather by 
giving him extra credit for pre-sentence custody. See Chan, ¶ 208-209, 223.  
489
 Maurice, supra note 484, ¶ 6. This point was highlighted recently by author J. Kent 
Donlevy, “Catholic Schools and Freedom of Conscience in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms”, (2008) 47 J. Cath. Legal Stud. 69, at 76 [Donlevy, “Catholic Schools and 
Freedom of Conscience”]. 
490
 Maurice, supra note 484, ¶ 11. 
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 Connected to freedom of conscience by way of a discussion on freedom of 
religion, the Supreme Court has agreed that it must not become the “arbiter of 
religious dogma”491. It is with this in mind that Justice Iacobucci crafted a subjective 
test for the sincerity of the religious belief. In this light, it was acknowledged that 
religious beliefs are deeply individual, subject to change and should not be 
measured against official religious teachings, but that should retain a nexus with 
religion. One could question whether the Court would want to become the arbiter of 
any dogma, religious or other492? In this perspective, if an individual is able to 
establish that his or her beliefs are sincere and can demonstrate a binding force to a 
particular doctrine, freedom of conscience could also benefit from the subjective 
approach adopted by the Court. It is perhaps this precise reason why courts have 
seemed reticent thus far in vigorously applying freedom of conscience. Sincerely-
held beliefs must retain a nexus with religion in order to be claimed under freedom of 
religion. However, a similar nexus with conscience could be established on the basis 
of moral ideas of right and wrong, ultimately creating the necessary connecting link. 
 
Freedom of conscience, in closing, remains an underused freedom in my 
opinion. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this stems from judges’ reluctance in 
using the provision or whether it reflects the small number of cases where freedom 
of conscience is invoked by the claimants. The difficulty of defining that freedom on 
the basis on its own merit has also been witnessed. Freedom of conscience has 
been framed, in my study, as a question of morality or moral order, though not 
founded on religious beliefs. Interpreted in this manner, freedom of conscience can 
be seen under a different hue: questions relating to town prayers before the opening 
of municipal meetings493 as well as schools prayers494 could now be conceptualised 
                                               
491
 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 50: “In my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it 
become, the arbiter of religious dogma.  Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially 
interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or implicitly, the content of a subjective 
understanding of religious requirement, “obligation”, precept, “commandment”, custom or 
ritual.  Secular judicial determinations of theological or religious disputes, or of contentious 
matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the court in the affairs of religion.” 
492
 Can it not be said that freedom of conscience is implicitly or partially recognised by the 
Court in Amselem? See Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 40: “This Court has long articulated an 
expansive definition of freedom of religion, which revolves around the notion of personal 
choice and individual autonomy and freedom.” 
493
 See Laval, supra note 209; Freitag, supra note 208. 
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under the banner of freedom of conscience, i.e. freedom from religion. This approach 
would also force a better conceptualisation of relations between the State and the 
individual and challenge us to finding equilibrium between freedom of conscience 
and religion, in order to fully embrace the ‘single integrated concept’. Finally, 
measuring freedom of conscience in this manner leaves the door ajar between 
concepts of freedom of religion and freedom from religion. I note, however, that 
freedom from religion does not constitute the only aspect of freedom of conscience. 
Rather, there exists a positive content, namely the right to invoke an accommodation 
for non-religious convictions, as seen in Maurice as well as countless examples 
emanating from military conscious-objector cases. The latter issue of conscious-
objector status to military service for non religious convictions is accepted almost in 
all States governed by the rule of law495. Nonetheless, this previously mentioned 
positive content is principally defined by analogy with religious convictions, rather 
than in an autonomous manner. This statement permits me to segue into freedom of 
conscience as related to free choice and personal autonomy. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
494
 See: Zylberberg, supra note 196; Bal v. Ontario (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII7363 (On. 
S.C.) [Bal]. 
495
 See, for example: UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, “Conscientious 
objection to military service”, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/77, online: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/5bc5759a53f36ab380256671004b643a?Ope
ndocument (site last accessed 28.05.2009). A recent decision of the Federal Court of 
Canada stated that the issue of conscientious objection still raises a host of outstanding 
issues. The case at bar dealt with the refusal to serve in wars condemned by the international 
community when applying for refugee status: see Lebedev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2007 CF 728. De Montigny J. suggested that although he was mindful that 
paragraph 172 of the UNHCR spoke of “religious” convictions, he believed that this notion 
should be expanded to recognise that moral principles may also be, for a number of people, 
sufficiently compelling to ground and organise their lives. This approach is also consistent 
with the interpretation that has been given to the right of freedom of religion by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Amselem, Big M Drug Mart and Edwards Books: see Lebedev, supra, ¶ 
46. On the subject of the increase in demand of conscientious exemptions from both 
individuals and groups, author Yossi Nehushtan argues that there are three main reasons: 
“Firstly, the fact that the modern state regulates the public and private spheres more than 
ever; secondly, increasing sensitivity to the discourse of human rights and the increasing use 
of it amongst individuals, organisations and communities; and thirdly, the great movement in 
Western democracies from the cultural model of a relatively homogenous nation state to a far 
more heterogeneous, multicultural one.” See Yossi Nehushtan, “Secular and religious 
conscientious exemptions: between tolerance and equality” in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans 
and Zoë Robinson, eds, Law and Religion in the Theoretical and Historical Context, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 243 at page 246 [Nehushtan, 
“Conscientious Exemptions”] 
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1.2 Freedom of Conscience as Related to Free Choice and Personal 
Autonomy 
 
The open texture of the concept of the conscience is revealed when 
designated as a question of “free choice” or “personal autonomy”496. Without delving 
into the philosophical ramifications of John Stuart Mill’s interpretation of 
conscience497, which merits (and has merited) its own analysis498, the focus on the 
individual is marked.  
 
Within the scope of Canadian case law, conscience as choice and/or 
autonomy has achieved an enviable position; nevertheless, one must differentiate 
“liberty” from “freedom”, and consequently section 2(a) from section 7 of the Charter. 
While “freedom” has generally been defined as the absence of constraint499, “liberty” 
                                               
496
 Author Joel Feinberg speaks of these two terms being mostly philosophically 
interchangeable; however, when distinguishing these concepts, freedom usually refers to 
“autonomy”, whereas liberty connotes “optionality”: Joel Feinberg, “Freedom and liberty” in 
Craig, supra note 23. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S026: “There are at least two basic ideas in the 
conceptual complex we call ‘freedom’; namely, rightful self-government (autonomy), and 
the overall ability to do, choose or achieve things, which can be called ‘optionality’ and 
defined as the possession of open options. To be autonomous is to be free in the sense 
of ‘self-governing’ and ‘independent’, in a manner analogous to that in which sovereign nation 
states are free. Optionality is when a person has an open option in respect to some possible 
action, x, when nothing in the objective circumstances prevents them from doing x should 
they choose to do so, and nothing requires them to do x should they choose not to. One has 
freedom of action when one can do what one wills, but in order to have the full benefit of 
optionality, it must be supplemented by freedom of choice (free will), which consists in being 
able to will what one wants to will, free of internal psychological impediments. Autonomy and 
optionality can vary independently of one another. A great deal of one can coexist with very 
little of the other.” [our emphasis] Feinberg’s approach rejoins that of author Isaih Berlin, in 
“Two concepts of liberty”, who explained positive freedom as essentially being “not freedom 
from, but freedom to – to lead one’s prescribed form of life”: see Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays 
on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), 131. 
497
 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1998) at page 16, where conscience (and consciousness) is described as the “most 
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological.” 
498
 On this subject, see Christian Brunelle, “L’interprétation des droits constitutionnels par le 
recours aux philosophes” (1990) 50(2) R. du B. 353; Robert Yalden, « Liberalism and 
Canadian Constitutional Law: Tensions in an Evolving Vision of Liberty » (1988) 47 U. of T. 
Fac. L. Rev. 132. 
499
 See Chief Justice Dickson in Big M Drug Mart, supra note 67, at 336-337, as quoted by 
Justice La Forest in Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 79: “Freedom can primarily be 
characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state 
or the will of another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have 
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cannot be defined as the “unconstrained freedom [or] freedom from physical 
restraint”500, according to Justice La Forest in Children's Aid Society. Conscience 
was effectively construed in this case both as a concept and as a sign of personal 
autonomy. As previously mentioned, the parents of a premature baby wanted 
medical treatment that was in line with the tenets of their faith as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses; as such, they argued that the Ontario Child Welfare Act501 infringed on 
their rights502. Blood transfusions, which constituted the very medical treatment that 
had been refused by the parents, could have been accepted if the premature baby 
was considered a “child in need of protection”. The question was therefore to 
determine whether the “child in need of protection” standard, as indicated by the 
Child Welfare Act, could effectively allow for the override of the parents’ right to 
choose medical treatment for their children and in doing so, infringe on their sections 
7 and 2(a) Charter rights. The majority of the Court held that the life and security of 
the child prevailed over the religious beliefs of the parents. When addressing the 
claim of breach of s. 2(a) of the Charter, Justice La Forest noted that a liberal 
interpretation must be given with a view to satisfying its purpose503. Although 
questions of fundamental personal importance warrant particular interest, it is in my 
view necessary to dissociate the freedom of conscious choice and the freedom of 
conscience. Whereas the former indicates cognisant decision-making, the latter 
points to an existing right and freedom. Furthermore, I consider that the juxtaposition 
of liberty and freedom of conscience diminishes the individual strength of each 
concept, and posits a false notion of both. It is suggested here that liberty and 
freedom of conscience have their own independent content; liberty denotes a state 
of mind as well as a political statement whereas freedom of conscience refers to a 
                                                                                                                                      
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of the 
major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint. 
Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or 
refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which 
determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad 
sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest 
beliefs and practices. Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.” 
500
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 80. 
501
 Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 66. 
502
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 42. 
503
 Ibid, ¶ 104. 
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protected right. Chief Justice Lamer, writing for himself, agreed with Justice La 
Forest on the distinction between “liberty” and “freedom” and thought that this use is 
by no means accidental and that the meaning should be determined by the context. 
Accordingly,  
 
“With due respect for the contrary opinion, I am of the opinion that the fact that two 
different expressions are used in the English version is neither meaningless nor 
accidental. The expression "freedom" refers to a concept that is related to but distinct 
from the expression "liberty", but it has no equivalent in French, where the two 
dimensions are expressed in one single word: "liberté". The meaning is then 
determined by the context.”504  
 
 
Although Children’s Aid Society was a case about fundamental freedoms, as well as 
the freedom of conscience and religion, it has become clear that it is first and 
foremost a decision about personal autonomy.  
 
Returning to Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion in Big M Drug Mart, individual 
conscience takes on a symbolic task, that of upholding democracy. In that respect,   
 
“It should also be noted, however, that an emphasis on individual conscience and 
individual judgment also lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition. The 
ability of each citizen to make free and informed decisions is the absolute 
prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-
government. It is because of the centrality of the rights associated with freedom 
of individual conscience both to basic beliefs about human worth and dignity and to 
a free and democratic political system that American jurisprudence has emphasized 
the primacy or "firstness" of the First Amendment. It is this same centrality that in my 
view underlies their designation in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as 
"fundamental". They are the sine qua non of the political tradition underlying the 
Charter.”505 
 
Individual conscience, therefore, represents the intersection of rights and freedoms 
and by that token, illustrates the ebb and flow of individual rights and societal 
obligations. The right to choice demonstrates the first step within the right to freedom 
of religion. In that sense, we can conceive of religion being but an aspect of freedom 
of conscience.  
 
                                               
504
 Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 34 and 36. 
505
 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 67, ¶ 122 [my emphasis]. 
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 In a similar vein to Children’s Aid Society, the right of parents to educate their 
children was juxtaposed with provincial compulsory education506 in Jones507. As 
mentioned before, Thomas Larry Jones, the appellant, was a pastor of a 
fundamentalist church and had taken on the education of twenty or so children under 
a schooling programme called “Western Baptist Academy”. The appellant refused to 
request a state permit for his private school and also refused to send his own 
children to public schools since, in his view, education was mandated by God and 
not accountable to government508. In this way, the appellant argued that the Alberta 
School Act infringed on his s. 2(a) and s. 7 Charter rights. Although both arguments 
ultimately failed509, the interference with liberty argument provides for an interesting 
discussion. Justice Wilson, writing alone in dissent, argued that on the one hand, the 
Alberta School Act accommodated religious freedom (McIntyre J., writing for Beetz 
and Le Dain, concurring) and on the other hand, opined that the appellant’s s. 7 
Charter rights were violated. In this manner, Justice Wilson was pointing to the dual 
aspects of many institutions in Canada. Therefore, “[a] person's belief in the religious 
aspect does not free him of his obligation to comply with the civil aspect.” 510 The 
appellant’s claim was therefore interpreted as being effects-based rather than purpose-
based by Justice Wilson. In practical terms, the impugned legislation defered to the 
beliefs of the parents, concluding therefore that the appellant failed to show a 
substantial impact on his rights511. Moreover, Justice Wilson offered a broad 
interpretation of the concept of liberty512, though noting that this right did not give 
                                               
506
 School Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-3, ss. 142(1), 143(1) [hereinafter “Alberta School Act”] 
507
 Jones, supra note 189. 
508
 Ibid, ¶ 2-3, 19. The stalemate was niftily summed up by the trial judge in this case. See at 
¶ 6: “Section 143(1)(a) has given rise to what the trial judge has described as a standoff 
between "a stiff-necked parson and a stiff-necked education establishment, both demanding 
the other make the first move in the inquiry to determine whether the children are receiving 
efficient instruction outside the public or separate school system".” 
509
 Jones, supra note 189, ¶ 33, 48-49 (Laforest J., writing for the majority). 
510
 Ibid, ¶ 67-69. 
511
 Ibid, ¶ 67-69. A fortiori at ¶ 69: “If the statutory machinery has any impact at all on the 
appellant's freedom of conscience and religion which, for the reasons I have given, I doubt, it is 
an extremely formalistic and technical one. I do not believe, therefore, that it gives rise to a 
violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter.” 
512
 Ibid, ¶ 76 (Wilson J.): “I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing 
"liberty" as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of 
the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own 
character, to make his own choices for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and 
even eccentric -- to be, in today's parlance, "his own person" and accountable as such. John 
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carte blanche on how to bring up and educate one’s children, since that would be 
considered too extravagant a claim513. In her view, the appellant had the right to 
raise his children in accordance with his conscientious beliefs.”514 The question of 
conformity, which acted at once as the backbone of the appellant’s argumentation as 
well as his causing his ultimate failure, illustrates the link between freedom of 
conscience and fundamental freedoms. According to Justice Wilson, while the 
impugned legislation did not violate the appellant’s right to freedom of conscience 
and religion, it did breach his right to liberty as a fundamental freedom. 
Fundamentally, this case (and Justice Wilson’s opinion in particular, bearing in mind 
that she is part of the minority opinion) broached the issue of the limits of one’s 
personal beliefs when faced with “statutory machinery for certification”515.  
 
As noted previously, “conscience” was treated as a necessary component of 
liberty as well as pertaining to “freedom of conscience and religion” by Justice Wilson 
in Morgentaler. Returning briefly to this seminal case, the right of individual choice 
represented, according to Justice Wilson, the foundation of liberty in society516.  This 
position exemplified John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, wherein the individual should 
be free, so long as his or her beliefs do not infringe other people’s same liberty. 
Justice Wilson’s comments on liberty in Morgentaler were made within the context of 
section 2(a) of the Charter. As such, my previous comments on the dichotomy 
between liberty and freedom resonate within this delicate framework and help 
demonstrate that one’s conscience and one’s right to freedom of conscience are not 
one and the same. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Stuart Mill described it as "pursuing our own good in our own way". This, he believed, we 
should be free to do "so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their 
efforts to obtain it".” Justice Wilson’s opinion of “liberty” should be contrasted with the 
narrower interpretation of liberty given by Lamer J. (as he was then) speaking for himself in 
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 
1177-1178, as cited by La Forest J. in Children’s Aid Society, supra note 200, ¶ 75. 
513
 Jones, supra note 189, ¶ 77.   
514
 Ibid, ¶ 79. 
515
 Ibid, ¶ 68. 
516
 Morgentaler, supra 469, ¶ 228: “Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a 
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, grants the individual a 
degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental personal importance.” In this same 
way, see Justice Wilson’s opinion in Jones, supra note 189, at 318-319. 
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 The common foundation of choice and personal control was further 
addressed in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)517. At issue was the 
choice of suicide. Suffering from a terminal illness, Ms. Rodriguez was seeking 
assistance to commit suicide at the time of her choice. The appellant argued that s. 
241(b) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited physician-assisted suicide, invoked the 
infringement of her s. 7, 12 and 15(1) Charter rights. However, freedom of 
conscience, addressed within the framework of choice by Justice Sopinka (writing for 
the majority), referred to the scope of security of the person and the general theory 
of inviolability518. Chief Justice Lamer, dissenting in this case, addressed the crux of 
this case through the right to equality rather than that of fundamental freedoms, 
unlike the majority519 and Justice McLachlin’s minority opinion (writing for L’Heureux-
Dubé J.)520. Weaving personal autonomy into the discourse of equal rights, Lamer 
C.J. explained that the Criminal Code provision created a disadvantage based on a 
personal characteristic521, namely a physical disability522. Freedom of conscience 
was channelled in order to provide a legal (and secular) platform for this case, rather 
than a moral perspective on the value of suicide.  
 
 Disentangling “freedom” from “liberty” is akin to separating choice from the 
freedom of choice. While related, as noted previously by Lamer C.J. in Children’s Aid 
Society, these concepts should not be seen as interchangeable. Moreover, Justice 
Wilson’s oftentimes solitary opinions on this fundamental freedom further illustrate 
her unwavering endorsement of classical liberalism523. Indeed, while sections 2(a) 
                                               
517
 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Rodriguez]. 
518
 Within the context of the Québec Charter, Judge Audet ascertained most recently in 
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c. Hôpital général juif Sir 
Mortimer B. Davis, 2007 QCTDP 29 (CanLII), at ¶ 143: “Accordingly, it may be concluded 
that section 1 of the Charter does not protect only the physical aspect of inviolability, but also 
its psychological, moral and social aspects.” [emphasis in the original] 
519
 Rodriguez, supra note 517, 78-92. 
520
 Ibid, 116-123. Justice Cory concurred with the reasons given by both Lamer C.J. and 
McLachlin J. in this case. 
521
 Rodriguez, supra note 517, 45. 
522
 Ibid, 46-47. Lamer C.J. found that s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code infringed the right to 
equality guaranteed through s. 15(1) of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1 of the 
Charter: Ibid, 49-62. A constitutional exemption was set out for Ms. Rodriguez; the conditions 
were summarised at pages 73-75 of the judgment.  
523
 On this subject, see Kent Roach, “Justice Bertha Wilson : A Classically Liberal Judge” in 
Jamie Cameron, ed, Reflections on the Legacy of Justice Bertha Wilson (Canada, 
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and 7 of the Charter intersect in the sense that they are both fundamental freedoms 
and thus share a common foundation of what one could call small “l” liberalism, this 
intersecting approach should be dissuaded, since it invites an unwarranted 
expansion of concepts beyond their natural limit and limit the overarching efficiency 
of provisions.  
 
1.3 Conclusion on the Canadian Case Law on Freedom of Conscience 
 
 Freedom of conscience has generally been subject to two interpretations in 
Canadian jurisprudence. On the one hand, freedom of conscience has rarely been 
invoked on its own and retains little independent content vis-à-vis its sister protection 
of freedom of religion. Nevertheless, in an increasingly secular society, where the 
role of the individual and the State is in continual motion and redefinition, it is highly 
possible that freedom of conscience finds its place on the Charter mantelpiece as 
deeply-held beliefs about the good life may not always be religious in nature. On the 
other hand, freedom of conscience has also been equated with free choice and 
personal autonomy: in this way, freedom of conscience is brought into the larger 
discourse on the philosophical notion of “freedom” and “liberty”. Thus freedom of 
conscience, as a fundamental freedom, has yet to find its own voice in the 
constitutional discourse on freedom of conscience and religion.   
  
2. The Significance of Freedom of Conscience in Legal Literature 
 
 Pierre-Basile Migneault once referred to freedom of conscience as being a 
fundamental principle of the social order524. This comment was made in the context 
                                                                                                                                      
LexisNexis, 2008), 193-223. Although Kent Roach examined Justice Wilson’s seminal 
opinion in Morgentaler at pages 195-199 (and especially at page 198), he did not, 
unfortunately, address the principle of individual conscience in detail, but chose rather to 
frame the tension between liberalism and feminism. I consider that a closer study of her 
conception of freedom of conscience would have strengthened his overall study of Justice 
Wilson as a classically liberal judge.  
524
 Pierre-Basile Migneault, Droit civil canadien, t. 4 (1899), p. 14 as cited by COMMISSION 
DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE DU QUÉBEC, Droit pour une infirmière en milieu 
hospitalier de refuser de participer à des avortements pour des raisons de conscience ou de 
religion, Cat. 113-002B, Montréal, 1987, Online : 
http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/fr/publications/docs/droit_infirmiere.pdf (site last accessed 
06.04.2009) p. 5. This opinion was written after the Syndicat professionnel des infirmières et 
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of the civil law in Québec being a valuable tool for the protection of human rights. 
However, one can wonder whether freedom of conscience, taken on its own, can 
deliver adequate protection. Given the prior case law analysis of freedom of 
conscience, it becomes clear that the waters are muddied around this concept. I 
propose therefore to seek out what has been said by authors on the subject of 
freedom of conscience, in an effort to provide a coherent approach to a concept that 
has been left wanting. 
 
As a precursor to our two-step dance on freedom of conscience and freedom 
of religion, Archie Bahm’s “Theories of Conscience”, continues in my view to clearly 
expose conscience’s quandary. This author touched upon a nerve when he stated 
that although everyone knows intuitively what conscience is, it has become 
increasingly difficult to explain525 and this, despite its multiple scientific and 
                                                                                                                                      
infirmiers de Trois-Rivières asked the Commission whether, within the context of her duties, a 
nurse holding a position in an operating room in a hospital must assist doctors who are 
performing operations, including abortions, even though she has clearly stated that abortions 
go against her freedom of conscience and religion. The Commission des droits de la 
personne du Québec noted that there are multiple interests and therefore rights at play: 
equilibrium must be found between competing rights. On the one hand, a professional’s right 
to freedom of conscience and religion and on the other hand, the mother’s right to life and 
integrity of her person. Furthermore, the right to assistance, as provided by s. 2 of the 
Québec Charter offers a solution to this moral dilemma, since the obligation resides in 
bringing forth help or rescue; aid can be offered either directly or by an intermediary. A similar 
option is provided by the Code of Ethics of Nurses (R.R.Q. 1981, c. I-8, r. 4, art. 4.01.01; this 
regulation has since been repealed and replaced in 2003 with the Code of Ethics of Nurses, 
R.R.Q., 1981, c. I-8, r. 4.1, art. 2), which allows a nurse to refuse treatment if he or she can 
reasonably ensure competent relief. After careful analysis of the situation, both under the 
right of freedom of conscience and religion as well as the right to equality, the Commission 
des droits de la personne du Québec concluded that the obligation to ensure competent relief 
is the determinant criterion. The beliefs (and rights) of the nurse can only pass after the 
health and well-being of the woman have been assured: see p. 9, 12. 
525
 Archie Bahm, “Theories of Conscience”, (1965) 75(2) Ethics 128 [Bahm, “Theories of 
Conscience”]. This sentiment is echoed recently by Hammer, supra note 85, at 107, where 
he acknowledged that the various approaches to conscience demonstrate that from a 
phenomenological standpoint, it is virtually impossible to adequately define the meaning or 
the implications of conscience. The issue of innate or acquired conscience as conceptualised 
by Bahm is exemplified by Hammer’s use of Hannah Arendt’s approach to conscience as 
‘emotive based’. However this is one understanding of conscience amidst many and space 
precludes us from delving into all the conceptualisations of conscience offered by Hammer. 
In “Thinking and Moral Considerations”, the faculties of judgment (tangible) and thinking 
(intangible) are distinct, as discovered by Kant and acknowledged by Arendt: these spheres 
of distinctiveness occur as well in conscience, permitting conscience to retain independent, 
though interconnected, meaning to consciousness. In this way, “[i]f thinking, the two-in-one of 
the soundless dialogue, actualizes the difference within our identity as given in 
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philosophical justifications. In an effort to classify existing theories of conscience 
along the innate or acquired divide, eight theories of conscience are proposed by 
Archie Bahm. In a first group, theories of conscience are depicted as innate; in this 
sense, conscience can be seen as the product of biological evolution, the proof of a 
higher being by theological implantation526, or the result of being axiologically 
inherent527. A second set of theories of conscience were portrayed as being 
acquired; therefore, conscience could be acquired naturally, socially and 
intellectually528. These six theories are considered to be organistic by the author529: 
thus, Bahm recognises that conscience is made up of many different – though 
fundamentally connected – factors530. Rather than multiply the reasons for the 
debate on the place of freedom of conscience in society, Archie Bahm presents a 
coherent portrait of the different forces at work when one speaks of ‘conscience’.  
 
Without proceeding to a definition of conscience in absolute terms, I believe 
that it is preferable to understand conscience as being a process of inner thought 
and outer morality. By framing conscience as both innate and acquired as opposed 
to innate or acquired, conscience can be understood as drawing on both individual 
and collective morals. In this way, conscience can understood in the organistic 
framework proposed by Bahm. While conscience has been raised with more 
frequency in religious claims, I do not believe that this eliminates the claim of non-
                                                                                                                                      
consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product of the liberating effect of 
thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always 
much too busy to be able to think.”: Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations” 
(1971) 38(3) Social Research 417, 446. 
526
 The author explained the ‘theological implantation of conscience’ as essentially moralistic: 
“God created man and placed within him a sense of right and wrong. Conscience is 
sometimes spoken of as "the voice of God" somehow dwelling within each person. If one will 
listen to, and heed, its commands, he will act rightly. Sometimes it is only "a still small voice"; 
sometimes it overwhelms one with frightening fear or feelings of shame. One who habitually 
attends to other things may lose his ability to hear it; but one may deliberately cultivate his 
ability to listen to it, just as he develops his other senses and ways of knowing.”: Bahm, 
“Theories of Conscience”, supra note 525, 128. 
527
 Ibid, 128-129. 
528
 Ibid, 129-130. 
529
 Ibid, 131. 
530
 Ibid, 130-131. Although the theory of interdependent models of conscience is favoured by 
the author, a theory asserting the reciprocal independence of acquired and innate conscience 
is also proposed. In this way, acquired and innate theories of conscience are credited with 
autonomous growth, rather than a contextual approach. 
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religious conscience. In this manner, the tension between competing claims to 
conscience surfaces: can conscience retain distinct meaning from religion, or is 
conscience destined to be synonymous with religion? Freedom of conscience, as 
addressed in Canadian legal literature, will now be examined. 
 
2.1 Freedom of Conscience as Analysed in Canadian Legal Literature 
 
 Perhaps a first indication of the misunderstood nature of freedom of 
conscience emerges from the proceedings from the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada leading up to the 
adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Freedom of conscience, 
unlike freedom of religion, received very little independent consideration from policy 
makers and social actors alike531. Afforded modestly more interest by authors 
recently, I suggest that freedom of conscience can be understood on a scale: it can 
be interpreted as being lesser than, equivalent to or broader than freedom of religion. 
                                               
531
 Freedom of conscience was infrequently discussed in the debates of the Senate Special 
Committee leading up to the repatriation of the Constitution. Representatives of the 
Mennonite Central Community underscored the importance of freedom of conscience in the 
context of providing alternatives to military service. Furthermore, the Mennonite Central 
Committee believed that the inclusion of a clause in the constitution that would recognize the 
right of conscience that would lead one to abstain from the taking of a human life (1st 
Session, 32nd Parliament, (1980-1981), 12:47). Freedom of conscience was also signalled by 
the Chief Metro Toronto Police, John Ackroyd, representative for the Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police, who stated that “[t[he [Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police] Association 
is of the opinion that the words “of conscience” [freedom of conscience and religion] are 
vague, and unnecessary, in that there is a real risk that the word “conscience” could be given 
so broad an interpretation by the courts as to make various sections of the criminal law 
inoperative, for example, those sections relating to morals and drug offences. We are also 
concerned with what these words may mean in relation to different cults that are operating in 
our country.” (1st Session, 32nd Parliament (1980-1981),14:7) While Chief Ackroyd questioned 
the location and even existence of “conscience” later on in his testimony before the Senate 
Special Committee, he was challenged by Mr. McGrath (MP in the House of Commons at the 
time of the proceedings), who framed the importance of ‘conscience’ in terms of being 
necessary in a western democracy (1st Session, 32nd Parliament (1980-1981), 14:13). Finally, 
freedom of conscience was briefly addressed in the context of the debate on abortion; 
however, as long as the right of choice is guaranteed, it was discerned that freedom of 
conscience was inconsequential to the terms of that debate (1st Session, 32nd Parliament 
(1980-1981), 24:107). I refer the reader to : CANADA, SENATE AND CANADA, HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st Session, 32nd 
Parliament, Issue no 12 (November 25th 1980), 09h45 (M. Ross Nigh); Issue no 14 (November 
27th 1980), 09h40 (M. John Ackroyd) and Issue no 24 (December 11th 1980), 21h20 (M. John 
Ackroyd and M. McGrath).  
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By understanding freedom conscience as being lesser than freedom of religion, 
authors argue that religion remains omnipresent in the framing of freedom of 
conscience. Recognising freedom of conscience as equivalent to freedom of religion 
leads others to distinguish the former from the latter. Finally, by considering freedom 
of conscience as broader than freedom of religion, religion becomes but an aspect of 
freedom of conscience532. I will propose that constructing freedom of conscience as 
equivalent to freedom of religion constitutes its optimal recognition in the Canadian 
constitutional context. The analysis will proceed accordingly.   
 
2.1.1 Freedom of Conscience as Lesser Than Freedom of Religion 
 
 The most vocal and articulated view of freedom of conscience as being lesser 
than freedom of religion has been proposed by author Jeremy Webber, who has 
acknowledged the presence of conscience but has argued that religion remains 
ubiquitous in the discourse on freedom of conscience and religion. In “The 
Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion”, Webber examines the 
incoherence and instability associated with a secularised definition of freedom of 
religion. Arguing that “if freedom of religion is genuinely concerned with religion’s 
protection rather than its active discouragement (which I will assume rather than 
argue), and if freedom of religion extends beyond the protection of one’s inmost 
thoughts to include any dimension of religious practice, then freedom cannot be 
separated from the affirmative valuing of religious beliefs.”533 This inevitably leads to 
privileging freedom of religion over other freedoms or rights. The author asserts that 
definitions of freedom of conscience rely too heavily on adjectives, offering little 
direction and even fewer examples534. While Webber admits the undeniable appeal 
                                               
532
 As stated by the authors of the Bouchard-Taylor Report on reasonable accommodations 
in Québec: Bouchard & Taylor, supra note 450, 144.  
533
 Jeremy Webber, “The Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion” in Avigail 
Eisenberg, ed., Diversity and Equality: The Changing Framework of Freedom in Canada, 
(Vancouver, UBC Press, 2006), 178 at 178 [references omitted] [Webber, “Irreducibly 
Religion Content 1”]. At page 194, Jeremy Webber concludes by stating that “[f]reedom of 
religion does not require, then, that the state remain indifferent to religion. Two motives drive 
the rights: (1) an acknowledgment of the importance of religion, and (2) a realization of 
religion’s diversity, ultimately resulting in an attempt to generalize respect for religion so that 
all members benefit from equivalent protection, no matter their beliefs.” 
534
 Webber, “Irreducibly Religious Content 1”, supra note 533, at 187-188: “the “fundamental 
principles of an individual (Big M Drug Mart 1983, 136, per Laycraft J.A.); “profound moral 
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of an approach to “freedom of religion which would require not only neutrality 
between religions, but also between religion and irreligion”535, he also demonstrates 
that one cannot be neutral about freedom of religion since it often carries “a much 
richer set of normative judgments than is often recognized”536. Moreover, as stated 
elsewhere by Webber, even if secular beliefs are recognised and thus worth 
protection, “one is still faced with the difficult problems of weighing and sifting 
identified in the case of religious neutrality.”537 Put differently, Webber admits that 
religion must remain experiential and concludes that religion remains the 
incontrovertible gravitational force in law. Indeed, as Webber unravels his own 
proposal for a definition of conscience, it becomes apparent that religion must 
remain experiential and concludes that religion remains the incontrovertible 
gravitational force in law538. Freedom of conscience is defined as follows by Webber:  
 
“[t]he best candidates for a definition of “conscience” that is not dependent on a 
religious analogy are those that focus on obedience to moral injunctions as the object 
of the guarantee. […] In any case, a definition of conscience focused on morality 
would not be sufficient to subsume freedom of religion, at least not without severely 
distorting the latter. Moral injunctions are a dimension of many religions, but religion 
includes elements that are not contained within morality, such as prayer, methods of 
worship, communal institutions, and what to a believer is knowledge of the divine.”539  
 
This definitional approach to conscience also confirms the title of Webber’s chapter: 
even if freedom of conscience is considered to be the essential right540, it becomes 
impossible to define belief (and thus morality) without religion, even when we are not 
speaking of religion. Despite the courts’ best efforts to provide freedom of 
conscience with autonomous content it remains “parasitic”, according to Webber, on 
                                                                                                                                      
and ethical beliefs” (Roach v. Canada, para. 45, per Linden J.A.); or “profoundly personal 
beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, humankind,  nature, and, in some cases, a 
higher or different order of being” (R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., para. 97, per Dickson 
C.J.C.).” 
535
 Webber, “Irreducibly Religious Content 1”, supra note 533, 182. 
536
 Ibid. Webber explains, at page 193, that we keep on reaching back into tradition and 
historical elements in an effort to better understand others’ faiths.  
537
 Jeremy Webber, “The Separation of Church from State” in Leslie A. Kenny, Clashing 
Fundamentalisms: When Rival Truth Claims Meet Head-On, Victoria, Victoria Centre for 
Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria, 2008, online: 
http://www.law.uvic.ca/jwebber/documents/SeparationofChurchWebber_offprint.pdf (site last 
accessed 09.04.2009), p. 58 at p. 74 [Webber, “Separation of Church from State”]. 
538
 Webber, “Irreducibly Religious Content 1”, supra note 533, 189.  
539
 Ibid, 188. 
540
 Ibid, 182. 
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freedom of religion541. That said, however, even if freedom of conscience could be 
characterised as the “generic freedom” and freedom of religion as the “specific 
freedom”, Webber contends that this would only be feasible if freedom of religion 
was treated as nothing more than an aspect of the freedom of our inmost thoughts. 
Nevertheless, to be able to define the motives of belief and manifestation requires us 
to confront the experience of religion, he argues542.  
 
Webber’s interpretation of the pervasiveness of religion should not be 
understood in antagonistic terms however; rather, I regard Webber’s approach as 
one that pays heed to the historical interpretation and implications of the discourse of 
freedom of religion. Moreover, a parallel could be drawn, I believe, between 
Webber’s belief and manifestation of religion and the ECHR’s approach to freedom 
of religion in terms of the forum internum and forum externum. Although both are 
afforded protection, the breadth of the protection differs greatly. Thus the 
interdependency of the freedoms of conscience and religion continues 
asymmetrically, compounding at once the task of defining both religion and 
conscience but also confirming religion’s upper-hand543.  
 
Although authors Iain T. Benson and Timothy Macklem do not advocate the 
lesser nature of conscience per se, Benson contends that all people have some form 
of belief system while Macklem maintains that there must be an added value to 
religious belief in order for it to be seen as legitimate and interpreted as fair544. In this 
light, while not proposing the outright pre-eminence of religion, these authors are 
admitting – and thus validating – the ever-present nature of religion.  
 
                                               
541
 Webber, “Irreducibly Religious Content 1”, supra note 533, 186 and also 188. For 
example, according to Webber at page 188, conscientious objector status was first 
recognised on the basis of religious grounds.  
542
 Ibid, 188-189. 
543
 Jeremy Webber furthers his argument based on the irreducibly religious content of 
freedom of religion in “Understanding the Religion in Freedom of Religion” in Cane, Evans & 
Robinson, supra note 495, 26 at 38-39 [Webber, “Understanding the Religion”], where he 
advocates for an open, engaged and reflexive approach to religion in order to preserve a 
space for religion.  
544
 See infra. 
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While Benson has been recognised principally for his approach to secularism, 
the author has recently embarked on a new vision of the religious-secular divide. By 
acknowledging that religion exists in both State and society545, Benson has most 
recently advocated the “cooperating of Church and State”: “[c]o-operation, rather 
than separation, suggests both a necessary jurisdictional distinction (the “church” 
and state have different roles and Canada is not a theocracy) and a functional 
relationship rather than strict separation.”546 Moreover, Benson has campaigned 
repeatedly for a redefinition of terms according to a trans-disciplinary approach547, in 
hopes of preventing false or confusing dichotomies548. In his view, it is imperative to 
use legal vocabulary appropriately, while taking the broader context into account. 
The author is not endorsing a paralleled approach between religion and conscience; 
rather he is advocating that these concepts be drawn on and from each other. 
Although he has gone to great pains to define “secular” and all its permutations and 
even reprimands those who haven’t ‘gone the distance’549 in his earlier texts, he sets 
                                               
545
 Benson explains that “secular” and “secularism” inevitably take on the position of the anti-
religious (as opposed to the religious) and has sought a new way to discuss the nature of the 
public realm: “The opposite of religious is non-religious, and if we are looking to discuss the 
relationship between religion and other aspects of society we must be careful to avoid setting 
up false dichotomies. Religion discussed in relation to the state or within the state is a far cry 
from the frequently used “religion and the state”. When we use the “state” to mean the order 
of government and the law and “society” to mean citizens at large, including both religious 
and non-religious citizens, we must remember that religion, in some sense, is within both, 
since religious and non-religious citizens make up both the state and society. This use of 
terms is simpler and less ideologically loaded than continuing to employ terms such as 
“secular” and “secularism”, which often contain conceptions foreign to our intentions in using 
them or that bury anti-religious categorizations often implicit in their use.”: Iain T. Benson, 
“The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and Opportunities”, (2007) 
21 Emory Int’l L.R. 111, 155 [Benson, “Challenges and Opportunities”]. 
546
 Iain T. Benson, Taking a Fresh Look at Religion and Public Policy in Canada: the Need for 
a Paradigm Shift, 2008, online: <Centre for Cultural Renewal>, <Archives>, <Articles & 
Papers>, http://www.culturalrenewal.ca/downloads/sb_culturalrenewal/Benson-
PRIeditsBensonFinalEditsApril32008-1.pdf (site last accessed 11.11.2009), p.1-2 [Benson, 
“Fresh Look at Religion”]. 
547
 Iain T. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the “Secular””, (1999-2000) 33 U.B.C. 
L. Rev. 519, 548-549 [Benson, “(Re) Definition of the Secular”]. 
548
 Benson, “Challenges and Opportunities”, supra note 545, 154-155 (and footnote 203). 
Examples of false dichotomies would be: religious/non-religious. Benson disagreed with 
Justice Winkler’s interpretation of secularism as being “neutral” and “a protection for minority 
rights” in Bal, supra note 494, 705. According to Benson, the term “secularism” was 
underdeveloped and its history and meaning were, in fact, misused.  
549
 Benson, “Challenges and Opportunities”, supra note 545, 154-155 (esp. footnotes 202 
and 205). 
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it aside to bring to the forefront that all human beings are believers550. Benson 
proposes, in a recent text, to look at religion in the state and religion within society so 
as to avoid the historically ideologically loaded terminology, all the while finding 
inclusion for both religious and non-religious citizens551. In this manner, Benson is 
advocating for a new terminological era in order to explain freedom of conscience 
and religion: in doing so, he is suggesting a more comprehensive approach to the 
relationship between law and religion by admitting the existence of religion in both 
state and society. While I agree that “secularism” and “secular” are ideologically-
laden terms, I think that the simplicity offered by “state” and “society” can be 
misleading, since these terms also carry their own historical baggage and 
particularities. Fundamentally, however, Benson is acknowledging the presence of 
religion in state and society as well as a remedy for the many misappropriations of 
concept of secularism. While the omnipresence of religion in society may come 
across as an equalising force, it points to Benson’s belief that a non-religious or a-
religious discourse cannot have precedence in the public sphere of society552. But 
then again, however, neither can religious discourse.  
                                               
550
 Benson, “Fresh Look at Religion”, supra note 546, 5-6. 
551
 Benson, “Challenges and Opportunities”, supra note 545, 155.  
552
 Benson, “Fresh Look at Religion”, supra note 546, 5-6: “Courts have, recently, come to 
acknowledge that any pre-emptive exclusion of “religion” from the category of “beliefs” that 
may operate in the public sphere of society, is an unwarranted attack on the freedom of 
“conscience and religion” set out in Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
recognition is of great significance for Canadian public policy but it has yet to be 
widely understood as such. To allow only the beliefs of atheists and agnostics to have 
any public relevance is not to treat religious beliefs fairly and those who hold them as 
equal citizens. To allow only those beliefs that emanate from the convictions of 
atheists and agnostics to have public relevance is discriminatory against religious 
beliefs just as much as it would be to allow only religious beliefs to have public 
relevance.” [my emphasis] Benson recommends, at pages 30-40, that Federal Government 
consider whether it might be a good idea to develop something like a Freedom of Conscience 
and Religion Act (as in South Africa), which would expressly deal with conscience and 
religion giving a set of guidelines regarding rights and obligations of religious believers and 
their communities as well as stipulating the limits on government power in certain areas. This 
suggestion should be contrasted with the suggestion made in the Bouchard-Taylor Report to 
adopt a Charter on Laicity. Moreover, although most of Benson’s stated considerations would 
likely fall under provincial jurisdiction, such as public school education and health care, he is 
advocating for the federal government to consider a Freedom of Conscience and Religion Act 
“or an Act though Federal/Provincial issues create challenges with respect to application. At 
the very least a Charter, Bill or legislative instrument could provide for express recognition of 
the importance of the group dimension of religious adherence - - an aspect known to be only 
weakly recognized in our current jurisprudence.” (Benson, “Fresh Look at Religion”, supra 
note 546, 32). Although reference is made by Benson, for example, to British Columbia’s 
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The continued relevance of freedom of religion has also been questioned by 
author Timothy Macklem in “Faith as a Secular Value”553. Proposing a new 
justification for freedom of religion, Macklem sets aside the conventional semantic 
and psychological approaches, suggesting instead that the morality justifying 
freedom of religion must be secular, not religious554. The former conventional 
approach tended to question the proper meaning of the term religion, whereas the 
latter sought to focus on the internal attitude of religious believers and thus on the 
individual’s ultimate concern555. The semantic justification was rejected by Macklem 
because employing religious doctrine ultimately produced a misguided meaning and 
scope of freedom of religion556 while the psychological justification was put aside 
because it suggested that even the most secular of individuals would lead a religious 
life, unless their life was devoid of anything that he or she could regard as an 
ultimate concern557. In light of these mitigated justifications to freedom of religion, 
Macklem recommended that an essential distinction needs to be made between faith 
and conscience: “religious belief is sustained by faith, conscientious belief by 
reason.”558 By emphasising faith, Macklem is advocating that there must an added 
value to religious belief559. In this way, it cannot exist because of existing religious 
doctrine or because of a personal feeling: “religious faith can only be said to be 
capable of enhancing human well-being when it is confined to issues that, from the 
                                                                                                                                      
Master Agreement respecting Denominational Health Care (Benson, “Fresh Look at 
Religion”, supra note 546, 34-35), Benson’s suggestion would require a re-examination of the 
constitutional separation of powers. 
553
 Timothy Macklem, “Faith as a Secular Value”, (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 1 [Macklem, “Faith as 
a Secular Value”]. 
554
 Ibid, 22. 
555
 Ibid, 23. 
556
 Ibid, 22. 
557
 Ibid, 23. Macklem demonstrates the dangers of reducing concepts to a point where they 
have lost their meaning and purpose by the example of the fanatical stamp collector. No 
matter how obsessive the collector may be, stamp collecting is not and should not be 
considered a religion: Macklem, supra, 25. This is also reminiscent of Durkheim’s 
determination that magical societies can exist, but a Church of magic cannot: see Chapter 1, 
supra. 
558
 Ibid, 36. Macklem describes “reasoned beliefs” at page 35 as being “protected by freedom 
of belief, and to offer the same beliefs the same protection in the name of freedom of religion 
would be superfluous.” 
559
 Macklem explains, ibid, at page 34 that “like religion, faith has several possible meanings, 
with the result that a selection must be made from among those meanings on the basis of 
their relevance to the issue at hand.” Faith does not have to be religious, continues Macklem 
at the same page, but rather must be able of providing the moral basis for the guarantee of a 
fundamental freedom. Therefore faith matters insofar as the justification that it provides. 
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point of view of the believer, are inaccessible to reason and, from the point of view of 
reason itself, are in some way genuinely mysterious.”560 Although Macklem is not 
attempting to tarnish the shine associated with religious freedom, he is proposing 
that it should not reside in instant gratification but rather be demonstrated 
constructively561, as would any other right or freedom562. Macklem’s faith-based 
beliefs have the potential to enlarge the scope of protection, though seems uncertain 
of which beliefs will recognised and worthy of protection. The example of marginal, 
“unconventional religious beliefs”, such as the Church of Scientology or the cult of 
Jim Jones, poses a particular problem insofar as their protection under the rubric of 
freedom of religion and their contribution to the enhancement of human well-being563. 
Atheists and agnostics, just as those who hold political views, are treated as the 
antithesis of a religious believer, since their beliefs are versed in reason; their beliefs 
could still be recognised, but always seconded to more religiously-leaning groups564. 
In this way, by changing the value of faith and making it a secular rather than 
religious value, the general lens by which religious freedom is regarded and 
evaluated is modified, permitting therein the recognition of both religious as well as 
faith-based beliefs, but always cognizant of the hierarchy that exists between these 
beliefs. 
 
 If freedom of conscience were to be considered as existing yet acutely 
anaemic (lesser than) when compared to freedom of religion, a question of 
existential order must be asked. If religion is omnipresent, irreducible and perceived 
to be essential by some authors, is conscience forever destined to be dependent? 
Furthermore, if one assumes that the Legislator does not speak unnecessarily, one 
wonders what is the point of including conscience in a document as essential as the 
Charter565? The interventions of the Central Mennonite Community and the 
                                               
560
 Macklem, “Faith as a Secular Value, supra note 553, 55-56. 
561
 Ibid, 57: “The ascendancy of reason in relation to those matters has not entirely displaced 
faith, as the continuing existence of religious conviction confirms, but has limited faith’s 
authority.” 
562
 Ibid, 63. 
563
 Ibid, 53-54. 
564
 Ibid, 54-63.  
565
 Although I admit and readily acknowledge that a fundamental freedom and the preamble 
to the Charter do not carry the same weight or importance, the Preamble to the Charter has 
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Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police on the subject of freedom of conscience 
demonstrate the breadth that could be afforded to this right, but also illustrate how 
this right could be misappropriated566. By conceiving of conscience as lesser than 
religion, the overarching theme becomes one of belief: by admitting that everyone 
believes567, it then becomes a question of justification or meritocracy of beliefs.  
 
2.1.2 Freedom of Conscience as Equivalent to Freedom of Religion 
 
 Freedom of conscience can also be interpreted as being equivalent to 
freedom of religion; in this light, conscience develops distinctly from religion. 
Inevitably, the line becomes drawn between religious and non-religious beliefs, 
suddenly at odds with the “single integrated concept” advocated by Chief Justice 
Dickson in Big M Drug Mart. Some authors have suggested that conscience should 
be interpreted as representing secular beliefs in society. I will now examine the 
proposal of freedom of conscience as equivalent to freedom of religion. 
 
Apart from the question of ultimate ends, the exclusive focus on religious 
beliefs/practices (and inclusion of non-mandatory religious practices) expressed by 
Justice Iacobucci in Amselem, demonstrates special treatment of freedom of religion. 
According to Richard Moon, by distinguishing religious beliefs/practices from secular 
or non religious-beliefs, a hierarchy of protections is fostered: as stated by the 
author, “[n]on-religious beliefs, however, do not generally receive the same 
protection from government interference or favouritism. Religion remains at the 
centre of the courts’ understanding of the freedom […] Religious beliefs/practices are 
viewed as both more threatening and more vulnerable tha[n] secular 
                                                                                                                                      
encountered great opposition in its interpretation and its very nature as a political 
compromise. On the Preamble’s questionable utility in the Charter era, the reader is referred 
to Lorne Sossin, “The “Supremacy of God”, Human Dignity, and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”, (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227; Jonathon W. Penney and Robert J. Danay, “The 
Embarrassing Preamble? Understanding the “Supremacy of God” and the Charter”, (2006) 
39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 287. 
566
 See supra, Chapter, section 3.2.1. 
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 Iain T. Benson came to this conclusion in his text entitled “There are No Secular 
“Unbelievers”” (2000) 7 Centre Points, reproduced in the PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE 
PROJECT, <Issues in Depth: Ethical Commentary>, “There are No Secular Unbelievers”, 
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beliefs/practices in the life of the community.”568 The value of the belief and thus the 
importance attributed to it varies according to whether it is of religious or secular 
leaning. This is not to say, therefore, that secular beliefs are not afforded protection; 
rather, it is calibrated meaning, according to its religious counterpart.  
 
Despite this position, there is a shift in Richard Moon’s approach to 
justification of religious adherence, since he signalled internal incoherence both 
before569 and in light of570 Amselem. Framed prior to Amselem as an uncertainty 
between membership to a particular community or as a contestable opinion, Moon 
later argued that religious adherence should be based on the dominant religious or 
secular values in the community. Subsequently justified by Moon because of the 
connection of the individual to a cultural community571, a different stance on the 
protection of religious freedom is adopted by the majority in Amselem. Richard Moon 
suggested that the majority’s view of religion as a cultural practice “fits awkwardly 
with Iacobucci’s J.’s insistence that religion is a “function of personal autonomy and 
choice” and that a claimant under section 2(a) need only show that his or her 
spiritual belief is sincere.”572 Hence, the emphasis is no longer based on an 
individual’s attachment to a community, but an individual’s choice and autonomy 
within a society. By favouring individual autonomy over cultural identity to define 
religious commitment, the door to non-religious beliefs is effectively opened, 
according to Moon, since it becomes difficult to explain why non-religious beliefs, 
which are the product of individual choice or judgment, should not receive the same 
protection as religious beliefs/practices573. As such, the reasoning behind protecting 
religious freedoms because they are at once more threatening and more vulnerable 
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 Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra note 382, 216 at footnote 32 
569
 Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality and Inclusion”, supra note 382, 573: “This ambiguity reflects a 
general uncertainty as to whether we should view religious adherence as a personal 
commitment or as a matter of identity (or socialized community membership), or whether we 
should see religious belief as contestable opinion/judgment or as outside the scope of 
reasonable debate.” 
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 Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra note 382, 214-215. 
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 Ibid, 214. 
572
 Ibid, 217-218. 
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 Ibid, 219. A fortiori at the same page: “Or, from the other direction, it is difficult to explain 
why freedom of religion should protect more than the individual’s liberty to make and follow 
moral judgments – a liberty that may be limited when it interferes with the rights and interest 
of others.” 
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starts to crumble with this new tension, jeopardising the religious stranglehold on 
morality574 and opening the door to protection of non-religious beliefs. Positing a 
hierarchy of protections within the freedom of conscience and religion, on the one 
hand, and an opening for equality between protections, on the other hand, there is 
no choice but accept that on some level, it is impossible to dissociate these two 
concepts but also impossible not to protect them on a more or less equal terrain.  
 
Bruce Ryder, in “State Neutrality and Religious Freedom”, attempts to provide 
readers with a justification for the constitutional protection of some non-religious 
belief systems: “freedom of conscience, for the purposes of section 2(a), ought to 
embrace comprehensive non-religious belief systems that have the kinds of 
significance in the lives of believers analogous to the significance of religion in the 
lives of the devout.”575 Moreover, Justice Iacobucci’s emphasis of personal choice in 
Amselem encourages the development of an “equally broad conception of freedom 
of conscience in the future”, according to the author576.  
 
I consider that Bruce Ryder’s approach fosters a contradiction of terms. On 
the one hand, freedom of conscience has to have the “significance” or intensity of 
belief that derives from freedom of religion. On the other, freedom of conscience is 
encouraged to develop in a broad manner, but once again, in a similar fashion to 
freedom of religion. Although Ryder’s definitional attempt has merit, it falls slightly 
short of an independent definition. I believe, however, that by embracing a purely 
synonymous approach, the debate on freedom of conscience is belittled, stripping it 
of flexibility not afforded to freedom of religion. 
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 Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra note 382, 219. 
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 Ryder, “State Neutrality”, supra note 388, 193-194 and footnote 85: I remark that by 
rendering this definition comparable to that of “religion”, as adopted by Supreme Court of the 
United States in conscientious objector cases such as Seeger and Welsh, Canadian courts 
are encouraged to adopt as broad an interpretation of conscience  
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 Ibid, 199. A fortiori at the same page : « His [Justice Iacobucci] opinion contains a strong 
endorsement of the idea that the courts should avoid as much as possible becoming arbiters 
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neutrality.” 
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 Perhaps the only author to actively divide freedom of conscience from 
freedom of religion is J. Kent Donlevy577. Nevertheless, despite the initial promise, 
his study of ‘juridical conscience’578 seems to muddle the line between freedom of 
conscience and religion and that of fundamental freedoms (which he calls a 
‘derivative right’579). He suggested that conscience under s. 7 of the Charter can be 
understood as an interpretive principle in relation to the Charter’s legal rights, rather 
than a substantive right580. Interestingly, Donlevy also explains that conscience can 
be understood as a “collective concept for Canadian values acting both as a shield 
(negative liberty) and a sword (positive liberty) for the individual.”581 Even though 
Donlevy readily admits that freedom of conscience under s. 2(a) of the Charter does 
not constitute a collective right582, he seemingly posits that conscience has been 
offered a collective meaning under s. 7 of the Charter as an interpretive principle. He 
accomplishes this, however, in an uncertain manner, by employing such words as 
“perhaps” and “at least some”583; indeed, an element of conscience exists, though it 
resides, in my opinion, in the right of choice. In my view, he does not expand 
sufficiently on these ‘collective legal rights’ found in s. 7 of the Charter to 
substantiate his argument. Although certain reservations were expressed about 
Donlevy’s methodology, I would be remiss to overlook his proffered definition of 
freedom of conscience: 
 
“Juridically, freedom of conscience is a fundamental right of all persons; it is 
expressly protected under section 2(a), but may be derived from section 7; it is 
defined as a belief conscientiously or strongly held; it is an individual right not a 
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 Donlevy, “Catholic Schools and Freedom of Conscience”, supra note 489. 
578
 The author explains “juridical conscience” in Canada as being “intrinsically entwined with 
the concept of freedom and is perceived by the courts as a keystone for a free, democratic, 
pluralistic society. It is secular in nature and relies upon the history, norms, and values of 
Canadian society for its content and juridical interpretation which in turn underpins and 
legitimizes the authority of the modern democratic state.” Ibid, 78. 
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 The author described finding freedom of conscience under section 7 of the Charter as a 
‘derivative right’. J.K. Donlevy explained that “[t]he significance of the Big M Drug Mart and 
Morgentaler cases are that the Court had defined freedom of conscience not as the collective 
right of a community but as an individual right, in accord with Dworkin’s notion of rights, in 
that it was necessary to ensure a free, liberal democracy.” [references omitted] Ibid, 72-73. 
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 Ibid, 77 [my emphasis]. 
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 Ibid, 73, 77.  
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collective right; it requires a cogent manifestation and clear indicia that such a belief 
is bona fide held by the individual; it is not based upon a philosophy or theology but 
arguably it may be so; its expression must be balanced against the fundamental 
rights and values of the Charter; and it is warranted as one of the, if not the, 
keystones to a free, democratic, pluralistic, democracy. The above is consistent with 
the idea that the Charter’s rights and freedoms are interpreted by the courts by the 
purposive method, which takes into account the purpose and rationale of the freedom 
or right in question within the context of the Charter as a whole, the Canadian legal 
and political tradition, and the changing needs of Canadian society. Juridically, 
freedom of conscience is the sine qua non of a free, democratic, pluralistic, liberal 
society.”584  
 
[…] 
 
“In sum, the juridical conscience in Canada is intrinsically entwined with the concept 
of freedom and is perceived by the courts as a keystone for a free, democratic, 
pluralistic society. It is secular in nature and relies upon the history, norms, and 
values of Canadian society for its content and juridical interpretation which in turn 
underpins and legitimizes the authority of the modern democratic state. Moreover, as 
a concept it is present in matters of extradition and equity and is used as a collective 
concept for Canadian values acting both as a shield (negative liberty) and a sword 
(positive liberty) for the individual.”585 
 
 
While it is acknowledged that conscience exists within the spheres of both 
sections 2(a) and 7 of the Charter, I believe that their purpose and protection vary 
greatly, since the former protects the freedom of conscience whereas the latter 
enables the liberty of conscience586. Resonating more loudly is the inherent need to 
clarify what is meant by freedom of conscience, as protected by the Charter as a 
fundamental freedom. While the legal literature on freedom of conscience has 
proposed certain elements of a solution, more reflection on this topic is needed. 
 
2.1.3 Freedom of Conscience as Broader Than Freedom of Religion 
 
Interpreting freedom of conscience as being equivalent to freedom of religion 
is an affirmation of both faith and reason and a denial of hierarchy.  Demonstrating 
that freedom of conscience is capable of having distinct – yet equally important – 
content from freedom of religion implies that these freedoms could be understood as 
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 Donlevy, “Catholic Schools and Freedom of Conscience”, supra note 489, 76-77 
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synonyms. Which raises the following question: could the sincerity of an individual’s 
asserted religious beliefs as required by the majority in Amselem587 apply proprio 
motu (of one’s own accord) to conscientious beliefs? In this way, freedom of 
conscience and religion really become a “single integrated concept”. The 
consequence of this approach, however, suggests that conscientious beliefs are 
ubiquitous to all claims, whether they are of religious or ‘secular’ in nature within the 
scope of freedom of conscience and religion.  
 
Referring to freedom of conscience as being broader than freedom of religion 
might turn a few heads, elicit certain existential questions and perhaps generate 
outcry from others, since it challenges the tradition order of things. However, this 
reference to freedom of conscience as broader than freedom of religion permits us to 
give weight to both convictions of conscience and religion; the difference, however, 
lies in formulation of the initial right. Therefore, conceiving of conscience as broader 
than religion becomes a strategic position: religion is therefore but an aspect of 
freedom of conscience. This stance was brought to the forefront by the authors of 
the Bouchard-Taylor Report588 as well as philosopher Jocelyn Maclure589.  
 
 The Bouchard-Taylor Report makes it eminently clear that it is not attempting 
to deny standing to freedom of religion. Rather, “[t]he idea here is not to assert that 
freedom of religion has a moral or legal status inferior to freedom of conscience but 
that freedom of conscience belongs to a broader class or category of freedom of 
conscience, which includes all deep-seated convictions.”590 The overarching 
objective of these beliefs, whether religious or secular in nature, is that they give 
direction to their life and act as their moral compass. The denial of deep-seated 
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 Amselem, supra note 3, ¶ 52: “the court’s role in assessing sincerity is intended only to 
ensure that a presently asserted religious belief is in good faith, neither fictitious nor 
capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Otherwise, nothing short of a religious inquisition 
would be required to decipher the innermost beliefs of human beings.” 
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 As stated in Bouchard & Taylor, supra note 450, 144.  
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 In the interest of full disclosure, Jocelyn Maclure served as an expert analyst for the 
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aux différences culturelles. See COMMISSION DE CONSULTATION SUR LES PRATIQUES 
D’ACCOMMODEMENTS RELIÉES AUX DIFFÉRENCES CULTURELLES, <Secretariat of the 
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(site last accessed 29.04.2009) 
590
 Bouchard & Taylor, supra note 450, 144 at footnote 23. 
Chapter III. Whither Conscience? The Place of “Freedom of Conscience” 
In “Freedom of Conscience and Religion” 
 
 
 
139 
convictions would therefore be detrimental to an individual’s moral integrity. 
Therefore, the emphasis is placed on the function of the belief rather than its source. 
This approach to freedom of conscience does away with the official diktats of a 
church and places the importance on the role of the conviction in the life of the 
individual. The Bouchard-Taylor Report, more than anything else, calls for a 
recalibration of perspectives. While the debate over reasonable accommodations is 
far from over, the focus on “deep-seated convictions” implies a broadening of views, 
all the while dispelling further myths about the ‘culture of disbelief’591.  
 
Rather than bring conscience ‘up’ to the plane of religion, or alternatively, 
dragging religion ‘down’ to the level of conscience, conjuring up negative perceptions 
of both religion and conscience, author Jocelyn Maclure proposes that the role that 
‘strong evaluations’ play in the moral life of an individual be assessed592. The notion 
of ‘strong evaluations’ comes from Charles Taylor’s philosophy and refers to “a 
language of evaluative distinctions in which different desires are described as noble 
or base, integrating or fragmenting, courageous or cowardly, clairvoyant or blind.”593 
Put differently, “strong evaluation is concerned with the qualitative worth of different 
desires.”594 Applied to the obligation of accommodation, Maclure argues that the 
essential question is not whether a belief emanates from personal choice or 
circumstance but rather to evaluate the role that the belief plays in the moral life of 
the individual595. In this way, the evaluative distinction is not between religious and 
secular beliefs, but rather between ‘strong evaluations’ and personal preferences596. 
By insisting on the moral weight rather than the origin of the belief, I consider that 
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 While I take no credit for this saying, I was not purposefully referring to author Stephen L. 
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Language (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), 19 [Taylor, « Human Agency »] 
as cited in Maclure, « Convictions de conscience» in Eid, Bosset, Milot & Lebel-Grenier, 
supra note 321, 340. 
594
 Taylor, “Human Agency”, supra note 593, 16. 
595
 Maclure, « Convictions de conscience» in Eid, Bosset, Milot & Lebel-Grenier, supra note 
321, 340. 
596
 Ibid, 344. 
Chapter III. Whither Conscience? The Place of “Freedom of Conscience” 
In “Freedom of Conscience and Religion” 
 
 
 
140 
Maclure brings religion and conscience onto the same playing field because they 
belong to the same normative category597 and are integral to the moral life of an 
individual598. While Maclure admits that this re-evaluation of the obligation of 
accommodation might cause a proliferation599 as well as an instrumentalisation600 of 
requests, it also has the potential to contribute most significantly to the development 
of a just and stable moral diversity which characterises contemporary liberal 
democracies601.  It would probably, should it be adopted, imply a “tightening” of the 
conditions of reasonable accommodation. While the vulnerabilities of this approach 
are not to be underestimated, this approach to convictions of conscience encourages 
a non-hierarchical view of beliefs, emphasising the qualitative contribution of the 
belief.  
 
3. The Future of Freedom of Conscience 
 
 Like most matters in law, freedom of conscience remains impregnated by its 
surroundings. Our brief survey of freedom of conscience in Canadian case law and 
legal literature leads to diverging interpretations. While the study of freedom of 
conscience in Canadian legal literature has led us to believe that its strength is 
derived from its interdependence with freedom of religion rather than afforded 
independent protection as a “secular” concept. It has become evident that 
distinguishing the freedoms of conscience and religion is not an exercise that has 
been particularly well envisaged or accomplished by authors and case law alike.  
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 Jocelyn Maclure reminds the reader that freedom of religion is a sub-category of freedom 
of conscience, which is in and of itself one of the fundamental freedoms that liberal regimes 
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Within the case law, freedom of conscience has been conceived either as 
related to personal autonomy and free choice – thus drawing on liberal theory – or as 
a protection of secular beliefs. Very rarely has freedom of conscience been afforded 
independent content in the case law; as such, Maurice represents a ‘blip’ on the 
constitutional radar. Nevertheless, by conceiving of freedom of conscience on a 
scale with freedom of religion within the legal literature, all authors acknowledge 
some role to freedom of conscience in Canada. Perceived as lesser than freedom of 
religion, freedom of conscience remains a footnote in the discourse on freedom of 
religion; considered as equivalent to freedom of religion, freedom of conscience is 
allowed to grow as an independent, yet staunchly interdependent, concept; lastly, 
understanding freedom of conscience as broader than freedom of religion, the basis 
of the claim loses its importance in favour of the role it plays in the individual’s life. 
While not aware of any cases having employed this broadest conception of freedom 
of conscience, I believe that this could herald a new era in claims of convictions 
under freedom of conscience and religion. Drawing on Archie Bahm’s 
aforementioned scale of theories of conscience, I also accept that at a fundamental 
level, the concepts (and thus rights) of freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religion are intertwined. In a Bahmian sense, I contend that there is an 
interdependence of organistic theories of conscience in Canada. The most 
favourable interpretation of freedom of conscience can be found, in my view, in the 
interpretation of freedom of conscience as equivalent to that of freedom of religion 
within the Canadian constitutional context. While this might ‘shock the conscience’602 
of some, I consider that it will assuage the conscience of others. In a way, a more 
level playing field is suggested, not drawing on historical conclusions, but rather on 
current evaluations of individuals’ beliefs in society. In the years to come, the quest 
for the Holy Grail of freedom of conscience will no doubt continue, religious 
undertones included.   
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 This expression is employed on a regular basis in Canadian case law, especially when 
situations can be considered as unjust or oppressive, such as that of extradition or surrender; 
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Chapter III. Whither Conscience? The Place of “Freedom of Conscience” 
In “Freedom of Conscience and Religion” 
 
 
 
142 
A mere look at some statistical facts bolsters our conclusion. Indeed, a 
general change in religious geography has been observed in Canada in recent 
years. Juxtaposed with this change in the religious landscape is an increase in the 
share of the population with “no religion”. According to the Canadian Centre for 
Justice (Statistics Profile Series), “[i]n 1999, 16% of Canadians said they had no 
religious affiliation, up from 13% in 1991, and 7% in both 1981 and 1971.”603 
Anecdotally, I point out that prior to the 1971 census, all persons were assumed to 
have a religious affiliation in Canada604. While it is beyond my objective to dissect 
these findings, the “nones” seem to represent a non-negligible segment of the 
population in Canada. Though they do not represent a unified front beyond their a-
religious status, the legal mobilisation of this segment of the population will likely be 
significant as well as of deep interest to the greater legal community.  
 
 Examining freedom of conscience offers a view that is not religious and 
serves as a new point of reference for understanding the relationship between the 
individual and the State. This is not to say, however, that the study on freedom of 
conscience has been without weaknesses. Perhaps its most obvious flaw is revealed 
in the case law on freedom of conscience, which presents a seemingly incomplete 
portrait of this fundamental freedom. Within the Canadian constitutional context, 
freedom of conscience is perceived alternatively as a broad-based concept or the 
right of choice comprised in liberal theory. While freedom of conscience has received 
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a certain degree of protection and well as recognition under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms; Amselem has also afforded a wider interpretation to both 
religion and conscience in Canada. The consequences of this approach have not yet 
been determined; however, there has been an unquestionable openness and 
respect of subjective beliefs, both religious and secular in nature.  
 
 Can freedom of religion ever be considered anything but an aspect of 
freedom of conscience? In light of the study of Canadian case law and legal 
literature, such an assertion cannot be endorsed. On the one hand, the relation 
between freedom of religion and freedom of conscience must be better understood 
and conceptualised within the discourse of constitutionalism and the ‘political culture 
of liberalism’605. On the other hand, convictions of conscience, whether religious or 
non-religious in nature, need to be better defined within the discourse of freedom of 
conscience and religion and better contextualised within the greater discourse of 
rights. In an effort to better grasp the interconnection between freedom of 
conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, the American and European 
experiences of freedom of conscience will be examined in the following chapter.  
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 See Berger, “Law’s Religion”, supra note 20; Peter D. Lauwers, “Religion and the 
Ambiguities of Liberal Pluralism: A Canadian Perspective (2007) 37 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1. 
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Chapter IV. Freedom of Conscience in Comparative Constitutional Law: 
American and European Perspectives 
 
Introduction 
 
As observed in the third chapter, freedom of conscience has yet to find its 
place in the Canadian constitutional setting. Its relationship with freedom of religion 
remains in flux, given recent overtures in Amselem and even Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony606. Within the Canadian case law on freedom of conscience, I 
interpreted freedom of conscience alternatively as the absence of autonomy of 
freedom of conscience or as related to free choice and personal autonomy. In my 
analysis of the Canadian legal literature, however, freedom of conscience was 
addressed as if on a scale, namely as lesser than, equivalent to and broader than 
freedom of religion. In an effort to present a more complete portrait of freedom of 
conscience, I have elected to examine freedom of conscience in a comparative 
setting, namely through the American and European Court of Human Rights 
perspectives. As observed in the Canadian study on freedom of conscience, it is 
difficult to dissociate it from freedom of religion; by not proceeding to a comparative 
analysis in this chapter, some may think that the analysis will be flawed or lacking. 
However, as I will argue, freedom of religion is undeniably present in the discourse 
on freedom of conscience: within the American context, freedom of conscience is 
only afforded a role if it is found to be synonymous with freedom of religion whereas 
the European context leads us to envision of freedom of conscience as protected 
amidst the freedoms of thought and religion. This, coupled with the theoretical 
models of religion in law, as addressed in the first Chapter, provides a complete 
framework to my study.  
 
In a first part, the case law of freedom of conscience will be examined in the 
United States (1.1) and through the decisions of the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights (1.2). In a second part, the legal literature related to freedom 
of conscience will be analysed, through the same perspectives, that is to say the 
United States (2.1) and in Europe (2.2.). A preliminary conclusion on the state of 
freedom of conscience will reveal that the right to freedom of religion is intensely 
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protected in the American context, forcing freedom of conscience to find a voice 
elsewhere in the constitutional setting; within the European context, freedom of 
conscience has been interpreted as possessing its own voice, but rarely receives 
individual judicial attention (3). In both cases, it remains apparent that freedom of 
conscience is an underdeveloped concept as well as protection in constitutional law. 
 
1. The Comparative Case Law of Freedom of Conscience: American and 
European Court of Human Rights’ Perspectives 
 
1.1 The American Case Law on Freedom of Conscience 
 
 Two preliminary remarks must be made before undertaking the case law 
analysis on freedom of conscience on the American constitutional condition. The use 
of “condition”, however, is not by accident: rather, it denotes a state of being. In fact, 
I am pointing at this sense of tension, this “play in the joints”607, between the Free 
Exercise and Anti-Establishment Clauses.  
 
 Firstly, freedom of conscience is not an expressly protected right under the 
Constitution. The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights states that: 
 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”608 
 
Although rights of conscience had been considered in earlier drafts of the 
Constitution609, they were ultimately excluded. Consequently, the omission of 
conscience has been interpreted by some as an admission of the exclusive 
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religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” [our 
emphasis] 
608
 U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
609
 Phillip E. Hammond, “Church, State, and the Dilemma of Conscience” (1995) 37 J. Church 
& State 555, 562-563. 
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protection of religion610; this point will be examined further on. Despite or in light of 
this, however, conscience has retained a place of interest in the American legal 
psyche, perhaps in an effort to reconcile the puzzle of Free Exercise and 
Establishment clauses611. As noted by author Andrew Koppelman, “[i]t is not logically 
possible for the government both to be neutral between religion and nonreligion and 
to give religion special protection.”612 Conscience offers a way out of this 
terminological tangle, according to Koppelman, “by describing the basis of free 
exercise in a way that specifies only the internal psychology of the person exempted, 
without endorsing any claims about religious truth.”613 In a way, then, conscience 
offers fluid neutrality without the cumbersome labels usually associated to this 
concept.  
 
 An example of conscience on the lateral constitutional move toward other 
clauses of the Constitution is Locke v. Davey614. At issue in this case was a 
scholarship programme established by the State of Washington; in accordance with 
the State constitution615, the scholarship could not be used to pursue theological 
                                               
610
 Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73, 803; Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and the 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion”, (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1410, 1495 
[McConnell, “Origins”]; Steven D. Smith, “What Does Religion have to do with Freedom of 
Conscience?”, (2005) 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 911, 913 [Smith, “What does Religion”]. 
611
 See Andrew Koppelman, “Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religion Exemptions”, 
(2006) bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 1761, 5-8, 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1761 (site last consulted 15.09.2008) [Koppelman, 
Volitional Necessity”]. 
612
 Ibid, 6. The author continues by explaining the “free exercise/establishment dilemma” at 
the same page: “Some justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the First 
Amendment as in tension with itself.” 
613
 Ibid, 7-8. 
614
 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004) [Locke], as cited in Smith, “What does 
Religion”, supra note 610, 913: “An while the Court as a whole has not fully embraced this 
position [as advocated by Justice Souter, when invoking freedom of conscience in school aid 
cases to argue that it is unconstitutional to burden the consciences of taxpayers who object 
to spending public money in ways that have a legitimate secular function but may also have 
the effect of subsidizing religious instruction], the Court has indicated that protecting the 
conscience of such tax-payers is at least a legitimate and important state interest – one that 
can serve to justify what might otherwise be anti-religious discrimination.” [emphasis in 
original] 
615
 Wash. CONST., Art. I, §11: “Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all 
matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, 
and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but 
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No 
Chapter IV. Freedom of Conscience in Comparative Constitutional Law:  
American and European Perspectives 
 
 
 
147 
devotional studies. Joshua Davey, the respondent and a recipient of the scholarship 
programme, chose to enrol in a double major of devotional pastoral studies and 
business management and administration. The respondent was unable to use the 
scholarship due to his choice of majors and argued that this constituted an 
infringement of his rights to free exercise and non-establishment, as protected by the 
Constitution’s First Amendment. Chief Justice Renquist, writing for the majority, held 
that this case involved that “play in the joints”: “[i]n other words, there are some state 
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”616 Distinguishing from the facially neutral rule about religion established in 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah617, the Court credits the State of 
Washington with having adopted a much milder “disfavour of religion”618 and 
ultimately found that there is no suggestion on the part of history, the Washington 
State Constitution or the operation of the scholarship programme that could suggest 
animus toward religion619. Therefore, the State’s interest in protecting taxpayers’ 
                                                                                                                                      
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” 
616
 Locke, supra note 614, 718-719. 
617
 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [Church of Lukumi]. 
At issue in the case at bar was the establishment of a church practising the rites associated 
with the religion of Santeria, namely animal sacrifice, in the Florida town of Hialeah. In an 
effort to ‘curb’ such practices, the city passed a number of resolutions and ordinances aimed 
at protecting the unnecessary cruelty or killing of animals. The petititionners for the Church 
argued that their rights to Free Exercise had consequently been violated. Justice Kennedy, 
delivering the opinion for the Court, concluded that the resolutions and ordinances passed 
were contrary to the Free Exercise clause. According to Justice Kennedy, “[a] law lacks facial 
neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the 
language or context. Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial 
neutrality because they use the words "sacrifice" and "ritual," words with strong religious 
connotations. […] Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like 
the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause "forbids 
subtle departures from neutrality," and "covert suppression of particular religious beliefs,". 
Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by 
mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects 
against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.”: Church of Lukumi, supra, 
533-534. [my emphasis; references omitted] 
618
 Locke, supra note 614, 720. As simply put by Chief Justice Burger at page 721, “[t]he 
State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.” However, at Locke, 
724, the Chief Justice also held that “[f]ar from evincing the hostility toward religion which 
was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program 
goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits. The program permits students to 
attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited.” [references omitted] 
619
 Ibid, 725. 
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conscience could justify the exclusion of theology students’ eligibility from state-
sponsored scholarships.  
 
 Secondly, although the United States does not define religion per se, the 
definition is derived from conscientious objector cases620. Thus, even though these 
cases should, a priori, allow a better understanding of conscience in the American 
setting, I contend that this categorisation of explaining religion by what it is not – 
since the State cannot address or define directly what is religion because that would 
be contrary to the Anti-Establishment Clause – further exacerbates the relationship 
between the freedoms of religion and conscience.  
 
 Following these preliminary remarks, I now turn to the American case law on 
freedom of conscience. 
 
 Although ‘conscience’ has been addressed most thoroughly through the lens 
of conscientious objection in the United States, it has still evaded proper definition. 
Conscience has been employed, therefore, to define what religion isn’t rather than 
what constitutes conscience; this was seen in the cases of Seeger and Welsh. At 
issue in Seeger was the interpretation of Section 6(j) of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act, which created an exception for conscientious objectors on 
the basis of their “religious training and belief”. The test established within the 
meaning of the exemption in Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act was the following: “whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief 
occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those 
admittedly qualified for the exemption”621. This launched a two-pronged constitutional 
attack under the Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause. Thus the 
following questions were put forth to the Supreme Court: “(1) the section does not 
exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between 
different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
                                               
620
 Seeger, supra note 64; Welsh, supra note 65. Authors agree that Seeger and Welsh serve 
as the foundation for the definition of religion: Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 4, 115-117 and 
Koppelman, “Volitional Necessity”, supra note 611, 8-12. 
621
 Seeger, supra note 64, 173-180. 
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Fifth Amendment”622. More precisely, the question revolved around the interpretation 
of “Supreme Being” in the before mentioned Section 6(j) of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act. Although Seeger based his objection on the “belief in and 
devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely 
ethical creed"623, the Supreme Court understood Seeger as having professed 
“religious belief” and “religious faith”624.  
 
 Factually similar to Seeger, the Supreme Court in Welsh held that although 
the applicant’s viewpoint constituted a set of beliefs, they were not considered 
religious enough to qualify for the exemption provided under Section 6(j) of the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act. The majority in Welsh developed a two-
pronged test to discern if an objection warranted an accommodation in law: “(1) that 
this opposition stem[s] from the [objector]’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about 
what is right and what is wrong and (2) that these beliefs be held with the strength of 
traditional religious conviction”625. Although Justice Harlan was concurring, his 
emphasis was placed on the intensity of the belief626, rather than what is believed to 
be right or wrong, irrespective of the foundation of the belief. The Supreme Court 
therefore closed the constitutional door on claims of conscience that could not be 
defined as analogous to that of religious convictions. This was affirmed in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, which clearly stated that philosophical and personal beliefs, whatever their 
sincerity, were not protected by the Free Exercise clause627.  
 
                                               
622
 Seeger, supra note 64, 165. 
623
 Ibid, 166. 
624
 Ibid, 187. 
625
 Welsh, supra note 65, 340. 
626
 Ibid, 358. Although Justice Harlan was concurring, he thought that the removal of the 
theistic requirement of Universal Military Training and Service Act was “a remarkable feat of 
judicial surgery”: Welsh, supra note 65, 351 as cited in Koppelman, “Volitional Necessity”, 
supra note 583, 12. 
627
 Yoder, supra note 66, 215-216: “[i]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their 
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the 
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at 
Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was 
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the 
demands of the Religion Clauses.” 
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 In conclusion, it can be said that the American position equates conscience 
with religion, if the intensity of the belief can be rendered analogous to a religious 
belief, therein dissolving the need for separate protection of non-religious beliefs. If 
conscience is interpreted as a ‘philosophical belief’, no protection is offered. In a 
similar way, if a religion cannot be recognised because it does not fit the pre-
ordained function of religion as ascertained by the Free Exercise and Establishment 
clauses, how can analogous nonreligious beliefs be protected628? A form of 
tautological thinking springs out from this response to conscience; it becomes 
inherently clear that within the framework of the Free Exercise clause, religion 
remains the first liberty629. In a way, the United States remains “one nation under 
God”… 
 
1.2 The Case Law on Freedom of Conscience under the European Court of 
Human Rights  
 
“Where shall the line be drawn between philosophical convictions whose freedom 
should be properly respected and the convictions of cranks and faddists?”630 
 
Although the question above was raised over fifty years ago, the contours of 
conscience remain fluid. However, the European perspective provides a distinct 
interpretation with respect to the protection of conscience due to the international 
instruments for the protection of human rights on which all EU members are 
bound631. It has been said that the text of Article 9 of the ECHR was derived “almost 
                                               
628
 In this way, religions such as Buddhism or Hinduism, whose institutional structures differ 
from monotheistic religions, could suffer. Moreover, if philosophical beliefs mirror the 
aforementioned religions, it might be difficult to get their beliefs recognised and protected 
under the Constitution. 
629
 See Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 at 
713 (1981) [Thomas], where the Supreme Court stated that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion 
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection the 
exercise of religion.” On that subject, see Michael W. McConnell, “Why is Religious Liberty 
the First Freedom?”, (1999-2000) 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1243 [McConnell, “First Freedom”]. 
630
 A.H. Robertson, “The European Convention of Human Rights: Recent Developments”, 
(1951) 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 359 at 362, as cited in Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and 
international law in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 280. 
631
 All EU members are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221at 223 [ECHR], the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. [ICESC], the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, (1976) R.T.N.U. 171 [ICCPR] and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
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verbatim”632 from Article 18 of the ICCPR633. While the right of freedom of conscience 
was recognised by the ICCPR, the right of conscientious objection was addressed by 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC)634. In its General Comment No. 22, the HRC 
stated that “[t]he Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious 
objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be derived from article 
18, inasmuch as the obligation to use legal force may seriously conflict with the 
freedom of conscience and the rights to manifest one’s religion or belief.”635 More 
                                                                                                                                      
Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW]: see E.U. NETWORK OF 
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Opinion No. 4-2005: The Right to 
Conscientious Objection and the Conclusion by EU Member States of Concordats with the 
Holy See, CFR-CDF.Opinion 4-2005.doc, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2005_4_en.pdf (site last accessed 
24.04.2009),  p. 15 
632
 According to author T. Jeremy Gunn, “Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights” in J. D. Van Der Vyer and  John Witte, eds., 
Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1996), 305 at 308. 
633
 Article 18 ICCPR, supra note 631, states: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.  
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice.  
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions.  
634
 Article 4(3)(b) ECHR, supra note 631 also addresses the “conscientious objector”, which 
provides an option if no replacement service is offered, but is not enforceable and thus does 
not constitute an absolute right: “4(3) For the purpose of this article the term ‘forced or 
compulsory labour’ shall not include  
[…]  
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries 
where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service.” 
635
 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, <General Comment No. 
22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (art. 18), (48th Sess. 1993), in 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies U.N. Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7>, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15 (site last 
accessed 24. 04.2009), ¶ 11. Although the adoption of an additional protocol amending 
article 4(3)(b) and article 9 of the ECHR has been proposed (known as Recommendation 
1518 (2001)), the Committee of Ministers, in a response dated March 1st 2002, considers that 
it would actually be preferable to concentrate efforts on the implementation of the 1987 
Recommendation (known as Recommendation No. R(87) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states regarding conscientious objection to compulsory military service, adopted by 
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recently, the E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights 
distinguished between the expressed position stated in the General Comment No. 22 
and the general right stated in the drafting process by the HRC636. However this 
same network of independent experts commenced their analysis on the right to 
religious conscientious objection by recalling that it “should be seen as one 
dimension of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious recognized 
both under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and under Article 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”637 While the right of 
conscientious objection has been addressed by certain international and European 
institutions638, it will become clear that the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights have not reached a similar conclusion on this issue. 
                                                                                                                                      
the Committee of Ministers on 9 April 1987 at the 406th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies): 
see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Parliamentary Assembly, “Exercice du droit à l’objection de 
conscience au   serrvice militaire dans les États members du Conseil de l’Europe 
Recommandation 1518 (2001)”, Doc. 9379 (adopted at the 785th meeting of Ministers’ 
Deputies, 26-27 February 2002),  
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc02/FDOC9379.htm> 
(site last accessed 24.04.2009). The Council of Europe also regards Recommendation No. R 
(87) 8 as setting out the “basic minimum principles”: see Directorate General of Human 
Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Conscientious Objection to Compulsory Military Service, 
Strasbourg, 2007, available online: http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/objcone.pdf (site last 
accessed 26.04.2009), p. 7. Finally, the European Union urged “all countries concerned to 
recognise the rights of conscientious objectors” at the OSCE Human Dimension 
Implementation Meeting 2006.”: EU Statement for Working Session 13: Fundamental 
Freedoms II, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2006 (10 October 2006, 
Warsaw) HDIM.DEL/412/06 (10 October 2006) 2 as cited in Hitomi Takemura, International 
Human Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service and Individual Duties to Disobey 
Manifestly Illegal Orders (Dusseldorf, Springer-Verlag, 2008), 95 
636
 E.U. NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra 
note 631, 16: “Article 18 ICCPR includes a more general right to religious conscientious 
objection.” 
637
 Ibid, 15. 
638
 Certain contexts, such as that of health care and the right of conscientious objection, 
require a compromise between conscientious objection and the patient’s right to health care 
access. Adriana Lamačková, in Pichon and Sajous v. France: Implications for Slovakia, 
proposed to examine the issue of conscientious objection invoked by pharmacists and its 
impact on women’s access to reproductive and sexual health care services and provided an 
excellent overview of the recognition of conscientious objection in international and European 
instruments (see esp. pages 10-23). She argued that a fair balance must be struck between 
a right to conscientious objection and other affected human rights and freedoms, since 
“restriction upon the exercise of conscientious objection in the health care field is justified by 
the state’s obligation to ensure effective enjoyment of women’s rights clustered around the 
reproductive interests.”: see  Adriana Lamačková, Pichon and Sajous v. France: Implications 
for Slovakia”, LL.M., Graduate Department for the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 
2006, 88 
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As previously discussed, article 9 of the ECHR is comprised of two 
paragraphs, the first stating the protections of thought, conscience and religion, while 
the second asserts the limits of manifesting one’s beliefs and religion. As a result, 
the freedom of conscience has been labelled a protected right, but the same cannot 
be said about its manifestation. I will examine the jurisprudence in order to better 
understand the place of conscience in the ECHR. I begin with three preliminary 
remarks that illustrate the scope, standing and consequences of invoking claims of 
conscience. 
 
Firstly, in Kokkinakis v. Greece639, a Jehovah’s Witness couple was arrested 
for proselytism after engaging the wife of a cantor at the local Greek Orthodox 
Church in a discussion. At the level of the ECtHR, Mr. Kokkinakis considered that his 
conviction for proselytism was contrary to his rights to freedom of expression and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected under the ECHR640. The 
majority of the Court explained Article 9 ECHR in the following manner: 
                                               
639
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113. 
640
 I reproduce the sections of the ECHR, as invoked by M. Kokkinakis before the European 
Commission on Human Rights: 
 
Article 7. No punishment without law 
1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the criminal offence was committed. 
2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
 
Article 9. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 10. Freedom of expression 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
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“freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a "democratic 
society" within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics 
and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. 
 
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter 
alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] religion”. Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound 
up with the existence of religious convictions. According to Article 9, freedom to manifest 
one’s religion is not only exercisable in community with others, “in public” and within the 
circle of those whose faith one shares, but can also be asserted “alone” and “in private”; 
furthermore, it includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for 
example through “teaching”, failing which, moreover, “freedom to change [one’s] religion 
or belief”, enshrined in Article 9, would be likely to remain a dead letter.”641 
 
 
While the ECtHR majority found that there was a breach of Article 9, judges Pettiti 
(partly concurring), Martens (partly dissenting)642 and judge Valticos (dissenting)643 
expressed their opinions differently. In his partially concurring opinion, Judge Pettiti 
criticises the majority of the Court on two levels. First, Judge Pettiti eschewed the 
case-by-case approach seemingly favoured by the majority, and stated that “what is 
in issue is the very principle of the punishment and it is not the European Court’s 
                                                                                                                                      
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
Article 14. Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status. 
 
641
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, ¶31 [my emphasis]. 
642
 Judge Martens was of the opinion that the majority of the Court touched only briefly on the 
crux of the case. According to Judge Martens (Kokkinakis, supra note 19, ¶ 13), Article 9 
does not allow member States to make it a criminal offence to attempt to induce somebody to 
change his religion. This view is different from that of the majority opinion (see ibid, ¶ 40-42 
and 46 of the main opinion). 
643
 After reviewing certain surrounding issues to the case, Judge Valticos concludes that the 
European Convention on Human Rights has not been breached.  
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function to rule on the degree of severity of sentences in domestic law”644. The 
expression of “proselytism that is not respectable” should have been sufficient to 
demonstrate the violation of article 9 ECHR, according to Judge Pettiti645. Flowing 
from the first criticism, the reasoning employed by the majority with respect to the 
breadth of Article 9 ECHR was severely questioned: given the ‘particular importance’ 
of Kokkinakis, the majority should have made more of an effort to define 
“proselytism” and “non-religious beliefs”646. This point has been echoed loudly by 
critics as well647. Judge Petitti’s dissection of freedom of religion and conscience 
illustrate that value-laden judgments or opinions should be avoided at all costs648. He 
also cautioned against using interdisciplinary documentation such as the rather 
distant (if not to say outdated) 1956 World Council of Churches report649, since the 
form of words used, namely “Christian witness” and “improper proselytism”, generate 
black and white judgments on issues that are predominantly grey. Although I agree 
that using material drawn from other sources can be regarded as a hazard, I believe 
that if employed properly – namely in a comparative fashion – other areas of study 
could bring much-needed context to legal concepts.  
 
Although Kokkinakis has had a lasting legacy with respect to the foundations 
of a democratic society, it remains clear that the pull between individual and society 
had not been resolved definitively. Nevertheless, the rights of the religious and the 
non-religious (and thus belief and non-belief) were acknowledged by the European 
                                               
644
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, 21 
645
 Judge Pettiti, at page 22 of Kokkinakis, asks “whether the very principle of applying a 
criminal statute to proselytism is compatible with Article 9 (art. 9) of the Convention.” 
646
 Ibid, 23: « The reasoning could also have better reflected the fact that Article 9 (art. 9) 
applies also to non-religious philosophical beliefs and that the application of it must protect 
people from abuses by certain sects; but here it is for the States to legislate so that any 
deviation leading to attempts at brainwashing are regulated by the ordinary law. Non-criminal 
proselytism remains the main expression of freedom of religion. Attempting to make converts 
is not in itself an attack on the freedom and beliefs of others or an infringement of their 
rights. » 
647
 As discussed supra. 
648
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, 22: « Freedom of religion and conscience certainly entails 
accepting proselytism, even where it is "not respectable". Believers and agnostic 
philosophers have a right to expound their beliefs, to try to get other people to share them 
and even to try to convert those whom they are addressing. The only limits on the exercise of 
this right are those dictated by respect for the rights of others where there is an attempt to 
coerce the person into consenting or to use manipulative techniques. » [my emphasis] 
649
 Ibid, 25.  
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Court on Human Rights. It is interesting to note that the formulation of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion given by the ECtHR in Kokkinakis defines the 
religious dimension of this freedom as “vital elements”650 whereas the non-religious 
dimension – which they refer to as the atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned – is seen as a “precious asset”651. The terms are not equivalent, I 
believe, since the former refers to a necessary component whereas the latter points 
more to a resource or advantage. In this way, the ECtHR distinguished between 
what is essential and what is helpful, but superfluous. Furthermore, the expression 
used to explain the religious dimension is redundant in nature and the term 
employed for the non-religious dimension connotes a lesser status in our view. 
Finally, the interweaving of pluralism and democracy has been recognised as a point 
of contention amongst authors652 and has generated further questions about the 
relationship between these two founding concepts.  
 
 Secondly, the European Commission on Human Rights held in Verein 
“Kontakt-Information Therapie” and Hagen v. Austria that unlike freedom of religion, 
claims of breach of conscience can only be asserted by individuals653.  Therefore, 
freedom of conscience, in the supranational setting that is the Council of Europe, has 
been acknowledged as an individual right, both in terms of who can argue this right 
as well as who it aims to protect.  
                                               
650
 “Element” was defined as follows by the Merriam-Webster as “2. a constituent part: as a 
plural : the simplest principles of a subject of study : RUDIMENTS b (1): a part of a geometric 
magnitude <an infinitesimal element of volume> (2): a generator of a geometric figure ; also : 
a line or line segment contained in the surface of a cone or cylinder (3): a basic member of a 
mathematical or logical class or set (4): one of the individual entries in a mathematical matrix 
or determinant c: a distinct group within a larger group or community <the criminal element in 
the city> d (1): one of the necessary data or values on which calculations or 
conclusions are based (2): one of the factors determining the outcome of a process e: 
any of the fundamental substances that consist of atoms of only one kind and that 
singly or in combination constitute all matter f: a distinct part of a composite device g: a 
subdivision of a military unit”: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved February 6, 
2009 from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/element [our emphasis] 
651
 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “asset” as “2. Avantage, Ressource < his wit is 
his chief asset >; 4. something that is useful in an effort to foil or defeat an enemy.” (asset. 
(2009). In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary., supra, Retrieved February 6, 2009, from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/asset) 
652
 For example, see Edge, “Current Problems”, supra note 110, 49; Evans, supra note 77, 
200-201. 
653
 Verein “Kontakt-Information Therapie” and Hagen v. Austria, decision of October 12th 
1998, App. No. 11921/96, D.R., no. 85, p. 29 [Kontakt-Information Therapie]. 
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 Finally, the European Court on Human Rights recognised that invoking 
conscience to protect a fledgling minority group cannot be justified as being 
“necessary in a democratic society”654. At issue in Sidiropoulos and others v. 
Greece655 was the formation of a non-profit organisation known as the “Home of 
Macedonian Civilization” by “Macedonians” who possessed a “Macedonian national 
consciousness”, their second objective being the protection of Macedonian culture 
and heritage. It should be noted, however, that the members of the embryonic 
association were born in what is considered Greece (and thus would be considered 
Greek nationals). The association failed to register its name, even though 
appropriate procedure had been followed. The Florina Court of First Instance opined 
that the second objective, namely the protection of Macedonian culture and heritage, 
was not the true objective but rather “the promotion of the idea that there is a 
Macedonian minority in Greece, which is contrary to the country’s national interest 
and consequently contrary to law.”656 After appeals in the national courts, the 
applicants applied to the European Commission on Human Rights, alleging 
violations of Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the ECHR. The European Commission on 
Human Rights examined the case under Article 11 ECHR, which provides the right to 
freedom of assembly and association, and found that the intervention by the State 
could not be justified as being “necessary in a democratic society”657; it became 
unnecessary to deal with the other articles of the ECHR.  
 
 As a conclusion to the preliminary remarks on Article 9 of the ECHR, 
“freedom of conscience” has been recognised by the European Commission and the 
Court of Human Rights as protecting the beliefs of the “atheists, agnostics, sceptics 
and the unconcerned”658, thus confirming that freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion protects both rights of the religious and the nonreligious. Another 
determining factor is that unlike freedom of religion, freedom of conscience can only 
be invoked by individuals. Finally, the simple act of invoking “conscience” is not 
                                               
654
 Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece, decision of July 10th 1998, App. No. 26695/95, Reports 
1998-IV [Sidiropoulos], ¶ 33-41, 47. See also Renucci, supra note 111, ¶ 154 (pages 196-
197). 
655
 Sidiropoulous, supra. 
656
 Ibid, ¶ 10. 
657
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, ¶ 33-41, 47. 
658
 Ibid, ¶ 31. 
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enough to engage its protection before the Courts. Nevertheless, the twin pillars 
extolled in Kokkinakis – pluralism and democratic society – seem to be at odds 
rather than in harmony with each other, which can be attributed to the use of the 
“margin of appreciation”659.  
 
In order to fully appreciate the scope and standing of claims of freedom of 
conscience in the European Union case law, one must return to its more humble 
beginnings. Non-religious rights were recognised far before Kokkinakis; pacifism was 
acknowledged as one such right in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom660 but its 
manifestation was not. Pat Arrowsmith, an avowed pacifist, distributed pamphlets to 
soldiers, which urged them to “desert or refuse to obey orders if they were posted in 
Northern Ireland”661. The Committee of Ministers found that although her right to 
conscience was protected, the content of her pamphlets was not, since it did not 
reflect her values as a pacifist but rather her criticism of governmental policy662. 
                                               
659
 On the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” in the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, see Howard C. Yourow, The margin of appreciation doctrine in the 
dynamics of European human rights jurisprudence (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
1996) and Yukata Arai-Takahashi, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of 
proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). Succintly put, 
the margin of appreciation refers to “the latitude a government enjoys in evaluating factual 
situations and in applying the provisions enumerated in international human rights treaties.”: 
see Y. Arai-Takahashi, supra, 2. In this way, the “margin of appreciation” was developed not 
through the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, but rather by the Strasbourg 
organs themselves: see George Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation” (2006) 
26(4) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 705, at 705-706 [Letsas, “Two Concepts”]. On recent criticisms 
of the doctrine of margin of appreciation and the decisions of the ECtHR, see, for example: 
Letsas, “Two Concepts”, supra; Janneke Gerards and Hanneke Senden, “The Structure of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (2009) 7 ICON 619 [Gerards 
& Senden, “Structure of Fundamental Rights”]; Stefan Sottiaux and Gerhard Van der 
Schyff, “Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication: Towards a More Structured 
Decision-Making Process for the European Court of Human Rights” (2008) 31 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 115 [Sottiaux & Van der Schyff, “Towards a More Structured Decision 
Making Process”]. 
660
 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, decision of May 16th 1977, App. No. 7050/77, D.R. 8, p. 
123 [Arrowsmith 1]. 
661
 Ibid, 124. 
662
 Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, decision of June 12th 1979, App. No. 7050/77, Committee 
of Ministers, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=687137&portal=hbkm&
source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (ECHR, 
HUDOC portal, last consulted 26.09.2008) [Arrowsmith 3]. 
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Furthermore, Arrowsmith’s claim under Article 10 ECHR for the right to impart 
information under freedom of expression was not violated.  
 
Freedom of conscience has routinely been invoked in cases of conscientious 
objection to military service, but no absolute right to conscientious objection exists 
under the auspices of the ECHR663. Representing a turning point in conscientious 
objection case law, Thlimmenos v. Greece examined the status of a military 
conscientious objector and the aftermath of his refusal664. While the European 
Commission on Human Rights relied on article 4(3)(b) ECHR to demonstrate that a 
right to conscientious objection did not exist in Grandrath v. Federal Republic of 
Germany665, the ECtHR held that there had been a violation on of one’s right to 
conscientious objection. What distinguishes Thlimmenos from previous cases is the 
manner in which conscientious objection was invoked, namely by a combination of 
Articles 14666 and 9 ECHR. Applied to the facts at hand, the applicant was contesting 
the laws governing access to the profession of chartered accountants which did not 
distinguish between categories of criminal records667. As a Jehovah’s Witness, the 
applicant was committed to pacifism; these beliefs also constituted the reason 
behind the applicant’s criminal record. Thus the ECtHR considered that the 
applicant’s Article 14 ECHR rights had been violated in two manners: first, by 
treating persons in analogous situations differently without providing an objective and 
reasonable justification and second, when States without an objective and 
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
                                               
663
 As noted by Renucci, supra note 111, ¶ 154 : « L’ancienne Commission s’est prononcée 
nettement : la Convention européenne ne garantit aucun droit à l’objection de conscience et 
si les États prévoient un service civil de remplacement, il ne sera pas possible d’invoquer une 
violation de l’article 4 de la Convention interdisant le travail forcé et obligatoire. » [references 
omitted] The author notes, at footnote 529 (p. 196) the cases mentioned by the Commission 
in its refusal to recognise a right to conscientious objection.  
664
 Thlimmenos v. Greece, decision of April 6th 2000, Application no. 34369/97 
[Thlimmenos]. 
665
 Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No 2299/64, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 324 
[Grandrath]. 
666
 Art. 14 ECHR, supra note 631: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
667
 The ECtHR decision was made on the conjoined claim of Articles 9 and 14 ECHR; it was 
deemed unnecessary to treat the Article 9 ECHR violation separately. See Thlimmenos, 
supra note 664, ¶ 42-43. 
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significantly different668. Indeed, while Thlimmenos illustrates a changing point in the 
recognition of conscientious objection, the ECtHR found it unnecessary to address 
“the question whether, notwithstanding the wording of Article 4 § 3 (b), the imposition 
of such sanctions on conscientious objectors to compulsory military service may in 
itself infringe the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by 
Article 9 § 1.”669 In this way, the ECtHR conveniently sidesteps the decision under 
Article 9 ECHR made by the European Commission of Human Rights in 
Thlimmenos. Therefore, pacifism as a committed value for both religious and non-
religious beliefs provides an interesting example of the crafting of claims and 
complaints. 
 
 Freedom from religion has been accepted by the European Commission and 
the European Court of Human Rights; in this way, one should be free to decide to 
partake in or hold religious beliefs. This principle was recognised in Kokkinakis670 
and reiterated more recently when taking an oath for public office671, as well as in the 
context of a professional oath672. After being elected to the parliament of the 
Republic of San Marino, officials must take an oath of office which required them to 
swear on the Holy Gospels673. This oath caused consternation amongst new officials, 
arguing that “holding parliamentary office […] was subject to publicly professing a 
particular faith, in breach of Article 9.”674 This view was upheld by the European 
Commission on Human Rights. Moreover, freedom from religion was re-asserted 
                                               
668
 Thlimmenos, supra note 664, ¶ 44. 
669
 Ibid, ¶ 43. In this way, the ECtHR conveniently sidesteps the question of Article 9 ECHR; 
this point was previously addressed, however, by the European Commission on Human 
Rights in Thlimmenos: see supra note19, ¶ 43. See also Evans, supra note 77, 178; 
Lamačková, supra note 638, 22. 
670
 Kokkinakis, supra note 113, ¶ 31. See also Buscarini and others v. San Marino, decision 
of February 18th 1999, App. No. 24645/94 [Buscarini], ¶ 34; Alexandris v. Greece, decision 
of February 21st 2008, App. No. 19516/06 [Alexandris], ¶ 31. 
671
 Buscarini, ibid. 
672
 Alexandris, supra note 670 [Alexandris]. 
673
 I reproduce the oath in its entirety. See Buscarini, supra note 670, ¶ 8: “I, …, swear on the 
Holy Gospels ever to be faithful to and obey the Constitution of the Republic, to uphold and 
defend freedom with all my might, ever to observe the Laws and Decrees, whether ancient, 
modern or yet to be enacted or issued and to nominate and vote for as candidates to the 
Judiciary and other Public Office only those whom I consider apt, loyal and fit to serve the 
Republic, without allowing myself to be swayed by any feelings of hatred or love or by any 
other consideration.” 
674
 Buscarini, supra note 670, ¶ 30. 
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recently in Alexandris, where the applicant alleged that he had to reveal that he was 
not of the Christian Orthodox faith when swearing a professional oath, which 
infringed on his right not to manifest his convictions. The ECtHR recalled the right 
not to manifest one’s convictions and stated that the State authorities (autorités 
étatiques) did not have the right to intervene in the sphere of an individual’s right to 
freedom of conscience and to seek out their religious convictions, or to oblige them 
to manifest their convictions regarding divinity675. The fact that this professional oath 
must be taken in order to practice – while bearing in mind that a lawyer is considered 
an officer of justice – makes State intervention all the more unsavoury. The ECtHR 
found that Articles 9 and 13 of the ECHR were violated676.  
 
 While freedom of conscience has been unequivocally articulated in cases of 
conscientious objection to military service, a right to religious conscientious freedom 
has also recently received considerable support from the E.U. Network of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights677. This recognition provides support 
for cases in the areas of employment relationships678, healthcare services679, 
taxation and objections to the content of schooling680 to name a few. 
 
In conclusion, claims of coerced consciousness remain difficult to prove and 
are often decided on the basis of other rights that have been violated, such as the 
                                               
675
 Alexandris, supra note 670, ¶ 38 [my translation]. 
676
 Ibid, ¶ 41. 
677
 E.U. NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra 
note 631. 
678
 While author Dinah Shelton offers the example of Gandharv Raj Chauhan v. United 
Kingdom, App. 11518/85, decision on admissibility (12/07/1988), where the European 
Commission on Human Rights deemed admissible a case where the applicant contended 
that his right to conscientious objection to joining a trade union had been violated due to his 
religious beliefs: Dinah Shelton, “Conscientious objection and Religious Groups” in Jean-
François Flauss, ed., La protection international de la liberté religieuse (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
2002), 189. A friendly settlement was reached in this case: see Gandharv Raj Chauhan v. 
United Kingdom, App. 11518/85, friendly settlement (16/05/1990) 
679
 This issue of conscientious objection to abortion remains a contentious issue: see E.U. 
NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 631. 
680
 Valsamis v. Greece, Decision of 18 December 1996, App. No. 21787/93 [Valsamis]; 
Efstratiou v. Greece, Decision of 18 December 1996, App. No. 24095/94 [Efstratiou]: the 
majority of the ECtHR found that Greece did not provide an effective legal channel or remedy 
to protect the religious rights of parents and their children. This is not to say, however, that a 
right to conscientious objection was recognised with respect to participation in a school 
parade: see Valsamis, supra, ¶ 35-37. 
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right to equality and the right to association. However, freedom of conscience has 
been interpreted to include the rights of pacifists, atheists681, vegans682 as well as 
conscientious objectors. As a sidebar, conscientious beliefs have recently been 
interpreted to include environmental beliefs, as observed by the decision of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in London683. Although Article 9(1) ECHR seemingly 
protects the freedoms of thought and conscience and religion equally, it is obvious 
that freedom of religion holds a privileged position with regard to its manifestation.  
 
1.3 Conclusion on the Comparative Case Law of Freedom of Conscience 
 
 Freedom of conscience, as seen through the American and European lenses, 
paints less than coherent picture. Perceived as analogous to religion, freedom of 
conscience retains little (if any) independent meaning in American jurisprudence. 
Interpreted as including certain non-religious opinions, the European concept of 
freedom of conscience provides an interesting – though stunted – vision of a right. 
 
 At best, conscience affords a certain protection to individuals and in this 
sense a collective understanding of conscience is developed, though its potential 
                                               
681
 Angelini v. Sweden, (1986), DR 51, App. No. 10491/83, p. 41 [Angelini], as cited by Jim 
Murdoch, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. A guide to the 
implementation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2007), Human 
Rights Handbook No. 9, online: http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/88B98643-09C1-4D80-
ACD8-EBBB51851747/0/DG2ENHRHAND092007.pdf (site last accessed 03.04.2009), 12. 
682
 W v. the United Kingdom, decision of 10 February 1993, App. No. 18187/91, as cited by J. 
Murdoch, supra note 681, 12. 
683
 See Grainger PLC and Others v. Nicholson, Appeal No. UKEAT/0219/09/ZT, online: 
<Employment Appeal Tribunal>, 
http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/Upload/09_0219rjfhLBZT.doc (site last accessed 
10.11.2009) [Nicholson]. The Respondent’s employment was terminated on grounds of 
redundancy; the Respondent claimed that his termination was due to his philosophical beliefs 
about climate change and the environment. Mr. Justice Burton, sitting alone, held at ¶ 31that 
“[t]he existence of a positive philosophical belief does not depend upon the existence of a 
negative philosophical belief to the contrary. What is intended to be protected by paragraph 
1(d) is discrimination against a person on the grounds of his lack of belief. Thus, if the 
Respondent has his philosophical belief in climate change, and he were to discriminate 
against someone else in the workforce who does not have that belief, then the latter would be 
capable of arguing that he was being treated less favourably because of his absence of the 
belief held by the Respondent.” The Respondent’s advocate also makes an interesting cross-
reference to Justice Wilson’s broad interpretation of conscientious beliefs in Morgentaler 
(Morgentaler, supra, ¶ 469) when treating the question of the genuineness of the belief, as 
stated in Williamson, supra note 109, ¶ 23-24 as cited in Nicholson, supra, ¶ 22-23. 
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remains unclear. However, the actual content of these provisions confers a 
seemingly incomplete portrait. In an effort the fill in the shadows and the voids, I will 
now examine freedom of conscience in comparative legal literature. 
 
2. Freedom of Conscience as Analysed in Comparative Legal Literature 
 
2.1 Freedom of Conscience in American Legal Literature 
 
Conscience has occupied a questionable place in the American constitutional 
debate, even referred to as a “black box” by one author684. Many authors have 
understood the omission of conscience from the First Amendment as an admission 
of the exclusive protection of religion685, while others have understood the existence 
of freedom of conscience as signalling the absence of (political) coercion686. While 
author Noah Feldman described the modern understanding of freedom of 
conscience as fundamentally secular, entitling “every person […] not to be coerced 
into performing actions or subscribing to beliefs that violate his most deeply held 
principles”687, he points out, however, that this applies only to the Establishment 
Clause. Whereas the Free Exercise Clause exhorts the protection of religion, the 
Establishment Clause safeguards against compulsory (political) beliefs on 
individuals. This precision leads us to two conclusions: first, “conscience” is not fully 
defined in law, constitutional or otherwise; second, a distinction must be made 
between “conscience” in the Free Exercise and Establishment settings. In light of 
this, the academic community has found different and innovative ways in which to 
deal with the definitional conundrum. Freedom of conscience thus faces a dilemma 
                                               
684
 Koppelman, “Volitional Necessity”, supra note 611, 2. Interestingly, authors Christopher L. 
Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, in the “Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional 
Basis For Protecting Religious Conduct”, (1994) 61 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1245, at 1292 
[Eisgruber & Sager, “Vulnerability of Conscience”], have referred to religious belief as 
being a black box: in this perspective, “religious conscience requires that the state treat 
religious belief as a “black box”; for purposes of assessing the impact of a sincerely held 
scheme of religious belief upon the believer, the ultimate truth or the reasonability of the 
scheme is beyond the constitutional competence of the state.” [emphasis in original] 
685
 Peñalver, “Note”, supra note 73, 803 (footnote 89); McConnell, “Origins”, supra note 610, 
1495.  
686
 Noah Feldman, “The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause”, (2002) 77 N.Y.U.L. 
Rev. 346 [Feldman, “Intellectual Origins”]; Martin H. Belsky, “A Practical and Pragmatic 
Approach to Freedom of Conscience” (2005) 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1057 [Belsky, “Practical 
and Pragmatic Approach”]; Smith, “What does Religion”, supra note 610. 
687
 Feldman, “Intellectual Origins”, supra note 686, 424. 
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of its own as to the locus of recognition: it must either be recognised of its own 
accord, or be resigned to be forever lost in the penumbras of religion. The manners 
in which freedom of conscience has been defined by scholars will be addressed as 
well as the conclusions that can be drawn from the use of freedom of conscience in 
the American setting.  
 
 Perhaps one of the most vocal sceptics of the importance of freedom of 
conscience has been Michael W. McConnell, author and now judge, who has 
unequivocally placed religion above all other claims of accommodation, since in his 
view, “[n]o other freedom is a duty to a higher authority.”688 McConnell explains that 
religion is not the only concept that is singled out by (and in) the Constitution and as 
such, detains legitimacy as a ‘human concern’689. This approach to religion – to the 
detriment of conscience amongst others – has aptly been coined the “McConnell-
conscience” by others690. Conscientious objector cases such as Welsh v. United 
States691 and United States v. Seeger692 have been dismissed by McConnell, stating 
that “in those cases, the Court relied on the interpretation of a statute, and only 
Justice Harlan took the position that the Constitution forbids the singling out of 
religion.”693 Another facet to McConnell’s reasoning, this time questioning the 
‘legitimacy’ of the sphere of religious discourse, considers that this discourse cannot 
be excluded from the public sphere on the basis of the principle of secular 
rationale694. McConnell explains that the principle of secular rationale (also known as 
the ideal of public reason) is put forward as a means of “protecting the public sphere 
                                               
688
 Michael W. McConnell, “The Problem of Singling Out Religion”, (2000) 50 DePaul L. Rev. 
1, 30 [McConnell, “Singling out Religion”]. 
689
 McConnell, “Singling out Religion”, supra note 688 32. The author lists many ideas, 
interests and concerns that are singled out by the Constitution. Among them are property, 
self-incriminating statements, punishment, habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, involuntary 
servitude, voting rights and rights deemed “fundamental”: Ibid, 31. 
690
 Koppelman, “Volitional Necessity”, supra note 611, 27. 
691
 Welsh, supra note 65. 
692
 Seeger, supra note 64. 
693
 McConnell, “Singling out Religion”, supra note 688, 6, as cited by Koppelman, “Volitional 
Necessity”, supra note 611, 27 at footnote 58 
694
 Michael W. McConnell, “Secular Reason and Misguided Attempts to Exclude Religious 
Arguments from Democratic Deliberation”, (2007) 1(1) J.L. Phil. & Culture 159, 174 
[McConnell, “Secular Reason and Misguided Attempts”]. In this article, the author 
contends that the principle of secular rationale rests on a false distinction between generally 
accessible public reason and religious ideas: see pages 161, 168-171. 
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from divisive, absolutist, intolerant impulses and from arguments that cannot be 
supported on basis of accessible evidence”695. The author states that this principle 
would in fact limit the scope as well as the actors engaged in public debate. 
Consequently, McConnell argues for arguments to be based on merit rather than on 
origin. While this suggestion might be persuasive and encourage acceptance, I 
believe it to be a misnomer, since McConnell is advocating for religious tolerance, 
not a general tolerance of ideas. Thus, to ask why religion’s firstness excludes 
convictions of conscience is perhaps not the right question; rather, the question is: 
can conscience serve a purpose in explaining the relationship between the State and 
society other than the one provided for by the Religion Clauses? Instead of 
acknowledging that conscience may have a place in the dialogue between the State 
and society, McConnell suggests that it may be more “helpful to think in ways in 
which the twin protections of free exercise and nonestablishment could be extended 
into nonreligious spheres of life.”696 Therefore, the McConnell-conscience approach 
unconscionably exhorts the “firstness” of religion at the cost of all other – including 
conscience – rationales.  
 
 Professor Martha Nussbaum, in her recent book entitled Liberty of 
Conscience697, grappled with the opposition of ‘ordinary conscience’ and the ‘special 
nature of religion’ in the American constitutional psyche698. A poignant example of 
the difference between conscience and religion can be found in the commitment 
behind the conscientious objector, demonstrating the space afforded in one sphere 
                                               
695
 McConnell, “Secular Reason and Misguided Attempts”, supra note 694, 174. 
696
 McConnell, “The Problem of Singling out Religion”, supra note 688, 47. Michael 
McConnell argues that it is not logically possible to achieve equal regard between each 
secular concept and religion, since the former are treated with unequal regard. Furthermore, 
according to the author, the Religion Clauses offer the most highly articulated constitutional 
doctrine insulating a sphere of life from governmental control and is therefore better suited to 
serve as the benchmark for analysing legal arrangements between government and other 
aspects of human life: see McConnell, “Singling out Religion”, supra note 688, 46-47.    
697
 M.C. Nussbaum, supra note 302. Martha Nussbaum readily admits that this book is first 
and foremost a work of philosophical analysis: see page 29. 
698
 Liberty of conscience was also addressed by Martha Nussbaum in “Liberty of Conscience: 
The Attack on Equal Respect”, (2007) 8(3) J. Hum. Dev. 337, at 339 [Nussbaum, “Attack 
on Equal Respect”]: “respecting liberty of conscience equally entails that the state may not 
create a two-tiered system of citizenship by establishing a religious orthodoxy that gives 
rights to others on unequal terms.” 
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at the expense of another699. Nussbaum proposes to return to Roger Williams’ idea 
of conscience to resolve its very meaning, as well as elicit other queries. Although 
Williams spoke of defending religious liberty in his definition of conscience700, 
Nussbaum contends that Williams conceived of moral choice “as a general power of 
choice, the directing capacity of our lives (like the Stoic hegemonikon).”701 It is worth 
noting that Williams is often seen as the precursor to Locke’s Letter on Tolerance. 
Accordingly, “it is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of political respect, and 
thus we can agree to respect the faculty without prejudging the question whether 
there is a meaning to be found, or what it might be like.”702 Interestingly, the Williams’ 
account of conscience also pushes the boundaries of religion further703, which ignites 
another dilemma as to the scope of religion in constitutional law in America. By 
insisting on the individual ‘practical identity’ and the sincerity of the individual as did 
Williams, Nussbaum believes that this could signal a new era in general moral 
choice. Again, it is the faculty rather than the outcome of the belief that would matter 
to Williams704. By exacting Williamsian tolerance, the structure of protection of 
religious freedom changes, therein proffering protection to Buddhism, Taoism and 
other nontheistic religions that had historically been set aside705. Despite this 
galvanizing approach to conscience, Nussbaum’s work remains admittedly bound to 
the current rule of law706.   
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 In Liberty of Conscience: in Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality, supra 
note 302, Nussbaum explains the judicial recognition of protected space as follows at page 
102: “If I resist the military draft because I follow the ethical ideas of Henry David Thoreau 
and you resist the draft because you are an Orthodox Jew, it seems somewhat unfair for your 
commitment to be honored and mine to be rejected, simply because yours is religious and 
mine is ethical – and yet this is what our Constitution appears to authorize.” 
700
 Martha Nussbaum explains that Williams defined conscience as ““holy Light” and as “a 
perswasion fixed in the minde and heart of a man, which inforceth him to judge … and to do 
so and so, with respect to God, his worship, etc.”: see Glenn La Fantaisie, The 
Correspondence of Roger William, (Providence, Brown University Press, 1988), vol. 1, pages 
33-40 as cited in Nussbaum, supra note 302, 51-52. 
701
 Ibid, 52.  
702
 Ibid, 169. 
703
 Ibid, 170. 
704
 Ibid, 169. See Chapter III discussion on the facets of freedom of conscience in Canada, 
supra. 
705
 Ibid, 170 
706
 Ibid, 174: “Americans, and their courts, will continue to disagree on all these issues, but 
we should admire the seriousness, and the subtlety, of our tradition’s wrestling with the 
fundamental issue, Antigone’s issue: how to respect the individual conscience when it seems 
to butt up against the rule of law.” 
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 Andrew Koppelman has also examined why conscience has been 
unsuccessful in justifying exemptions and why it thus far has escaped proper 
explanation. Despite these puzzles, he contends that the right to conscience remains 
a powerful idea for people707. Nevertheless, conscience remains an unsuitable fit for 
accommodation, according to him. Using Harry Frankfurt’s account of volitional 
necessity, Koppelman argues that conscience cannot serve as a basis for 
accommodation708. Volitional necessity is described as someone caring so 
wholeheartedly about something that he cannot form an intention to act in a way that 
is inconsistent with that care. Volitional necessity is by its existence, a subjective 
tool. By its very nature, then, objectification of the situation – thus rendering a 
situation comparable to others – is very difficult, rendering it an unsuitable basis for 
claims. Hence, according to Koppelman, conscience can be employed as a tool to 
determine whether a claim is religious, but cannot serve as the determining 
element709.  
 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager have extensively discussed 
and written about the role of religion in American law. In a well-known 1994 article, 
the authors explain that the line between religious and secular consciences as 
follows:  
 
“religious conscience is crucially dependent on schemes of fact and value 
(epistemologies) that are private in the sense that they do not depend upon their 
conformity to generally accepted tests of truth or widely shared perceptions of value; 
secular conscience, in contrast, appeals to a public epistemology that depends 
on generally accepted tests of truth and widely shared perceptions of value.”710 
 
 
The authors explain that the protection of religious conscience, in their view, 
demands that the State treat religious belief as a “black box”, since the reasonability 
of the scheme is viewed as beyond the constitutional competence of the State711. On 
                                               
707
 Koppelman, “Volitional Necessity”, supra note 611, 2 
708
 Ibid, 3.  
709
 Ibid, 3-4. A fortiori at 4: “The same is true of conscience, which is simply volitional 
necessity with a (perceived) moral component.” The author refers later on to this form of 
conscience as “Welsh-conscience”: see page 49. 
710
 Eisgruber & Sager, “Vulnerability of Conscience”, supra note 684, 1291 [my emphasis]. 
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 Ibid, 1292. 
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the other hand, “[w]ith secular claims of conscience, however, the believer and the 
state in principle share a common epistemic foundation.” 712 The State can therefore 
respond to the responsibility of the secular claimant’s conscientious commitment713. 
Eisgruber and Sager admit that the concept of secular conscience fits imperfectly 
with their theory of equal regard. Although equal regard is a symmetrical principle 
insofar as it applies to both secular as well as sectarian concerns, one cannot 
logically conclude that the enforcement of equal regard, as it applied to secular 
conscience, is appropriately on the agenda of the judiciary714. Despite the fact that 
equal regard should apply to the abovementioned concerns, the authors argue that 
secular beliefs are distinctly vulnerable to discrimination and should equal protection 
from discrimination, just as religious conscience. This approach would render a 
parsimonious application of the protection of conscience unconscionable, thereby 
reinforcing the application of equal regard715. Equal regard is defined as follows: 
 
“First, no members of our political community ought to be devalued on the basis of 
the spiritual foundations of their important commitments and projects. Second, all 
members of our political community ought to enjoy rights of free speech, personal 
autonomy, and private property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor 
defined in terms of religion, will allow a broad range of religious beliefs and practices 
to flourish.”716 
 
Eisgruber and Sager acknowledged that equal regard is not without costs to the 
citizens, though it is difficult to quantify by the State. Following the United States 
                                               
712
 Eisgruber & Sager, “Vulnerability of Conscience”, supra note 684, 1293. According to the 
authors at the same page, “[r]easonability here speaks not so much to the plausibility of a 
given belief, as to the elevation of that belief to a dominant position with regard to motivation 
and self-identity.” 
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remedy failures of equal regard”: See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, 
Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007) at 
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 Eisgruber & Sager, “Vulnerability of Conscience”, supra note 684, 1291-1292. 
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 Ibid, 1285. The authors define “equal regard” in Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 
supra note 714, 4. See also Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, “Chips off Our 
Block? A Reply to Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle”, (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1272 
[Eisgruber & Sager, “Chips off Our Block”]. 
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Supreme Court ruling in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment 
Security Division717 where it was found that the denial of unemployment 
compensation benefits to the petitioner violated his First Amendment right to 
religious freedom. The petitioner quit his employment because he believed that his 
religious convictions as a Jehovah’s Witness prevented him from engaging in the 
production of weapons; it was discerned that his beliefs did not constitute “good 
cause” of voluntary termination as required by the Indiana statute. In this light, 
Eisgruber and Sager developed the hypothetical “Secular Thomas” (Secular Thomas 
is a pacifist, but on secular rather than on religious grounds)718 to exemplify their 
approach to equal regard. The authors were attempting to demonstrate that the 
Thomases are the two side of the same coin: both are requesting an exemption, the 
only difference being the source of the request. Although the Secular and Religious 
dichotomies of “Thomas” should receive equal protection, Eisgruber and Sager note 
that these observations cannot be generalised to what they call the ‘full run of 
conscientious secular claimants’; rather, “they are specific (and presumably 
substantial) subset of claimants whose conscientious commitments are 
reasonable.”719 Indeed, while the reasonability of the claim ultimately determines its 
recognition by the courts, Koppelman wonders whether Eisgruber and Sager find 
something problematic about religion-specific accommodations720. I believe that 
authors Eisgruber and Sager have responded indirectly to Koppelman’s concern in a 
recent article, explaining that the distinctiveness of religion constitutionally justifies 
subjecting the government’s treatment of religion to greater scrutiny than many other 
topics or policies receive721.  
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 Thomas, supra note 629. 
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 Eisgruber & Sager, “Vulnerability of Conscience”, supra note 684, 1292; Eisgruber & 
Sager, supra note 714, 114. The authors have also developed, in a similar fashion, ‘Officer 
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 Andrew Koppelman, “Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?”, (2006) 3 U. Ill. L. 
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A final – though by no means exhaustive – view of conscience in American 
constitutional law comes to us from Steven D. Smith722. He contributes to the 
discussion on freedom of conscience in two ways: first, in terms of the real locus of 
the debate; second, with respect to the senses given to conscience in American 
constitutional dialogue. In a recent working paper, the author acknowledged that 
although the epistemology of conscience might be interesting, it is the metaethical 
presuppositions of conscience that cannot be ignored723, since it is at the root of 
one’s moral judgment. In fact, the metaethical approach requires that our moral 
judgments be justified; metaethics demand that we look at the broader picture 
without a vested opinion724. While the various metaethical reasonings shed some 
light on what arguments can further or hinder the cause of conscience, Smith’s paper 
regrettably lives up to its (tenuous) title. Instead of conclusions, we are informed by 
the author that conscience suffers from “partly parasitic […] older ways of thinking” 
on the one hand, and on the other, “uncertainty [and] degradation” in the modern 
invocations of conscience725. This unflattering portrait of conscience is perhaps the 
most realistic one: conscience has proven to be inseparable from its religious 
content and unable to form an utterly distinct (secular) identity. Perhaps a rejoinder 
to Smith’s conclusions on the tenuous case for conscience can be found in another 
of his texts, where he argued that conscience has migrated to textual locations such 
as the Establishment Clause and the Due Process Clause, where freedom of 
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 See Smith, “What Does Religion”, supra note 610; Steven Douglas Smith, “The Tenuous 
Case for Conscience”, (2004) U San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-02. 
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conscience can appear in peculiar and secularized forms726. As such, under the 
Establishment Clause, freedom of conscience has been invoked in school aid cases 
when attempting to balance the consciences of taxpayers with unintended 
consequences of public funding, namely indirectly supporting religious instruction. 
Although he acknowledges that this position has not been adhered to fully, “the 
Court has indicated that protecting the consciences of such taxpayers is at least a 
legitimate and important state interest – one that can serve to justify what might 
otherwise be anti-religious discrimination.”727 Conscience has also been afforded a 
role within ‘substantive due process’, though this offensive has been led almost 
exclusively by Justice J.P. Stevens728. Although these illustrations might be 
underwhelming in terms of effectiveness, I think that Smith has fingered the pulse of 
a deeper problem, that of “conscience” and “belief”, where “in reality, the two are 
neither identical nor coextensive.”729 The “personhood” rationale is developed by 
Smith, following unsatisfactory results with classic rationales730, as a plausible yet 
admittedly precarious alternative and is defined as follows: “[a]nd that [personhood] 
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rationale, grounded in a contestable but nonetheless intuitively attractive account of 
what it is to be a full person, is neither inherently religious nor limited in its 
application to religiously-formed conscience.”731. Smith has offered a somewhat 
frustrating, yet highly edifying, portrait of conscience in the American constitutional 
setting.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 When the black box is retrieved from a crash site, much hope is placed on 
the answers found in the device. However, when freedom of conscience is likened to 
a black box, it is not in the guise of providing answers, but rather to illustrate its 
‘mysterious or unknown internal functions or mechanisms’732. Freedom of 
conscience’s definition, role, objective, constitutional force, remains therefore, 
subject to debate and often times, discord. I suggest that conscience should be seen 
through the lens of a prism733 in American constitutional law. From one facet, 
freedom of religion is valued above all other rationales, effectively shutting down the 
debate over the place of freedom of conscience. From another facet, freedom of 
conscience is offered a supporting role, but that it cannot be the decisive factor. 
From yet another facet, it is argued that freedom of conscience should be afforded 
an equal place to religion, but it is recognised that its enforcement will remain 
problematic. In sum, there is a role for freedom of conscience in American 
constitutional law; its clout, given its undefined status, remains unquantifiable. 
Epistemological and metaethical concerns, as highlighted by Steven D. Smith, 
illustrate the complexity and dependent nature relationship of freedoms of religion 
and conscience. It becomes all the more difficult to define freedom conscience vis-à-
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vis freedom of religion, when the scope of freedom of religion is determined by what 
it is not. Perhaps, as he suggests, freedom of conscience will have to find a home 
outside of the realm of freedom of religion in order to validate its place in American 
constitutional law, and to a greater extent, society.  
 
2.2 Freedom of Conscience in European Legal Literature 
 
Freedom of conscience as a concept has generally been developed by 
authors rather than by the courts734 in the European context. This approach has led 
to a number of interesting uses and interpretations of freedom of conscience, while 
not necessarily following the jurisprudential developments. Nevertheless, it is quite 
clear that freedom of conscience suffers from a definitional deficit in the European 
context, much like the already studied contexts of Canada and the United States. 
The distinction that must be made with previous case studies, however, is the way in 
which the conceptualisation of freedom of conscience has evolved. On that note, 
according to Corneliu Birsan, current member of the ECtHR, « la conscience nous 
paraît comme un ‘produit’ plus élaboré et structuré que la pensée de la 
personne. »735 Touching upon this form of thought suggests the inevitable presence 
of a moral framework as a reference point in a person’s life. Nevertheless, 
interpreting freedom of conscience as an elaborated version of freedom of thought 
can permeate other domains of the ECHR, reflecting the ebb and flow of such a lithe 
– albeit laden – concept. Freedom of expression offers a much broader protection 
than that of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and therefore encompasses 
not only the content of the opinion but also every expression of an opinion736. As put 
by Jacques Robert, in his introductory report on freedom of conscience before the 
Council of Europe in 1992, freedom of conscience is midway between freedom of 
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 Jean-François Renucci, L’article 9 de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’Homme : 
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expression and freedom of religion or better yet, at the junction of what they both 
represent737. According to that author, freedom of conscience assumes freedom of 
expression and implies freedom of religion738. I will now examine how Article 9 ECHR 
has been interpreted by authors, as well as offer suggestions for a better 
understanding of the right to freedom of conscience.  
 
Freedom of conscience, has for the most part, occupied a minor role in 
greater European works on freedom of religion739. This diminutive address can be 
interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand, the lack of importance given to 
freedom of conscience in doctrine could demonstrate that freedom of conscience, as 
a deeply-seated conviction is capable of permeating other existing discourses. As 
noted by one author when defining freedom of conscience, “[l]a liberté de conscience 
semble pouvoir se définir comme la liberté d’avoir des opinions religieuses, 
philosophiques, sociales ou politiques.”740 Convictions of conscience therefore imply 
first and foremost the right of inner choice or forum internum. Flowing from this 
proposal, freedom of conscience is not, a priori, religious or secular but can become 
either. On the other hand, cases of particular interest to freedom of conscience have 
been afforded a modest space before the legal bodies of the ECHR, reducing the 
opportunities of examining and exacting the conditions and chances related to the 
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 Jacques Robert, “Liberté de conscience, pluralisme et tolérance” (Rapport introductif) in 
CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE, Liberté de conscience / actes, séminaire organisé par le Secrétariat 
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See Taylor, supra note 118, 119-202 
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acts of freedom of conscience741. Author Jean-Bernard Marie argues that cases 
involving freedom of conscience are more likely to be examined through the lens of 
freedom of religion, expression, privacy, association and anti-discrimination, 
therefore marginalising the content of conscience further742. Either way, freedom of 
conscience finds itself inserted in various rights and discourses, reaching beyond the 
simple protection afforded in the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
discussions of the 1992 Report on freedom of conscience are still applicable, since 
freedom of conscience can still be addressed through the lenses of pluralism and 
tolerance, conscientious objection743 and that of minority groups744. A collective right 
to freedom of conscience seems to evoke a greater sense of responsibility and 
engagement on the side of the State. This idea of a collective freedom of conscience 
has been used to further both religious745 and secular746 arguments. Although polar 
opposites, claims based on a collective freedom of conscience share an important 
element and thus draw from the same source: the need to be heard outside of 
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traditionally established rights. This recourse to freedom of conscience, albeit far 
from clear-cut as a judicial tool or concept, suggests that recalibration of 
relationships between the State and the group and between the individual and the 
collective747 is needed. 
 
  Alain Garay acknowledges the definitional deficit of freedom of conscience in 
international law748. He notes, however, that freedom of conscience is a principle of 
the contemporary legal order that has been formulated in international law as an 
individual civil right749. Notwithstanding its recognition as an individual right, freedom 
of conscience has an undeniable collective dimension, according to Garay, which 
has produced less interest than it should have750. He argues that there should be a 
collective right to religious freedom of conscience, since it is the necessary corollary 
of ‘spiritual freedom’ taken in its individual form751. From this perspective, if an 
individual right is exercised in a collective fashion by many individuals, a collective 
protection is fostered. Garay explains that a collective conscience is akin to a 
community chest (fonds commun), a communal project and ideal that embodies 
religious values that are expressed in communally, collectively or in public752. 
Moreover, this collective right is promoted in order to establish a basic moral order 
(“morale-plancher”753) from the religious collective unto the individual. An imbalance 
in the call to morality is uncovered when comparing the individual and collective’s 
right to freedom of conscience. While Garay admits that the collective right to 
freedom of religious conscience does not have a comfortable legal status754, he 
believes that it is the necessary corollary to individual spiritual freedom755. I consider 
that Garay’s claim to a collective right of freedom of (religious) conscience also lacks 
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 See Alain Garay, who states that « qu’il exprime par un principe moral, éthique ou 
religieux, le droit à la liberté de conscience conduit à s’interroger sur la relation entre 
l’individu et la collectivité (société civile), d’une part, et, d’autre part, sur la relation entre 
l’individu et l’État. » in Garay, « L’exercice collectif », supra note 745, 600. 
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 Ibid, 599. 
749
 Ibid, 600 [my translation]. 
750
 Ibid, 600. 
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 Ibid, 613 [my translation]. 
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 Ibid, 603. 
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 Dominique Laszlo-Fenouillet, La conscience (Paris, L.G.D.J., Bibliothèque de droit privé, 
tome 235, 1993), 70, as cited in Garay, « L’exercice collectif », supra note 745, 603. 
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 Garay, « L’exercice collectif », supra note 745, 604. 
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a secure intellectual status and would perform a redundant function given available 
protections of the ECHR. Approaching freedom of conscience in this manner, as a 
form of social or ethical curtailment, effectively eliminates the individual from the 
equation. While this might serve to strengthen a collective right, it is at the expense 
of an individual one. Lastly, Garay’s conception of a collective freedom of conscience 
obliterates the line between philosophical convictions and the convictions of the 
nonconformists and extremists756.  
 
Jean-Marie Bernard and Patrice Meyer-Bisch suggest that freedom of 
conscience, within the scope of religion, should be considered through the lens of 
cultural rights. Cultural rights, therefore, are identity rights (droits à l’identité)757, 
which foster a dialectic between the individual and the community and the space 
metered out to each758. In this way, freedom of conscience acts as a “red thread” (“fil 
rouge”), providing a continuum between the forum internum and the forum 
externum759. Seen in another light, freedom of conscience acts as the bond between 
the individual and the collectivity: it is the most intimate freedom that engages all the 
other freedoms and is continually questioned and daily jostled by all them760. Hence 
conscience serves as our gauge between individual conscience and collective 
action. Meyer-Bisch expanded on this argument in a recent interdisciplinary 
collection entitled Un noeud de libertés, where he suggests the intersection of seven 
(religious) freedoms: the three contemplative sisters (freedom of opinion, thought 
and conscience) and the four gate keeping sisters (freedom of expression, 
association, information and formation)761. The use of the familial imagery allows the 
author to reveal the uniqueness of each right, as well as the clashes between these 
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 I am, of course, alluding to A.H. Robertson’s quote at the beginning of the section on the 
ECHR perspective on freedom of conscience. By establishing (or effectively imposing by its 
collective exercise by individuals) a basic moral order, the middle is favored at the expense of 
more extreme positions or convictions.  
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 Patrice Meyer-Bisch, « Le droit à la liberté de conscience dans le champ religieux selon la 
logique des droits culturels » in Meyer-Bisch & Marie, supra note 713, 8 at 12. 
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d'espaces de libertés, les dimensions de son espace/écart culturel propre. » 
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 Ibid, 8 at 9. 
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rights762. In my opinion, it also demonstrates the inherent interdependency of such 
rights. Meyer-Bisch explains that freedom of conscience implies a permanent 
reflexive process, reinvigorating and reaffirming one’s faith each time763. While I think 
that Meyer-Bisch has correctly identified the flexibility allotted to freedom of 
conscience, I find it conceptually difficult to limit freedom of conscience to the scope 
of religion. This reflexive act can then be employed to demonstrate the (continued) 
existence of any deep seated conviction, not just religious ones.  
 
Finally, Leonard M. Hammer proposes to look at the right to freedom of 
conscience in order to distinguish between the more formalised and recognised 
notions of religious beliefs from conscientious beliefs. The author explains that the 
term ‘conscientious beliefs’ refer to a belief that is external to a religious context764. 
The group approach to the right of conscience is proposed by Hammer in order to 
give a voice to emergent minority communities and other groups within the state who 
assert the right to uphold their beliefs and their rights. This perspective lends itself to 
a secular rather than religious interpretation of conscientious beliefs. Nonetheless, 
by favouring the intersection of minority groups and individual beliefs, I consider that 
the author is left with a cultural interpretation of the right to freedom of conscience. In 
fact, conscience is used here to reduce the boundaries between internal beliefs 
(forum internum) and external actions (forum externum); this same tactic is 
employed to better define “minority”765 in “minority rights”. Hammer has understood 
conscience as an external, transgressive notion766. Conscience goes beyond the 
boundary of individual rights and becomes necessary in shaping the social 
community. In this perspective, freedom of conscience can thus be considered as a 
group right. It then becomes possible to use conscience as a medium to achieve a 
certain balance between individual and collective rights. On that subject, the author 
notes that one manner of dealing with group-individual rights conflicts is to consider 
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 Patrice Meyer-Bisch, « Comment les libertés culturelles se nouent : le défi d’une culture 
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763
 Ibid, 54. 
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how the group notion of conscientious belief conforms to the normative structure 
proposed by the rights of minorities and the right of freedom of religion and 
conscience767. Hammer relies heavily on social factors, such as the impact of 
common beliefs to put forward his proposal of a group-oriented approach to freedom 
of conscience768. Conscience takes on a ‘common identity’ and promptly enhances 
the minority group’s eligibility for legal safeguards. He cites the “vexing” problem of 
proselytism in international law as a candidate for a group understanding of freedom 
of conscience. By considering the missionary activity from the standpoint of a group, 
one necessarily includes social elements, thus implicating the community (the 
group), the individual but also the community at large. This approach, which can be 
qualified as contextual, presents a supple frame which permits for the evolution of 
minority groups. By addressing conscience as constituting a cultural right, Hammer 
is encouraging the reader to move beyond the ‘sober normative framework’ and 
examine other social factors that shape and are shaped by individuals and 
societies769. While I agree that it is necessary for conscience to develop outside of 
the shadow cast by religion, some of the same pitfalls are unavoidable770. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of “New Social Movements” (NSM)771 – who are to be 
considered analogous to group conscientious beliefs according to Leonard Hammer 
– illustrate at once the need for recognition as well as reassessment of what 
constitutes the forum internum as well as who may benefit from its protection.  
 
Conclusion 
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 Hammer, supra note 85, 246. 
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 The author defines “group beliefs” as follows: “[a] spontaneous, yet permanent, joining of 
individuals for a specific purpose or due to particular qualities, depending on the individuals 
within the group and the greater community’s view of the group as such.” Hammer, supra 
note 85, 253. 
769
 Ibid, 271. 
770
 Ibid, 266. By ‘unavoidable pitfalls’ the author is referring to the descriptive interpretations 
of conscientious belief, one such example being the analysis of the phenomenon of 
conscience and its necessary implications. 
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 Leonard Hammer gives early examples Protestantism during the Reformation and the 
Salvation Army; contemporary examples of NSM would include Scientologists, Falun Gong 
and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Nevertheless, it is the desire to change the forum internum of the 
individual which draws the line between what is ‘acceptable’ and ‘coercive’: see Hammer, 
supra note 85, 260. I can only surmise that time will tell if these minority groups will be 
recognised within the scope of conscientious beliefs to the same extent as other groups.   
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 In conclusion, freedom of conscience has found a collective voice, as well as 
religious and secular vocations within the European context. The enduring 
characteristic of conscience is its legal malleability. Understanding conscience as a 
collective right demands that the boundaries of both individual and collective rights 
be reassessed. Interpreting conscience as a cultural right infers that conscience also 
constitute a cultural identity as well as the gateway to group membership772. Finally, 
by demonstrating the interdependence of rights as well as actors, conscience 
remains a flexible discourse in European legal literature.    
 
Nevertheless and despite the claims of common beliefs, it seems impossible 
to thoroughly develop an independent claim to freedom of conscience and as such, 
remains inevitably associated to religion in some degree. In spite of author Leonard 
Hammer’s valiant attempt at examining freedom of conscience through the lens of 
minority rights and common beliefs, the groups most likely to use the interpretation of 
this right are considered “religious”. Perhaps most salient in the study of freedom of 
conscience in the European context, is the re-evaluation of the relationship between 
the individual and the community.  
 
3. The Future of Freedom of Conscience in American and European 
Constitutional Settings 
 
 Despite it being a much layered concept, freedom of conscience has 
emerged with a voice in the American and European constitutional settings. While 
the definition and justification of freedom of conscience remains a work in progress, 
the right to freedom of conscience warrants, and calls for, deeper examination.  
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 While beyond the objectives of my chapter to examine ‘identity politics’ and legal-political 
ramifications as well as multiple criticisms, I recognise the important discussion on the 
existence of a people’s culture and how it remains essential to the survival of the group: see 
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton 
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Just as a general change in religious geography has been observed in 
Canada773 in recent years, a similar change has also been ascertained in the United 
States and especially in the European Union. Juxtaposed with this change in the 
religious landscape is an increase in the share of the population with “no religion”, 
also known as the “Nones”774 in the United States. The American Religious 
Identification Survey (ARIS) of 2008 observed that the ““Nones” (no stated religious 
preference, atheist, or agnostic) continue to grow, though at a much slower pace 
than in the 1990s, from 8.2% in 1990, to 14.1% in 2001, to 15.0% in 2008.”775 The 
group that grew most rapidly between 1990 and 2008 was the population who didn’t 
know or refused to answer the key question about religious self-identification in the 
ARIS survey, which “reflects social changes in attitudes and in American society 
over the past two years.”776 Given that the U.S. Census Bureau is constitutionally 
precluded from such inquiries into the religious lives of individuals, the ARIS has 
become the statistical source for religious identification777. Within the European 
context, according to the Special Eurobarometer778 on Social Values, Science and 
Technology779, “18% [of all EU citizens] declares that they don’t believe that there is 
any sort of spirit, God or life force.”780 The effect of this change in religious 
geography remains imprecise at this point; however, it is clear that the traditional 
categories of beliefs are in need of re-evaluation, given the individual’s changing 
relationship with society, and by extension, the State. 
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 See supra. 
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 The “Nones” are identified, in the ARIS taxonomy of religious traditions, as: “None, No 
religion, Humanistic, Ethical Culture, Agnostic, Atheist, Secular”. See Barry A. Kosmin and 
Ariela Keysar, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY (ARIS), Summary Report (March 
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AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY (ARIS)]. 
775
 Ibid, 3. 
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 Freedom of conscience, in the American and European case law contexts, 
serves as a new point of reference for understanding the relationship between the 
individual and the State. The European perspective on freedom of conscience relies 
on both religious and secular conceptions of conscience. Secular convictions were 
recognised by the ECtHR in Kokkinakis; furthermore, freedom of conscience was 
recognised as a deeply subjective and individual consideration. As stated previously, 
freedom of conscience is not recognised under the American Constitution or its 
Amendments; it has served instead to demonstrate what should be included in a 
claim of religion rather than a claim of conscience. It is eminently evident that religion 
as a right retains a privileged position, within both the eyes of the law and of society 
and exposes its intrinsic connection when freedom of conscience is invoked. 
 
 The study of comparative legal literature has revealed itself to be more 
fruitful. By imagining conscience through the lens of a prism in the setting American 
legal literature, it is possible to retain different understandings of the role of 
conscience in society and law but it is clear that protection of freedom of religion is 
second to none. However, the overarching and ever-present right of free exercise of 
religion overshadows any true developments of the concept of conscience. Given 
this unwavering diktat, the best manner for freedom of conscience to grow is outside 
of the shadow of religion. Author Steven D. Smith’s pragmatic approach to the 
problem of conscience, namely that it must migrate to other textual locations in the 
Constitution, would be most apt to garner normative content as well as respect for 
the concept. Finally, freedom of conscience has found meaning in various 
discourses of the ECHR, thus reinforcing its legal malleability. Understanding 
freedom of conscience as encompassing pluralism and tolerance, conscientious 
objection as well as minority groups781 demonstrates the plausible breadth afforded 
to this fundamental freedom under the ECHR and by authors alike. This European 
approach to conscience also calls for a re-evaluation of the relationship between the 
individual and the community, which leaves the door open to non-traditional ‘groups’ 
to find a place in the general discourse on conscientious rights. Nevertheless, 
envisioning conscience as something other than religion – such as expression or 
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non-religious beliefs – demonstrates the flexibility of the concept and a possibility to 
continually reinvent the relationship between the individual and the State.    
 
 What can be retained from this comparative study of freedom of conscience? 
Freedom of conscience has an undeniable interdependence with freedom of religion, 
but at the same time, demonstrates a certain level of independent interpretation. 
Either way, convictions of conscience, whether religious or non-religious in nature, 
need to be better defined within the discourse of freedom of conscience and religion 
and better contextualised within the greater discourse of rights.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
I chose to examine the freedoms of conscience and religion in comparative 
constitutional law settings of Canada, the United States and through the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights under Article 9 ECHR in my master’s thesis. In 
light of this discussion, I explored more closely the tensions that exist between 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. 
 
I investigated, in a first chapter, how a better understanding of religion in law 
can be achieved by examining religion out of law. Drawing on different definitional 
philosophies of religion from the areas of sociology and anthropology, various 
approaches to religion were suggested, thereby challenging what could be 
considered part of the context and the subtext of religion. In studying religion out of 
law, the role of the community was greatly emphasised and valued, constituting the 
foremost difference with the evaluation of religion in law782. In studying religion in 
law, three approaches to defining religion in law were proposed, setting the stage for 
our comparative constitutional analysis of Canada, the United States and the 
decisions under article 9 of the ECHR. I argued that the Supreme Court of Canada 
had espoused a definition of freedom of religion that ultimately straddles the 
subjective-functional and substantive-content approaches since Amselem783, 
demonstrating the inherent difficulty of defining religion in law, and its impact on its 
sister provision of freedom of conscience. 
 
In a second chapter, I examined freedom of religion in Canada, also known 
as its ‘first freedom’, in order to later suggest that the relationship between freedom 
of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada should be examined in order to 
present a better understanding of these two fundamentally interrelated freedoms. By 
examining freedom of religion in successive waves, one is reminded that freedom of 
religion should not be considered an absolute right, but rather one that must be 
                                               
782
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calibrated with other rights. By proceeding to an assessment of rights and thus a 
balancing of interests, I suggested that the locus for assessing violations of freedom 
of religion has migrated from that of reasonable accommodation to the 
proportionality of the Oakes test under section 1 of the Charter. While this 
resettlement can be understood as a further indication of where resolution should 
occur when a violation of freedom of religion has been admitted, this only represents 
a part of its implications, in my view. It should also be interpreted as a statement as 
to how rights should be managed vis-à-vis the greater community. In this way, while 
still bound by the test based on the sincerity of beliefs, the Supreme Court can move 
forward by addressing the infringed right in terms of context, and therefore minimal 
impairment. Lastly, I addressed certain unresolved issues pertaining to freedom of 
religion, thereby indicating the ongoing discourse on this fundamental freedom. 
 
In a third chapter, I explored how freedom of conscience has been interpreted 
in Canadian case law and legal literature. In the case law, I suggested that freedom 
of conscience could either be interpreted as related to free choice and personal 
autonomy or as the absence of autonomy of freedom of conscience in the 
interpretation of this right. In practice, this means that freedom of conscience can be 
regarded as a philosophical choice but also as a concrete right than can be called 
upon on its own. In the legal literature, I proposed that all authors seem to create 
space for this freedom, through with varying intensity. It is on this basis that I 
presented an interpretative a scale with freedom of religion: in this way, freedom of 
conscience could be understood as lesser than, equivalent to and broader than 
freedom of religion. Within this framework, I argued that recognising freedom of 
conscience as equivalent to freedom of religion would constitute its optimal 
recognition in the Canadian constitutional context. While the case law and legal 
literature on freedom of conscience remains scant, I consider that claims based on 
this fundamental right will increase in the years to come; it is therefore essential to 
think more about what we mean by and what we want from freedom of conscience, 
rather than a formulaic reaction. Pivotal in its constitutional recognition yet intensely 
private in nature, freedom of conscience invites further discussion and consideration 
on the interconnectedness of these freedoms of conscience and religion.  
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In a last chapter, I sought to ascertain whether freedom of conscience was 
present or absent from the American and European constitutional law discourses, in 
an effort to provide a point of comparison to my Canadian case study. As noted 
earlier, freedom of conscience was purposively excluded from the American 
Constitution or its Amendments. This choice inherently colours the place and the 
positioning that freedom of conscience can occupy in case law and legal literature. 
Developed mainly in through conscientious objector cases in the United States, 
freedom of conscience was circumscribed to and by religious standards. In this way, 
synonymy with religious beliefs was the only option. Within the legal literature, 
freedom of conscience was discussed in further detail, but the omnipresence of 
religion lingered. Unlike the American portrait, freedom of conscience figures 
prominently and constitutionally in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
However, as noted previously, freedom of conscience has developed more in the 
literature than in the case law. Within the legal literature, freedom of conscience was 
interpreted as a vehicle for groups as a supplementary protection to a more stringent 
freedom of religion. In the case law under the ECHR, pacifists, atheists, vegans, 
conscientious objectors and the environmentally-conscious have all had their beliefs 
upheld under freedom of conscience. In this manner, freedom of conscience is 
afforded a breadth unparalleled by its American or even Canadian counterparts. 
While convictions of conscience exist, whether religious or a-religious in nature, they 
would benefit greatly from a better understanding within the discourse of freedom of 
conscience and religion and better contextualised within the greater discourse of 
rights.  
 
Freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, as seen through the 
comparative legal lenses of Canada, the United States and through the decisions on 
Article 9 of the ECHR, can enhance one’s own comprehension of the belief. As 
noted by Robert Leckey, “[a] transnational discourse of comparative 
constitutionalism is thriving in the law reviews […] [o]n its terms, constitutional 
quandaries are ones of political morality or policy, not hermeneutics. It is from that 
vantage that the ‘imperative’ for consultation of foreign and international sources is 
plainest.”784 This statement should not denote a state of certainty, but rather an 
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opportunity of understanding, in my opinion. Although a comparative lens can be of 
use, it should not supplant, or come at the expense of, a detailed local analysis. 
Whereas the European and American perspectives can be seen as the two extremes 
of constitutional comparative discourse, the Canadian approach has been an 
intermediary pole in this exchange. Recent comparative legal literature on freedom 
of religion seems to focus on the presence or absence of the Establishment 
Clause785, when putting Canada and the United States side by side. This does not, 
for all intents and purposes, serve to further the debate, but rather exacerbate the 
differences that exist between these countries. As a point of contrast, when 
examining freedom of religion in American and European perspectives, certain 
authors have suggested that a reorientation toward a less individualistic approach786. 
While these are only a few examples of how freedom of religion is discussed in a 
comparative lens, it should not be taken as conclusive evidence, but rather as an 
invitation for further transnational investigation.  
 
Returning to the title of my master’s thesis, where does the triangulation of 
rights fit into the balancing of interests? Triangulation, as a concept, implies “1 (in 
surveying) the tracing and measurement of a series or network of triangles in order 
to determine the distances and relative positions of points spread over a territory or 
region. 2 formation of or division into triangles.”787 Applied to freedom of conscience 
and religion, I traced the network between this overarching right and those of 
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. In this manner, a triangulation 
enables an independent content to each right, though requiring an overarching 
structure for the greater fundamental freedom. That “single integrated concept” of 
freedom of conscience and religion, advocated by Justice Dickson (as he was 
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then)788, has elicited certain questions in recent years, as discussed earlier on in my 
study.  While freedom of conscience does not constitute an independent right at 
present in the Canadian constitutional context, there is a certain openness of 
interpretation. I take this overture as an invitation for further academic consideration. 
Completing the final point of the triangle, the fundamental freedom of religion has 
developed greatly, envisioning outer definitions and inner protections. In my opinion, 
freedom of religion also serves as the juncture point between triangulation of rights 
and the balancing of interests. This can be observed in the shift toward 
‘communitarian interests’ and ‘Charter values’ in the recent case law on freedom of 
religion. While this can be interpreted as a more effective manner in which to 
manage religious claims, by playing devil’s advocate, I suggest that it could be seen 
as a more efficient fashion by which religious minority claims can be deflected under 
the guise of ‘collective interests’789. Either way, however, the language employed 
toward justificatory measures and ‘Charter values’ needs to clarified, in my view. 
Lastly, I would like to underline to two overlapping points: first, the use of speculative 
risk in freedom of religion cases and second, the employment of magical language to 
demonstrate the difficulty of using legal tools to explain religious concepts. Whereas 
the former was used in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony by the majority to 
demonstrate the factual risk of identity fraud and the ‘speculative’ risk of exercising 
one’s right to religion, the latter was employed to demonstrate that no magic formula 
(or barometer, as in the case of Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony) or ‘eureka’ 
moment (as was the case in A.C.) exists to quantify that risk, or the breach to one’s 
fundamental rights. By relying on magic – which implies retaining an element of 
disbelief – and eureka moments – which require a definitive moment – there is an 
admission of the uncertainty of content in freedom of religion. While recourse to 
magical language does not claim to decipher the language of rights, it declares its 
vulnerability to the multiplicity of voices and influences in this discourse. This point is 
buttressed, I think, by McLachlin C.J.’s explanation of freedom of religion as being “a 
matter of faith, intermingled with culture”790, which admits and invites a more 
contextual exploration of freedom of religion. At the same time, it is also 
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acknowledged that the locus of the equation between rights and interests will 
migrate, inviting us to decipher the language of communal interests and the 
justification of the ‘common good’. Composing with the communities of faith and the 
good faith of communities using this new equation hails, in my view, an innovative 
era in the constitutional discourse on fundamental freedoms in Canada.   
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